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ftOPl^TY Of

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ARTES SC^ENTIA VERITAS

THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH

1897-1898

t W1M.1AH LucKHART, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
« of ihe Tirah ExiJcdilkmary Force.

THE

CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH

1897-1898

AN ACCOUNT OF

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE
ORAKZAIS AND AFRIDIS

UNDER

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.

BASED (BY PERMISSION) ON LETTERS CONTRIBUTED TO

'THE TIMES'

COLONEL Hl^'by HUTCHINSON

OIRECTOK OP MILITARY BDUCATION IN INDIA

AUTMOK OF 'TKB STOKV OF WATSSLOO,' 'THE STORY OP l8xa,' 'THB STORY OP

CORUNNA,' 'MILITARY SKETCHING MADE EASY,' ETC., ETC.

WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited

NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1898

A/i right t rturvtd

3)
H51

/i^/6S^(>f

DEDICATED BY PERMISSION

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM S. A. LOCKHART,

Q.C.B.y iC.C.S.I.

COMMANDER OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

PREFACE

I BELIEVE this narrative of the Tirah Expedition
gives an accurate account of the operations, and I
hope it will also be found a readable account. Its
interest will certainly be enhanced by the reliable
maps and plans which accompany it, and by the
excellent illustrations, for which I am indebted to
my friends Colonel More - Molyneux, Assistant
Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, Lieutenant-
Colonel C. Pulley, commanding the 3rd Gurkha
Rifles, and others. These officers served with
distinction in the expedition, and their pictures
portray scenes in which they were themselves
actors.

It has not been part of my plan to make any
reference to the frontier policy of the Government
of India. It is a policy of which it may be said,
** Quot homines^ tot sententue'' Nothing, indeed,
could be more striking than the fact that on this

viii THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

great Imperial question, men whose knowledge of

the subject, and experience, are equal, hold opinions

absolutely opposed. It is, however, outside my

province, or my purpose, even to approach the

discussion which has recently attracted so much

public attention. I have only, in my introductory

chapters, following my usual practice when I write

the story of a campaign, endeavoured to state so

much of facts which are notorious as may enable

the general reader to form his own conclusions as

to the cause of the war, and '* what they killed each

other for."

H. D. HUTCHINSON, Colonel.

London, \st September 1898.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

Introductory ...... i

CHAPTER II
The Afridis and their Grievances .16

CHAPTER III

Preparations, and the Plan of Campaign .22

CHAPTER IV

Waiting to Begin . -43

CHAPTER V

The Actions at Dargai .57

CHAPTER VI

In the KhAnki Valley .76

X THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

CHAPTER VII

PAGE

The Capture of the Sampagha Pass . 85

CHAPTER VIII

The Capture of the Arhanga Pass, and the

Occupation of Tirah -95

CHAPTER IX

Life in Tirah — The Affair of the qth November . 112

CHAPTER X

Still in Tirah — The Terms to the Orakzais — The

Affair of the i6th November . .128

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X

The Correspondence of the Mullahs. 151

CHAPTER XI

The Move to Bagh — Terms to the Afridis — The

Reconnaissance to Dwatoi . .158

CHAPTER XII
The 1ST Brigade in Mastura — The Punishment

OF THE CHAMKANIS — PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE

Tirah 173

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER XIII

PAGE

Through the Dwatoi Defile again, and down

THE Bara Valley . .186

CHAPTER XIV

The Bazar Valley Expedition and Reoccupation
OF the Khyber — The Affair at Shin Kamar —
The End of the Campaign 207

CHAPTER XV

Tactical Lessons and Concluding Notes .224

APPENDIX
Officers Killed and Wounded 247

MAPS AND PLANS

General Map to Illustrate the Operations At end of book

Plan of the Actions at Dargai, i8th and 2oth

October 1897 ... To face page 62

OuTUNE Sketch of the Dargai Heights
Plan of the Action at the Sampagha Pass
Plan of the Action at the Arhanga Pass
Plan of the Picquets on the Arhanga Pass
Plan of the Action at Shin Kamar

100

114

217

ILLUSTRATIONS

General Sir William Lockhart, G.C.B., K.C.S. I. Frontispiece
Brig.-Gen. Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B. . To face page 28
The Camp at Shinauri • • • ,» 49

*'The brave little Gurkhas streamed across the
deadly space. . . . The Scottish Borderers
followed close." — Dargai^ \2>th October 1897 „ 61

**A wretched mule falls down, and the road is

blocked at once " >, 78

" On this particular evening the casualties were

numerous" . . . „ 82

''Sir William Lockhart . . . examined the ap-
proaches to the pass " . „ 88

The Mastura Valley. • • « 93

The Mastura Valley — looking North „ 98

" Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient
escorts, and return in the evening laden up
with forage" ,,109

Saran Sar — ^th November \Z<^l „ 119

"The men, however, rallied bravely round their

officers" „ 121

xvi THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

" A search party found the bodies the next day" . To face p. 123

** Sir William Lockhart received them in camp to-
day " ,,129

" Every house in this valley ... is a little fortress" „ 161

The Dwatoi Defile ,,167

" A company of the Queen's, led by Lieut. Engledue,

went for them in dashing style'' . ,,178

**The mountain guns again . . . were of the

greatest service" ,,192

** On the 1 3th the march was resumed " . » I99

Gurkhas — the Raw Material

Between pages 238, 239
Gurkhas — the Finished Article

}

CHAPTER I

^ INTRODUCTORY

" Now tell us all about ths war^
And what they killed each other for f "

" Why, that I cannot tell,'' said he,
" But 'twas a famous victory I "

I HAVE been through this campaign in Tirah
myself; I have talked about it a great deal with
friends; and I have read much that has been
written about it in newspapers, books, and des-
patches. But I am quite sure that, even now that
it is all over, if you button-hole ten intelligent men,
and ask them ''all about the war, and what they
killed each other for?" you will get a different
answer from each, and no two will agree in essential
particulars !

This may seem an amazing assertion to make,
but I am convinced it is not far outside the truth.
We all know that the general object of the expedi-
tion launched by us against the Afridis and Orakzais

was to exact reparation for their unprovoked aggres-
7/ B

2 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

sion on the Peshawar - Kohat border, for their
attacks on our frontier posts, and for the damage to
life and property inflicted by these raids on British
territory and British subjects. But that is only our
view of the matter. We want to get behind this,
and ascertain the Afridi view. Why did they^ who
had faithfully kept their agreements with us for
sixteen long years, why did they rise against us,
and commit these outrages } Were they altogether
** unprovoked," as we so confidently assert ? Besides,
the Afridis and Orakzais were not the only tribes in
arms against us in this momentous year. The
Waziris, the Swatis, the Boners, the Mohmands, the
Bajauris, and others, have all been on the war-path
in 1897-98, in deadly earnest; and undoubtedly
something more than a fanaticism fanned by frenzied
Mullahs has been the cause of a conflagration so
widely spread, so fierce, and so dangerous.

Before, then, I plunge in ntedias res, and recount
the incidents of a campaign which took us into a
wild and difficult and unknown country, and intro-
duced our troops to a warfare more serious than
anything they have been engaged in since the
Mutiny, it will be interesting to discuss the events
which preceded the expedition, and rendered it
necessary, and to arrive, if we can, at some definite
conclusion as to the " why " and the " wherefore" of
it all

It will be understood, of course, that any opinions
which I may express in the course of this narrative

I INTRODUCTORY 3

are my own, that I profess to possess no special
acquaintance with facts, and that I merely endeavour
to place them before the reader in the light in which
they have appeared to one on the spot, who has had
ordinary opportunities to read, mark, learn, and
inwardly digest them.

To go, then, at once to the root of the matter,
I venture to submit that for xhe,fons et origo malt,
we must hark back to the year 1893, when Sir
Mortimer Durand returned from Cabul with the
Boundary Agreement signed by the Amir of
Afghanistan in his hand, and that that document
was the outward and visible sign of all our sub-
sequent troubles on the North-West Frontier. Our
idea in proposing that a definite boundary should
be demarcated between Afghanistan and India was
a most just and reasonable one. We wished that
it should be made clear, once for all, under whose
influence and control the tribes on the border
should remain. Wild, turbulent freebooters, loving
frays and forays, fiercely jealous of their inde-
pendence, acknowledging the authority of no one
but their own immediate Maliks and Mullahs, they
had for years past been a veritable thorn in the
flesh of successive Governments ; and the difficulty
of restraining them within limits, and of dealing
out punishment to them when patience and
the expedients of diplomacy were exhausted by
some more - than - usually - lawless outrage, was
accentuated by the fact that it was in many in-

4 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, x897-98 chap.

Stances impossible to say, or at least a delicate
matter to decide, whether the offenders were
subjects of the Amir or fairly inside the pale of
our own influence.

For this principal reason, it was deemed necessary
to come to a definite 'agreement with the Amir
regarding a boundary. Once a line was agreed to,
and demarcated, between Afghanistan and India,
there could be no question when raids and outrages
were committed as to the responsibility of the
Power concerned, or as to the right of that Power
to intervene, restrain, and punish.

But it is an open secret that the idea of a
boundary was distasteful to the Amir. The
negotiations for a friendly commission to visit
Cabul to arrange the details of it, more than once
very nearly fell through, and there can be no doubt
that it required all the patience, and tact, and
diplomatic skill that Sir Mortimer Durand could
command, to get the Agreement signed by His
Highness, and to carry the affair to a successful
conclusion.

For the Amir and his people were quite satisfied
with the existing regime. What useful purpose
could a boundary serve for them } The tribes
seldom troubled them, and the English, on the
other hand, had always been well able to take care
of themselves when their borders were harried.
What was the need then of a boundary ? One
certain effect of it would be to lop off", and place

I INTRODUCTORY 5

definitely under the influence of the British Govern-
ment, certain tribes and sections, which hitherto
had, at least nominally and outwardly, acknowledged
the Amir as their Suzerain. By so much at all
events he would be disadvantaged. North of the
Khyber, particularly, the new boundary would run
through districts — the Mohmand country, Bajaur,
and Asmar — in which he was extremely sensitive
of interference, and though he was persuaded
at last into a reluctant acquiescence, we may
be sure it was with many an arriire pens^e, and
much mental reserve, that he appended his
signature to the fateful document ; and that, astute
and shrewd as he is, he foresaw then the storm that
would blow when actual demarcation should be
attempted.

But the irritation caused by the actual boundary
question, with the interference and misappropriation
(from his point of view) which it threatened, was
comparatively insignificant. It was a deeper anxiety
which troubled the Amir, and made the whole
arrangement repugnant to him. He was not a
student of European history, and knew nothing of
Napoleon, and his wars of aggression and conquest ;
and yet, even as the Czar Alexander, after the
overthrow of Frederick William at Jena and Auer-
stadt in 1806, protested against the total dismember-
ment of Prussia,^ not from friendship to Prussia,

^ After Jena, '*the Czar objected to Napoleon absorbing Silesia, not
because it would be unjust to Prussia, but because he feared Napoleon as a

6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

but because he deemed it wise to keep such a
powerful neighbour as the French Emperor at arm's
length ; so did the Amir instinctively feel that the
longer the tribes could be maintained in their
original independence as a buffer between India and
Afghanistan, the longer would his own country be
secluded and safe. Of any injustice or hardship to
the tribes, or of what fate might befall them through
coming under British influence and control, or even
of their own wishes and feelings in the matter, he
was supremely careless. Such considerations would
not affect him, any more than similar sentiments in
similar circumstances swayed Alexander when the
fate of Prussia was discussed with Napoleon at
Tilsit. But the Amir well understood what a
wonderful power of absorption the British possess.
Where they go they stay, fy suis, fy reste, appears
to be their motto ; and being convinced that once a
boundary was fixed tkey would live up to it, he was
filled with alarm for what might happen next.

We, of course, on our side, have always re-
pudiated any idea of advance or annexation, or of
interference with tribal customs and independence ;
but circumstances have often been in the past, and
will be no doubt in the future, too strong for us.
We find it necessary to push forward military posts,

neighbour." . . . *< Napoleon certainly would have made an end of Prussia
at once, had he not feared thereby to lose the friendship of the Russian Czar.
That Czar cared little for Frederick William, but he had a keen distrust of
Napoleon, and insisted that Prussia should remain between them as a buffer."
— Poulteny Bigelow, History of the German Struggle for Liberty,

I INTRODUCTORY 7

to make roads to them, to raise tribal levies, to
establish police arrangements, to interfere in tribal
quarrels, and so forth ; and however judiciously
these steps are taken, however they may be forced
upon us, by whatever name we may describe them,
the result is the same : we advance, we absorb,
we dominate, we destroy independence, and we
practically assume the administrative control of the
country occupied.

Such would, at all events, rightly or wrongly, be
the Amir s line of thought and argument, and with
such convictions in his mind it is easy to understand
why he should intensely dislike the boundary
proposals ; for when agreed to, and carried out, they
would mean that in the course of years the wild
mountain barrier at present shutting off India from
Afghanistan would disappear, because it would be
penetrated at so many points by our military roads ;
the fierce and warlike tribes who hitherto had inter-
posed their strength between the Afghans and the
English would be tamed, and disarmed, and domi-
nated ; and in their place he would have his
powerful neighbour living right up against his own
ring-fence, overlooking him, and possibly threaten-
ing next his own independence.

However, he signed the Agreement. Sir Morti-
mer Durand returned to India with honour, his
mission accomplished, in November 1893, ^^^ ^^e
next step in the proceedings, the actual demarcation
of the boundary agreed to, was forthwith under-

8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

taken by the Indian Government, to whom, how-
ever, it was patent, from many indications, that the
work would not be carried out unmolested. A
strong escort, some 3000 men and 6 guns, was
accordingly sent with the Delimitation Commission,
vid the Gomal Valley, into Southern Waziristan,
where it was intended to commence the task, and
the immediate consequence was — Wana. In the
early morning of the 3rd November 1894, ^^^ camp
at that place was fiercely attacked by the tribesmen,
who thus rudely and emphatically made their pro-
test against our presence, and against our work.
They were, of course, beaten off (after a severe and
costly engagement), and a regular expedition sent
against them after this, under Sir William Lockhart,
traversed their country from end to end, inflicted
severe loss upon them, drove off their flocks and
herds, and destroyed their village defences and
towers. In the end they sued for peace, accepted
our terms, paid up the fines demanded, and allowed
the boundary from the Gomal in the south to the
Tochi and the Kurram in the north to be demar-
cated without further interruption.

I have only referred to this Wana affair to
illustrate the spirit in which the tribes regard our
arrangements about a boundary, and to show the
Amirs acumen and judgment were correct when
he foresaw the storm that would burst whenever we
might attempt to demarcate the line agreed to.
And how can one blame these people, simple.

I INTRODUCTORY 9

savage, and unsophisticated as they are ? We may
explain to them as much as we like, and protest as
loudly as we can, but when they see the long line of
boundary pillars going up ; when they are told that
henceforth all inside that line practically belongs to
the British Raj, and that from this time their allegi-
ance must be to us ; and when, finally, they note
our surveyors at work, mapping their country and
measuring their fields, their reflection is, " Methinks
you do protest too much ! " And they are irresist-
ibly driven to the conclusion that their country is
annexed, and their independence gone ; a conclusion
which it is not easy to dispel when we follow on
with military posts on their borders, or in their
midst, as, for instance, those now established at
Wana, and at points in the Gomal, Tochi, and
Kurram valleys, and more especially on the Samana
range.

The next section of the boundary which we pro-
posed to demarcate was that north of the Khyber,
where the line would run through Mohmand, Bajaur,
and Asmar. Here, as I have previously indicated,
we were, literally, on very delicate ground indeed,
and although the Mission worked with the full con-
currence of the Amir, and travelled indeed as his
guests, and under the escort of his troops, yet
hitches and difficulties constantly arose, and such
frequent references to their respective Governments
by Afghan and English officials were necessary, that
little or no progress had been made with the work

lo THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

when, in the spring of 1895, the Chitral affair oc-
curred, and a military expedition to that country
diverted attention for a while to matters more grave
than boundary commissions. In the autumn of
1895 Sir Robert Low and his troops returned to
India, their task brilliantly completed. But we
stayed in Chitral ; we built a fort there ; we made a
good road to it from India, and placed it in the
keeping of tribal levies in our pay ; and we estab-
lished strong posts on the Malakhand and Chakdara.

In the meantime, matters had come to an
absolute dead-lock on the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar
border, and our Commission was withdrawn, the
boundary unmarked.

This brings us to a point where we may pause
for a moment, not to consider the wisdom or
expediency of our policy on the Frontier (which
it is no part either of my plan or my business to
discuss) but to consider its effects. In view of the
facts which I have stated it will probably be con-
ceded as reasonable inferences —

(a) That the boundary agreement was most

distasteful to the Amir ; and a fortiori to
his subjects.

[b) That the tribes on the border were

thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of
the boundary, that their fears were accentu-
ated by our establishment of military posts
in Wana, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys,
in Chitral, on the Malakhand, and on the

I INTRODUCTORY il

Samana range, and that in spite of our
assurances they trembled for their in-
dependence.
(c) That the Amir's subjects and officials all
along the border, particularly Gholam
Hyder Khan, the Sipah Salar, or Com-
mander-in-Chief, would be, and were,
thoroughly imbued with the Amir's own
views and spirit in the matter of the
boundary agreement.

I would lay particular stress upon this last point,
because while the Sipah Salar has been universally
charged with hostility to the Indian Government ;
and while it has been laid at his door that he has
corresponded (to our hurt) with the leading Mullahs
on the border, e.g. Sayid Akbar of the Aka Khels,
the " Mad Fakir " in Swat, and the Hadda Mulla
at Jarobi in the Mohmand country ; that he has
instigated risings against us, and helped the tribes-
men with arms, ammunition, and even men ;
strenuous efforts have been made to prove that he
has acted throughout on his own initiative and
responsibility, and in direct opposition to the wishes
of the Amir, whom, it is asserted, having the Afghan
troops and tribesmen of the Jellalabad district at
his back, he was strong enough to defy.

Well, perhaps he was not in touch or corre-
spondence with his master, but there are certainly
some who think otherwise, and when, on the loth
June 1897, ^^^ Maizar outrage (in the Tochi

12 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap.

valley) occurred, — a regular bolt from the blue, for
it was a time of profound peace and quiet on the
border : and when this ominous occurrence was
followed by the attacks on the Malakhand in the
end of July, by the rising of the Mohmands and
Bajauris in early August, and finally by the revolt
of the Afridis and Orakzais in the latter part of the
same month, then undoubtedly the universal senti-
ment was that the Amir himself was at least in
sympathy with an outbreak which had set the
whole border in a blaze from the Malakhand to the
Kurram.

And most certainly there were substantial reasons
for connecting the Amir with these risings. It was
notorious that for some years past "he had been
devoting himself with much persistency to the
religious nature of the sovereignty which he wields
over the followers of the prophet in north-west
I ndia, and beyond ; and the means employed to
solidify his supreme headship as the light of religion
were such as to be considered antagonistic to the
preservation of harmonious relations between the
tribesmen and the Indian Government. There was
the book Takwim-ud-din, inspired by the Amir
himself, and written to his command, which im-
pressed upon true Muhammadans the essential and
all-important character of the jehad — that war of
religious fanaticism laid down by the Koran as the
duty of every follower of Islam to wage against the
infidel. The book was certainly a remarkable

INTRODUCTORY 13

production, and even assuming that the greater
part of it was merely a rehearsal and exposition
of doctrines laid down in the Muhammadan gospels,
it was none the less singular that Abdur Rahman
should feel the necessity to propagate afresh its
doctrines, and give them his own imperial impress
at such a time. Fanatical Mussulmans realise only
too completely at present that the jehad is, under
given circumstances, a part of their creed, and it
was with reason argued that to have its meaning
newly interpreted in times of peace by a Muhammadan
ruler was in itself more or less of an incitement to
spread out the green flag of Islam, and to smite the
infidel wherever found." ^

It was further noted that the Amir had recently
assumed the title of Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din, i.e.
the Light of Union and Faith, and referred to him-
self significantly in correspondence as the " King of
Islam."

Also, it was well-known that a Turkish visitor
had been received with honour in Cabul in May
1897, and that all Mullahs had been summoned to
that city for an interview shortly afterwards. It
may be that the Turk was a nobody, travelling
on his own account, unaccredited by the Sultan s
Government : and it may be that the gathering of
the Mullahs had no political importance whatever.
But the significance of incidents like these must
depend upon the connection in which they are

1 MUU, Tki PathoH RtvoU in North- IVeH India.

lo THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

In the meantime, matters had come to an
absolute dead-lock on the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar
border, and our Commission was withdrawn, the
boundary unmarked.

(a) That the boundary agreement was most
distasteful to the Amir ; and a fortiori to
his subjects.

(^) That the tribes on the border were
thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of
the boundary, that their fears were accentu-
ated by our establishment of military posts
in Wana, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys,
in Chitral, on the Malakhand, and on the

I INTRODUCTORY 15

out in public durbar the Viceroy's letter to himself,
and the draft of his own reply, and at the same
solemnly asserted his sincere friendship for the
British, and his determination to maintain his agree-
ments with them unbroken, he was fully rehabilitated
in the good opinion of Government ; and it may
be said here that, from this time, and throughout
the operations which ensued, he adhered honourably
to the friendly attitude assumed.

CHAPTER II

THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

The Afridis alleged their reasons for quarrelling
with the British to be —

1. Encroachment upon their country.

2. Enhancement of the salt tax.

3. Interference with tribal customs, in that we

refused to give up to them such of their
women as had taken refuge in British
territory.

Probably the first of these reasons, the facts
being considered in the light of what I have written
in the preceding chapter, was the real teterritna
causa belli: and, in the audacious demand now
made by their leaders that we should abandon our
posts on the Samana, and withdraw altogether
from the Swat Valley, they doubtless reckoned on
the countenance and support of the Amir.

At the conclusion of the Afghan war of 1878-80
the Government of India, with the concurrence of
the Amir, entered into an agreement with the
Afridis to keep open the Khyber Pass. For cen-

CHAP. II THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES 17

turies past the route via the Khyber has been the
great historic highway connecting Central Asia,
Afghanistan, and India. All other avenues of
approach sink into insignificance by comparison
with it : and it is of the first importance in the
interests of peace and trade and civilisation that
it should be steadily kept open, and safeguarded
against the marauding bands who in the past have
made it their happy hunting-ground, and have levied
tolls of blood and money from all who have ventured
to use it.

The Government of India determined, therefore,
to place the Pass arrangements permanently on a
sound basis, and it was agreed, in February 1881,
that the Afridis should cease their raiding from
this time, receiving from Government in lieu of
the plunder collected from caravans and travellers
an annual payment of 87,000 rupees. It was
further decided that forts should be built by
us in the Khyber, and garrisoned by levies fur-
nished by the Afridis, but paid by us. This put
another 87,000 rupees annually into their hungry
pockets.

These arrangements were fully assented to by
the Afridis, and cordially concurred in by the Amir,
to whom it is a matter of much moment that the
Pass should be kept open uninterruptedly for traffic,
for he derives a large revenue from the tolls paid
by caravans which traverse it, as they enter or
leave his territory. Forts were built by us at Ali

i8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

Musjid, and at Landi Kotal, and at one or two
intermediate points ; the levies were raised and
armed ; and under the command of men like Mr.
Hastings (who was their first CO.) and after-
wards Colonel Warburton (whose name is a house-
hold word among these border clans), and still
later under Captain Barton of the Guides, they
discharged their duties punctually and faithfully,
and peace and order reigned along the perilous
route.

But this was to end now. The preposterous
demand of the Afridis that we should withdraw from
the Samana and the Swat Valley could not, of course,
be entertained for a moment. They decided, there-
fore, urged on by their Mullahs, to break the faith
they had kept with us for sixteen years, to sack the
forts, and to close the Khyber. They persuaded the
Orakzais to join them in this declaration of war, and
almost before we had realised that such a stroke
could fall, they had assembled their lashkars, and
attacked and captured forts Ali Musjid, Maude, and
Landi Kotal. A few days later, the Orakzais rose
in revolt on the Kohat border, and fiercely assailed
the Samana forts, of which one, Saragheri, small
and isolated, fell, after a heroic defence by the hand-
ful of 36th Sikhs, who constituted its garrison, and
died to a man before the enemy finally got posses-
sion.

In the meantime the Afridis, realising the
gravity of the situation they had themselves created,

11 THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANXES 19

turaed now to the Amir for aid in the coming
struggle. In a petition sent to Cabul by a deputa-
tion of their Maliks and Elders, they wrote —

Tike British Gacemment has been firom aidem times gradmaify
emcroiuhing up<m our amtUry^ and even upon Afghan territuny^ and
has erected forts at various points within our borders. We have
complained of this to the Afghan Government on many occasions^
but your Highness has paid no attention to our complaints. There-
forCy being helpless^ and having regard to fslam^ and our constancy
in religion, we have now^ under the guidance of Gody opened the
door of jehad in the face of the said Government^ and we have
severed our connection with them in every way. IVe have plundered
and destroyed five forts on the Samdna above Hangu^ one fort at
Shinauriy at the foot of the Samdna^ in British territory ^ one fort
at the Ubldn Pass^ near Kohat^ e/r., etc. There are^ however^ three
big forts on the top of the said mountain {the Samdna) which have
not been taken yet. By the grace of God we will destroy and bum
these also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position on
the top of the mountain (Samdna) ; and at its base^ from Kohat to
the Rud-i'Kurman in the district of Kurraniy the frontier of the
Orakzai runs^ and the tribesmen have been making ]thsid from time
to time within their respective limits. We will never consent to
tender our allegiance to the British Government^ and become their
subjects. We will never give up the reins of authority of our
country to the hands of the Government. On the contrary^ we are
willing to tender our allegiance to the King of Islam. It is in-
cumbent on the Government of Islam not only to look after our
interests^ and consider our position^ but that of the whole of Afghan-
istan. We therefore send these eighteen persons from among our
MalikSy Ulama^ and Elders^ with our petitions to your Highness*
presence. We are at present engaged in a jehad on the Samdna
range, and we request that your Highness will be pleased to do
what is for our good and benefit ; and^ by the grace of God^ we
will act up to your Highness* instructions^ became we leave the
conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of your Highness
in every respect. We have used our endeavours with our tribesmen
to do service to your Highness. This is the time to gain the object

20 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

of your Highness} All the Moslems are now at the disposal of
your Highness in the shape of regular troops^ artillery^ and money.
If the British prove victorious ^ they will ruin the Moslems. The
services to be done on this side may be left to us by your Highness,
We hope that after the perusal of our petition your Highness will
favour us with a reply. — Dated 7 Rabius-Sani, 131 5 (7 th Sep-
tember 1897).

To this appeal the Amir turned a deaf ear. The
petition was sent on to him in Cabul, but the
members of the deputation were refused an audience,
and were not allowed to proceed beyond Jellalabad.
On the 23rd of September His Highness replied as
follows : —

I have perused your petitions^ all of which were with one object.
I now write to you in reply that it is eighteen years since I came to
Cabul, and you know yourselves that I went to Rawal Pindi (in
April \%Z^)by the Khyber route. In consideration of my friend-
ship with the British Government I had gone to their country as
their guest, and on my way I found many of your tribesmen on bdth
sides of the Pass, who made salaams to me. If what you state now
is true, why did you not tell me at that time about the matter, so
that I might have conferred with HE. the Viceroy about itf
Some years after this, when the boundary was being laid down.
Sir Mortimer Durand passed through the Khyber and came to
Cabul. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this, and saw the
Mission with their own eyes. Why did not then your Mullahs,
and Maliks, and Elders come to me when Sir Mortimer Durand
came with authority to settle the boundary, so that I could have
discussed the matter with him f At that time you all remained
silent, and silence indicates consent. I do not know on what account
now a breach has taken place between you and the English. But
after you have fought with them, and displeased them, you inform me.

^ A remarkable expression.

* Each section of the Afridis seems to have petitioned separately, but the
purport of their combined appeab is given accurately above.

II THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES 21

/ have entered into an alliance with the British Government in
regard to matters of State, and up to the present time no breach of
the agreement has occurred from the side of the British, notwith-
standing that th^ are Christians. We are Moslems and followers
of the religion of the Prophet, and also of the four Khalifas of the
Prophet, How can we then commit a breach of an agreement?
What do you say about the verse in the Koran — ^^ Fulfil your
promise; to fulfil your promise is the first duty of a Moslem, God,
on the day when the first promise was taken, asked all the creatures
whether he was their God or not. They said, * Yes, you are our
God and our Creator,* Therefore, on the day of the resurrection
the first question will be about the observance of agreements. Infidels
and Moslems will thus be distinguished by this test J* You will
thus see that the matter of the agreement is of great importance, I
will never, without cause or occasion, swerve from an agreement,
because the English, up to the present time, have in no way departed
from the line of boundary laid down in the map they have agreed
upon with me. Then why should I do so? To do so will be far
from justice, I cannot, at the instance of a few interested people,
bring ignominy on myself and my people.

What you have done with your own hands you must now carry
on your own backs, I have nothing to do with you. You are the
best judge of your affairs. Now that you have got into trouble
(literally, spoiled the matter) you want me to help you. You have
allowed the time when matters might have been ameliorated to slip
by. Now I cannot say or do anything, I have sent bcuk from
Jellalabcul the Maliks you had deputed to me, I gave them each a
lungi and ten rupees for their road expenses, and I did not trouble
them to come to Cabul,

And that, for the present, was all the Afridis got
out of the Amir. It would be interesting to know
what were their thoughts and speculations, as, dis-
appointed and with heavy hearts, the members of the
deputation retraced their steps to the highlands of
Tirah.

CHAPTER III

PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

While the Afridis sought in vain the help of the
Amir, the Government of India was organising its
forces to punish them, and the Commander-in-Chief
was considering the plan of the coming campaign.
It was generally admitted that the autumn was not
the most favourable time for the start of the expedi-
tion. If any choice had been permissible in the
matter, the spring, when the luxuriant crops of the
uplands of Maidan and Tirah, and of the fertile
valleys of Mastura and Bara, were ready for cutting,
would have been the best season for an advance.
An invasion of their country at this time, following
on a rigorous blockade throughout the preceding
winter, would probably have brought the tribes to
their senses, and secured their submission, compara-
tively early in the day. But it was no time to dally
or delay. The irruption into the Khyber, and the
capture and destruction of our forts, were a serious
blow to our prestige, and an outrage demanding
swift and certain punishment To have delayed

CH.1U PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 23

active operations for even a week longer than was
necessary for earnest preparation, would have been
misinterpreted on both sides of the border to mean
hesitation, weakness, and fear, and irreparable mis-
chief and misunderstanding might have been the
result.

It was wisely decided therefore to launch a force
forthwith against the foe. General Sir William
Lockhart was nominated to command it, and
hastened out at short notice from England, where
he was enjoying a well-earned holiday, to assume
the leadership of an army which included many of
the finest regiments, British and Native, in the
Service.

The composition of the force, and the names of
those who filled the chief commands and staff
appointments, are given below.

In considering the size of this force, it must be
remembered that the Orakzais and the Afridis could
muster between them between 40,000 and 50,000
fighting men, if all the sections combined and put
forth their full strength. But it was not probable
that this would happen ; and, notwithstanding the
pressure put upon them by their Mullahs, certain
sections held aloof from the first — the Adamkhels
and the Jowakis, for example — ^while others, particu-
larly amongst the Orakzais, betrayed irresolution
and reluctance to join in the fray.

Still, it was certain that formidable numbers
would oppose our advance. The country to be

24 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^ chap.

invaded was a terra incognita, but known to be wild
and mountainous, abounding in difficult passes and
dangerous defiles ; the tribesmen were notoriously
well-armed, enterprising, and bold ; and the line of
communication would be a long one, subject to
attack throughout its length, and requiring careful
guarding. Therefore, large though the force des-
cribed below was, it was felt, and the event proved
that not a regiment too many had been detailed.

The force was officially styled the "Tirah Ex-
peditionary Force," and was distributed for operations
as follows : —

{a) A main column of two divisions, each consist-
ing of two infantry brigades and certain
divisional troops, to start from Kohat and
advance on Tirah from the neighbourhood
of the Samana range.

(b) A force to hold the line of communication of

the main column between Kohat and Tirah
(including the posts on the Samana range),
consisting of one mountain battery, two
native cavalry regiments, and four native
infantry battalions.

Column," to operate as required from Pesh-
awar.
{d) A force, designated the ** Kurram Movable
Column," to be stationed in support on the
Hangu-Parachinar line, for employment as
circumstances might require.

Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 25

(e) A mixed brigade to be formed at Rawal

Pindi as a reserve.
These forces were composed as follows : —

THE MAIN COLUMN— First Division

jFi'rsf Brigade

2nd Battalion, The Derbyshire Regiment.
1st „ The Devonshire Regiment.

2nd „ 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
30th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
No. 6 British Field Hospital.
No. 34 Native Field Hospital.

Second Brigade

2nd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment.

1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.

2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.

3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.

Sections A and B of No. 8 British Field Hospital.

Sections A and C of No. 1 4 British Field Hospital

No. 5 1 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

No. I Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.

No. I (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

Two Squadrons, 1 8th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.

28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).

No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

One Printing Section from the Bombay Sappers and Miners

The Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.

The Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers.

Section A of No. 1 3 British Field Hospital.

No. 63 Native Field Hospital.

Second Division

Third Brigade

1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders.
I St Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment

26 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chaf.

1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment

1 5th (The Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

No. 24 British Field Hospital.

No. 44 Native Field Hospital.

Fourth Brigade

2nd Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers.
1st Battalion, The Northamptonshire Regiment
1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Sections C and D of No. 9 British Field Hospital.
Sections A and B of No. 23 British Field Hospital
No. 48 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.

Machine Gun Detachment, i6th Lancers.

Two Squadrons, 1 8th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.

2 1 St Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers).

No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

One Printing Section from the Madras Sappers and Miners.

The Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infiuitry.

The Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.

Section B of No. 1 3 British Field Hospital.

No. 43 Native Field Hospital

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

No. I Kashmir Mountain Battery.

22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment

39th (Gurhwal Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

2nd Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.

3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.

1 8th Regiment, Bengal Lancers.

No. I Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

No. 42 Native Field Hospital

No. 52 Native Field Hospital.

The Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps.

Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 27

The Gwalior Imperial Service Transport Corps.

Ordnance Field Park.

Engineer Field Park.

British General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Rawal Pindl

Native General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Rawal Pindi.

No. I Field Medical Store Dep6t. (For First Division.)

No. 2 Field Medical Store Dep6t. (For Second Division.)

No. 5 Veterinary Field Hospital.

No. 1 1 British Field Hospital, x

No. 25 British Field Hospital. I For sick and wounded retum-

Na 47 Native Field Hospital. | ing from the field.

No. 64 Native Field Hospital. /

THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

2nd Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

2nd Battalion, The Oxfordshire Light Infantry.

9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

34th Pioneers.

45th (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry

57th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

9th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.

No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

No. 5 British Field Hospital.

No. 45 Native Field Hospital, A and B Sections.

British General Hospital, of 250 beds, at Nowshera.

Native General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Nowshera.

THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN

1 2th (Khelat-i-Ghilzai) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1st Battalion, 5 th Gurkha Rifles.

The Kapurthala Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.

3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

6th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.

One Regiment of Central India Horse.

Section D of No. 3 British Field Hospital.

No. 62 Native Field Hospital.

Section B of No. 46 Native Field Hospital.

Native General Hospital, ot 200 beds, at Kohat

THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

CHAP.

THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE

2nd Battalion, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

1st Battalion, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.

27th Regiment ( I St Baluch Battalion) of Bombay (Light) Infantry.

2nd Regiment of Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.

Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers.

No. 12 British Field Hospital.

No. 53 Native Field Hospital.

Aides-de-Camp

Orderly Officers

The staff and commands of the force were as
follows : —

ARMY STAFF

Lieutenant-Genera] Commanding ( General Sir W. S. A Lockhart, K.C.B.,
the Force I K.C.S.I.

'Lieutenant F. A Maxwell, i8th Bengal

Lancers.
2nd Lieutenant J. H. A Annesley, i8th

Hussars.
Lieutenant G. R. De. H. Smith, Central
India Horse.
, 2nd Lieutenant E. H. E. CoUen, Royal
Artillery.
Maharaj Dhiraj Sir Pratap Singh,
Bahadur, G.CS.I.t of Jodhpur.
Deputy Adjutant • General and f Brigadier -General W. G. Nicholson,

I CB.

{Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel £. G. Barrow,
7th Bengal Infantry.
Assistant Quartermaster-General . Major G. H. W. 0*SuIlivan, RE.
DeputyAssUtantAdjutant.Genenil|C«P«fif J- A. L. Haldane. Gordon

I Highlanders.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- 1 ^^ ^^^^ 3^ 3 j^

General ) ^

Assistant Quartermaster-Generalf Colonel G. H. More-Molyneux, Assist-

for Intelligence \ ant Quartermaster-GeneraL

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Captain E. W.^. K. Maconchy, D.S.O.,
General for Intelligence \ 4th Sikhs.

FiddlnteUigence Officer. ./ Captain F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., 1st

I Batulion 5tb Gurkhas.

Prindpal Medical Officer (with ^ gurgeon- Colonel G. Thon»on. CB..
the temponuy rank of Surgeon- ^ j^^.^ j^^^ g^^
Major-General) ;

Chief of the Staff
Assistant Adjutant-General

BKICADJKH-GkNKRAI. SlH \V. (1, NiClltl

Dcpuly .\(lju(a(il-(«-n.-r,i1 ami Clii.'f of the Staff, Tir:
rrr ^ brilliant «Mii:<..f,<in:,y„j rc,.,ur.,.„u4„t,ri,:., ,

Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 29

Secretary to Principal Medical f Surgeon -Major W. A. Morris, Army

Officer \ Medical Staff.

Brigadier -General, Commanding f Brigadier-General C. H. Spragge, Royal

Royal Artillery \ Artillery.

Brigade-Major, Royal Artillery .{^J^„, ^ ^' ^^ "»«»'"°"' ^'^'^^

Orderly Officer, Royal Artillery . Major H. F. Mercer, Royal Artillery.

Ordnance Officer . . . Colonel C. H. Scott, Royal Artillery.

T> . J. r* I ^ J' r Brevet-Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E.

Brigadier- General, Commanding I . ., , *' , ^«. ,.

Royal Engineers | (jnthAe temporary rank of Bng.d.er-

Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers . Captain S. L. Craster, R.E.

Orderly Officer, Royal Engineers . Lieutenant H. Biddulph, R.E.

e • ^ J ^ A CO* IV f Major G. J. N. Logan-Home, ist Bed-
Supermtendent, Army Signallmg . < ^ , , . ^ .

L fordshire Regiment.

Headquarter Commandant /Captain R. E. Grimston, 6th Bengal

^ I Cavalry.

A*-**Tj *j */-. I f Captain F. J. S. Lowry, 29th Bombay

Assistant Judge Advocate-General < f, -' /» ^ /

"^ ^ I Infantry.

Principal Provost Marshal . ( Lieutenant -Colonel E. Balfe. Deputy

I Judge Advocate-General.

r^ . • » T* -* r\ai ( Captain G. W. Palin, Assistant Com-

Commissariat Transport Officer * < '^ . ^ ,

t missary-General.

Staff-Surgeon (from the Force).

Inspecting Veterinuy Officer ./Veterinary Lieutenant- Colonel B. L.

I Glover.

( Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Le G. Ander-
\ son, Military Accounts Department,
r Captain P. G. Shevirell, Military
\ Accounts Department,
r Brevet -Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich,
^ iCC.I. £. , CB., R.E.
Rev. A. S. Dyer, M.A.

Controller of Military Accounts

Field Paymaster .

Chief Survey Officer
Principal Chaplain

MAIN COLUMN
First Division

Commanding (with the local "nkj Brigadier-General W. P. Symon^ CB.
of Major-General) J

Aide-de-Camp . . . Captain A G. Dallas, 1 6th Lancers.

Orderly Officer . . . Lieutenant J. M. Wikely, 17th B.C.

Orderly Officer . . . Lieutenant G. H. Badcock, 7th B.C.

AssUUnt Adjutant-General . | Lie-tenant-Colonel C. W. Muir, CLE.,

I 17th Bengal Cavalry.

THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

CHAP.

A . . r^ -^ ^ r^ if Major E. A. G. Gosset, 2nd Derbyshire
Assistant Quartermaster-General . i i . '

I Regiment.

Deputy Assbtant Quartermaster- T Captain A. NichoUs, 2nd Punjab

General \ Infimtry.

▼n. , J T . 11- r\tc ( Lieutenant C. E. E F. K. Macquoid, ist

Field Intelligence Officer . -It tj^ u j i- .• *

I Lancers, Hjrderabad Contingent

Prindpal Medical Officer. • ( ^"ff^"-?^°"^ ^ Townsend, Army

i Medical Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding ( Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Duthy, Royal

Royal Artillery \ Artillery.

Adjutant, Royal Artillery . Captain W. K. Macleod, Royal Artillery.

Divisional Ordnance Officer Captain A. R. Braid, Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Hart, R.E.

r Captain O. M. R Thackwell, Royal

\ Engineers.

r Major J. A. Ferrier, D.S.O., Royal

* \ Engineers.
/ Lieutenant J. F. N. Carmichael, Royal

'l Engineers.
( Lieutenant W. H. Bunbury, Royal

* \ Engineers.

Assistant Superintendent, Army f Captain H. T. Kenny, 2nd Bombay
Signalling \ Lancers.

Provost Marshal . /Captain H. W. G. Graham, D.S.O.. Sth

I Lancers.

r Colonel L. W. Christopher, Commis-
\ sariat Department
r Captain H. S. G. Hall, Commissariat
\ Department.

( Major Mansfield, Commissariat Depart-
\ ment.

Commanding Royal Engineers
Adjutant, Royal Engineers

Field Engineer .

Assistant Field Engineer .

Commissary-General

Assbtant to Commissary-General

Chief Transport Officer .

Assistant to Divisional Commis
sariat Officer

Divisional Transport Officer

Assistant to Chief Transport 1 ^^ . . o^ tt c •»u ^*u t> ^
^^ ^ >Captam T. H. Smith, 12th B.C.

Utncer . . .J

Divisional Commissariat Officer . / **"J°' ^- ^- Yielding, CLE., D.S.O.,

t Commissariat Department

{Lieutenant C. H. Corbctt, i8th
Hussars.
{Captain F. C. W. Rideout, Commissariat
Department.

Assistant to Divisional Transport T Captain A. W. V. Plunkett, 2nd Bat-
Officer \ talion. The Manchester Regiment.
Survey Officer . . . Major W. T. Bythell, RE.
Chaplain, Church of England . Rev. R. M. Kirwan, M. A.
Wesleyan Chaplain Rev. J. Findlater.
Roman Catholic Chaplain . Rev. Father N. J. Winkley.

Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 31

First Brigade : First Division

Commanding . . / Brigadier-General R. C Hart. V.C.

t. C*B.

Orderly OflScer . . . ( Lieutenant A. H. S. Hart, East Surrey

I Regiment.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generall^P^^^, ^' «• K^"^^*"' ''' ^^^^"^
^ ' "' I 5th Gurkhas.

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Captain H. R. B. Donne, ist Norfolk

General \ Regiment

Brigade Commissariat Officer . ( ^*P'"" ^ M""*'y> ^^^^ AssisXaM

y. Commissary-General.

Assistant to Brigade Commissariat ( Lieutenant H. I. Nicholl, 1st Bedford-
Officer . . . \ shire Regiment.

Brigade Transport Officer . | ^P'"" ^- <^« V. Wintle. isth Bengal

L Lancers.

Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann.

Second Brigade : First Diznsion
Commanding . . /A.D.C. Brigadier-General A. Gaselee,

Orderly Officer . . f Lieutenant A N. D. Fagan, ist Lancers,

I Hyderabad Contingent.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General P'^j"' W- AWworlh, D.S.O.. 1st Bed-

I fordshire Regiment.

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- ( Major A. A. Barrett, 2nd Battalion 5th

General \ Gurkhas.

Brigade Commissariat Officer . | Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Deputy

t Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat r Captain H. de la P. Gough, i6th

Officer 1 Lancers.

Brigade Transport Officer Lieutenant H. Macandrew, 5th B.C.

Veterinary Officer . . Veterinary Lieutenant W. F. Shore.

Second Division

. . . ^ , ^ ,. ( Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Bigcs,

Major-General Commanding • 1 ^ t>

t C.B.

. . . , P ( Captain E. St. A. Wake, loth Bengal

' \ Lancers.

I' Captain R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars.
Hon. Lieutenant - Colonel H. H.
v/rucxiy v/mccn . Maharajah Sir Nripendra Narayun,

Bahadur, of Cooch Behar, G.CI.£.»
6th B.C.

32 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

A •* * A J- * 4^ 1 r Lieutenant -Colonel R. K. Ridgeway,

Assistant Adjutant-General ' i v r -& ^ »

Assistant Quartermaster-General . Major C. P. Triscott, D.S.O., RA.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- J Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley,
General for Intelligence \ King's Royal Rifle Corps.

Field InteUigence Officer. ./Captain H. F. Walter,, 24th (Mu-

i chistan) Regiment of Bombay In&ntry.

Principal Medical Officer . . | Surgeon-Colonel G M'B. Davis. D.S.O.,

t Indian Medical Service.
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding / Lieutenant-Colonel R. Purdy, Royal

Royal Artillery \ Artillery.

Adjutant, Royal Artillery . Captain H. D. Grier, Royal Artillery.

Divisional Ordnance Officer . Captain H. F. Head, Royal Artillery.

Commanding Royal Engineer . Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Wilkieson, RE.
Adjutant, Royal Engineers . Captain T. Fraser, R.E

Field Engineer . . . Captain F. H. Kelly, RE

Assistant Field Engineer . Lieutenant W. A. Stokes, R.E.

Assistant Field Engineer . . Lieutenant C B. L. Greenstreet, R.E.

Assistant Superintendent, Army /Captain G. C. Rigby, 1st Wiltshire

Signalling \ Regiment.

Provost Marshal . . /Captain W. C. Knight, 4* Bengal

I Cavalry.

Field Treasure Chest Officer . | Li«.tenant W. M. Grimley. 30th (Pnnjab)

t Bengal Infantry.
Chaplain, Church of England . Rev. H. W. Nelson, M. A.
Roman Catholic Chaplain . Rev. Father A. Vanden Deyssel.

Divisional Commissariat Officer /Lieutenant-Colonel B. L P. ReiUy,

t Commissariat Department
Assistant to Divisional Commis- T Lieutenant A. D. Macpherson, 2nd
sariat Officer . . . \ P.C.

Divisional Transport Officer ./Major H. L. Hutchins, Commissariat

i Department
Assistant to Divisional Transport ( Major H. R. W. Lumsden, 3rd Bengal

Officer \ Infantry.

Survey Officer . . . Mr. E A. Wainwright, Survey of India.

Assistant Survey Officer . . Lieutenant G. A. J. Leslie, R.E.

Third Brigade : Second Division

Commanduig (with the temporary r Colonel F. J. Kempster, D.S.O.,
rank of Brigadier-General) \ A.D.C.

Orderly Officer . . . / Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Royal

I Munster Fusiliers.

Deputy AssUtantAdjntant-General I *'*j*" "• S«- Leger Wood, ist Dorset-

I shire Regiment.

HI PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 33

Dtfotj Awttant QiuitenuMtei- / Major H. S. Mu*;, t9th Bengal

Geoeral \ Lancert.

Brig«le Commi^ariat Officer . / Li*«t=°«t D. H. Drake- Brock man,

\ D.A.C.G.
AHiftanl to Brigade CommJMariat / lieutenant F. W. Bircb, 39th Punjab

Officer I Infantiy.

Brittle Tranaport Officer . / Li«««»»» ^ *. N. T>tler. i.t Gordon

Veterinary Officer

Orderly Officer

Brigade Commi

Brigade Traniport Officer
Veterinary Officer

Highlander:
Veterinarjr lieutenant C Rok.

Fanrti BrigatU 1 Seemd Dinuim

{Brigadier-General R. Wettmacatt, C.B.,
D.S.O.
f Lieutenant R. C. Welletley, Royal
' \ HorM Artillery.

DepaiyAwislant Adjutant-Generall^P^i^- ^- ^'°°^' "' ^'^ ^'^

{Captain F. J. M. Edwardi, 3rd Bombay
Light Cavalry.
/Captain E. V. Wation, Commiuaiiat

Aiuttant to Br^ade CoomiitMiial / Lieutenant N. G. Frawr, 4tb Boint«y
Officer -

/Captain W. H. Armstrong, itt £ai
I Votkihire RegimenL
Veterinary Uentenant F. W, Wilion.

LiNS OF COUUUNICATIONS

General Officer Commanding

{liealenant-General Sir A P. Palmer,
K.C.B.

Aide-de-camp . . . Lieutenant F. C. Galloway, R.A

Orderly Omcei . . Lieutenant H. O. Pan, yth B. I.

AssistBjit Adjutant and Qnartei- / Caplajn (temporary Major) J. W. G.

miuter-Genetal \ Toltoch, 34th Bombay Inrantry.

Deputy Auistact Adjutant and /Captain I. Philippi, t*t Battalion, 5th
Quart ermasler-GeDeral l Gurlfbai.

Lolonel) J

Senior Ordnance Officer . . Captain Watkina, Royal Artillery.

Section Commandant . . { ^^^ °- ^ S. F. Shore. iSih Bengal

/Captain St. G. L. Steel, ind Bengal

Section Commandant

THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

CHAP.

Section G)mmandant

Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding,

Royal Engineers
Adjutant, Royal Engineers
Field Engineer .

Assistant Field Engineer .

Assistant Field Engineer .
Provost Marshal .

Chief Commissariat Officer

Chief Transport Officer, L. of C.

Assistant to Chief Transport

Officer
Veterinary Inspector

{Captain F. de B. Young, 6th Bengal
Cavalry,
r Lieutenant - Colonel J. W. Thurbum,
\ Royal Engineers.

Captain H. V. Biggs, Royal Engineers.

Captain C. H. Cowie, Rojral Engineers.
/Lieutenant H. S. Rogers, Royal En-
\ gineers.

( Lieutenant R. P. T. Hawksley, Royal
I Engineers.

Lieutenant A. E. Turner, Rojral Engineers.

Major L. S. Peyton, 14th Bengal Lancers.
( Brevet Colonel C. M. Keighley, D.S.O.,
I Commissariat Department.
( Major C. V. Williamson, Commissariat
\ Department

r Captain T. H. Smith, 12th Bengal
\ Cavalry.

Veterinary Captain F. W. Forsdyke.

Staff at the Base

Base Commandant

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and

Quartermaster-General
Commandant, British Troops

Dep6t
Adjutant and Quartermaster,

British Troops Dep6t
Commandant, Native Troops

Dep6t

Base Ordnance Officer

Officer in charge of Engineer Field
Park

Base Commissariat Officer

Departmental Assistants to Base
Commissariat Officer

/Colonel W. J. Vousden, V.C., Indian
I Staff Corps.

( Major A. J. W. Allen, 1st East Kent
\ Regiment.

{Major A. de B. V. Paget, Durham
Light Infjemtry.
{Captain A. F. Bundock, 2nd Battalion
South Lancashire Regiment
/Captain S. M. Edwardes, D.S.O., 2nd
\ Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers).
/ Captain M. W. S. Pasley, Royal Artil-
l Icry.

I Captain U. W. Evans, R.E.

/ Major H. R. Marrett, Assistant Com-
\ missary-General.

^Captain W. H. D. Rich, Assistant Com-
missary-General.
Lieutenant F. W. H. Forteath, Deputy

Assistant Commissary-General.
Lieutenant L. H. Marriott, Deputy Assist-
ant Commissary-General.
Lieutenant H. G. P. Beville, Deputy-
Assistant Commissary-General.

Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 35

Departmental AssUtant (for Trans- ^ ^ .^ ^ j^ ^^^.^^^^ j^^p^^ ^j^^.

port) to the Base Commissariat V ^^^ Commissary-General.
Officer J

Captain W. P. M. Pollock, i8th

Hussars.
Captain H. Smyth, ist BatUlion,
Cheshire Regiment.
Regimental Assistants to Base I Lieutenant T. E. Bayley, 20th Hussars.
Commissariat Officer Lieutenant C. G. E. Ewart, 5th Bengal

Cavalry.
Lieutenant E. N. Davis, 3rd Infantry,
Hyderabad Contingent.
Controller of Military Accounts .

THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

^ ,. f Brigadier -General A. G. Hammond,

Commanding . . .| c.B., D.S.O.. V.C, A.D.C.

^ , , -. -. f Lieutenant H. D. Hammond, Royal

Orderly Office, . .[ ^,^

Assistant Adjutant and Quarter- ( Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Gwat-
master-General 1 kin, 13th Bengal Lancers.

Deputy Assistant AdjuUnt and f Major C. T. Becker, 2nd King's Own

Quartermaster-General \ Scottish Borderers.

t:.- u T . If rsa: /Captain F. H. Hoghton, ist Bombay

Field Intelligence Officer . '\ r r . ,r^ j-^

^ t Infantry (Grenadiers).

^. . , ,, ,. , ^«. f Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel R.

Pnncpal Medical Officer . .| q. Thomsett, Army Medical Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, ( Lieutenant -Colonel W. M. M. Smith,

Royal Artillery . \ Royal Artillery.

Adjutant, Royal Artillery . Captain F. R. Drake, Royal Artillery.

Brigade Ordnance Officer Major T. E. Rowan, Royal Artillery.

Field Engineer . . Major E C Spilsbury, R.E.

Assistant Field Engineer . . Lieutenant C. B. Farwell, R.E.

Assistant Superintendent, Army f Lieutenant C. E. Cobb, East Yorkshire

Signalling \ Regiment

Brigade Commimriat Officer . | Lieutenant H. H. Jones. Deputy Assist-

I ant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat ( Lieutenant V. R. Pigott, ist Battalion
Officer \ Cheshire Regiment.

Brigade Transport Officer .(Lieutenant C Charlton, Royal Horse

^ *^ \ Artillery.

Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Lieutenant F. U. Carr.

1st

36 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN

Commanding (with nmk and payjcoioncl W. HiU. Indian Staff Corps,
of Colonel on the Staff) J ^

Orderly Officer . . J ^^P^° ^- ^' ^' "^°*^' ^«^«' ^^"

I ment

Deputy Assistant Adjutant.Genena I ^V*" ^ ^' "i ^'^^' ^■^■^•'

I Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Captain C. P. Scudamore, D.S.O., ist

General \ Royal Scots Fusiliers.

r Brigade-Surgeon- Lieutenant-Colonel W.
Principal Medical Officer. .< R. Murphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical

I Service.
Brigade Ordnance Officer . { Lij"'""" D. R. Pouher, Royal Artil-

Field Engineer . . . Captain J. A. Gibbon, Royal Engineers.

Assistuit Field Engineer . . | Li«»'"»°' ^ A. Tandy. Royal En-

I gineers.

Assistant Superintendent, Army f Lieutenant C. R. Scott - Elliott, 4th

Signalling \ Madras Pioneers.

Brigade Commissariat Officer ./Captain C. F T. Murray. Assistant

i Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat J Captain P. H. Rogers, 2nd Yorkshire
Officer 1 Light Infantry.

Brigade Transport Officer .l^fiT "\^- ^- ^olquhoun, 24th

t Madras Infantry.

S rvev Offi er f Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Wahab,C. I.E.,

Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Lieutenant W. N. Wright.

THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE

^ ,. r Brigadier - General C. R. Macgregor,

Commandmg . . .| ^^^

Orderly Officer . .("'' \^T^\ f ^" ^' ^^^"^y'

* I 29th Punjab Infantry.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General/^^]^' ^/^.^^^J^',^^"''^"' ^^ ^''
^ ^ "' I Royal Welsh FusUiers.

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- T Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal

General \ Lancers.

Brigade Commissariat Officer . | Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan. Commissariat

l Department
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat i Lieutenant A. P. Trevor, 20th Bombay
Officer \ Infantry.

m PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 37

Brig»ie Transport Officer . | Lieut«»nt K. E. Nangle. 3rd In&ntry.

t Hyderabad Contingent
Veterinary Officer . Veterinary Lientenant W. S. Anthony.

The political officers with the Force were Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I.,
G>lonel Warburton, C.S.I., and Messrs. King, Hastings, Donald, and
Blakeway. But in Sir William Lockhart himself was vested supreme political
power, as well as supreme military control of the expedition.

The approximate strength of the force detailed
in the foregoing pages was loio British officers,
10,882 British troops, 491 native officers, 22,123
native troops, 197 hospital assistants, 179 clerks,
19,558 followers, 8000 horses, 18,384 mules and
ponies, and 1440 hospital riding-ponies. But to
these figures must be added an enormous number of
camels, carts, ponies, etc., working on the long line
of communication with Kohat, and gradually brought
into use as needs increased and the roads were im-
proved.

In considering the plan of campaign it must be
borne in mind that the objective of the expedition
was Tirah, the summer home of the Afridis and
Orakzais, which had never before been entered by
a British force, or, for the matter of that, had never
been visited by any European. The distribution of
the force to effect the object in view has already been
indicated. The chief feature of the scheme is the
direct advance on Tirah of the main column in one
body, under the personal command of Sir William
Lockhart, "from the neighbourhood of the SamSna
range." Other plans suggest themselves, and nodoubt

38 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

were discussed ; for example, the advance of one
division only, with the headquarters, from the SamSna,
while the other, diverging at Usterzai, shortly after
leaving Kohat, might penetrate vid the valley of the
Kariach river and the Landukai Pass, into Mastura,
and there join hands with the main body. This
would perhaps have relieved the pressure caused by
an advance on a single line, but possibly there were
political objections to it. A simultaneous advance
up the Bara Valley, by the Peshawar column, under
Brigadier-General Hammond, would have cut off
the Afridis from retreat in the direction of Jellalabad
and Lalpura, whither already they were sending
their families. But this no doubt would have been
a very hazardous undertaking. The BSra Valley,
though absolutely unexplored at this time, was known
to be long and difficult, and abounding in dangerous
defiles. The risks involved in fighting a way up
such a route, and in maintaining such a long and
precarious line of communication, far outweighed
any advantage to be gained by attempting a diversion
of this kind, unless with a very much larger force
thaii was at this time available for the purpose, and
had any disaster (and such things will happen)
brought the movement prematurely to a standstill.
Sir William Lockhart's own advance would have
been seriously embarrassed at a critical juncture.

The special advantage of the line actually selected
for the advance of the main column, viz. from Kohat
7nd Shinauri, Khorappa, and the Sampagha and

Ill PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 39

Arhanga Passes, into Tirah, was, that up to the
advanced base, Shinauri, it lay inside our own
territory, while from this point, not only could a blow
be struck at the very centre of the Orakzai country,
cutting the defenders into two at once (an important
achievement from a political point of view, for
already there were waverers amongst them), but
also the Tirah plateau, the objective of the expedi-
tion, the hub and heart of the Afridi nation, could
be reached in four or five easy marches.

At the same time, when the main column had
crossed the Sam£na and was assembled at Khan-
garbur in the Khanki Valley, it is a question whether
from this point, and before assaulting the Sampagha,
one of its divisions might not with advantage have
marched up the Khanki Valley and penetrated into
Tirah independently, vid the Chingakh or Lozakka
Pass. Here, again, the argument is that by
separating the divisions, the pressure caused by
moving such a mass of men and transport on a
single road would be relaxed, and consequent delays
avoided, and that the enemy would be alarmed by
the demonstration against his flank and rear.

But there were undoubtedly strong reasons for
adhering to the single line of advance, and keeping
the column concentrated.

In the first place, the stronger the force brought
to bear directly on the objective point, the less
formidable and obstinate the resistance likely to be
met with, while the value and importance of a quick.

40 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

decisive, knock-down blow, where Asiatics are con-
cerned, are not to be over-estimated.

Secondly, a considerable proportion of the trans-
port was of an inferior type, and imperfectly organ-
ised, while the supervising staff was limited. Had
that staff been divided into two sections at the very
outset of the expedition, confusion and delay would
certainly have increased.

Thirdly, the whole country-side up the Khanki
Valley was hostile. It is, moreover, a region inter-
sected by deep ravines, and commanded by numerous
heights, while the existing roads and tracks through
it were practically useless for military purposes.

Consequently, had this double line of advance
been adopted, a much larger force to guard the com-
munications would have been imperative, and as no
advance on either line could be made until sappers
and pioneers, working incessantly, had improved the
way sufficiently to admit of the passage of laden
animals, the military labour available, which was
strictly limited, would have taken at least twice as
long as it actually did to accomplish its double task,
and the delay thus caused would have been most
mischievous.

Even with a single line of advance it was found
necessary later to reinforce the troops on the line of
communication by one native infantry regiment to
hold the Dargai heights, and by a pioneer regiment
to strengthen the Khangarbur post, when the main
column had passed on. And after the Sampagha

in PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 41

Pass had been captured the whole of the First
Brigade, augmented by a pioneer regiment and a
battery of artillery, had to be posted permanently
in the Mastura Valley to overawe the Orakzais,
and maintain uninterrupted communication between
Khangarbur and the headquarters in Tirah.

The theoretical advantages of a double line of
advance are obvious and indisputable, but, on the
other hand, the practical objections to it, which I
have endeavoured to make clear, are not to be
denied.

It may be added here that when the force was at
Khangarbur nothing was known of the condition of
the western passes — ^the Durbikhel, the Chingakh,
or the Lozakka — by one of which the detached
division, had the double line of advance been
adopted, would have had to make its way into
Tirah, except that native report declared them all to
be extremely bad. When later, in an expedition
against the Chamkanis and Massozais, an oppor-
tunity was afforded to examine these passes, the first
two of them being actually crossed by our troops,
they were found to be so difficult as to fully justify
the decision previously arrived at by Sir William
Lockhart to pursue his course by a single line of
advance.

We may now consider the preliminaries of the
campaign made fairly clear, and I proceed, with the
kind permission of the proprietors of the Times,

42 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, hi

with the narrative of the expedition in the form of
letters contributed by me at the time, and while
impressions were fresh ; but expanded now, and
supplemented where necessary by notes and infor-
mation which have reached me since the original
letters were written.

CHAPTER IV

WAITING TO BEGIN

KOHAT, 6th October,

*' Tout vient k qui sait attendre ! " There has been
waiting enough for the launch of this expedition, and
even the Afridis amid the rocks and glens of Tirah,
conscious that the long arm of retribution must
eventually reach them, and exact a full penalty for
their treacherous assaults on Ali Masjid and Landi
Kotal, must wonder when we are going to begin.
But if the mills of the British Raj grind slowly, their
work is sure, and they grind exceeding small, once
set in motion. An expedition into a difficult and
unsurveyed country like that which lies between the
Samana range and the Safed Koh mountains, and
against such warlike and well-armed tribes as the
Orakzais and the Afridis, was not to be lightly
undertaken, nor without ample means and careful
preparation ; and while other insurgent clans in
many directions — the Waziris in the Tochi Valley
to the south, and the Mohmands, the Bajauris, and
the Swatis to the north — had still to be dealt with.

44 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

and absorbed some of our best regiments, together
with a large proportion of the transport, the Tirah
expedition had perforce to be postponed. When
our authority had been re-established in these other
districts, undivided attention could be paid to the
formidable foe on our western border who has defied
us, and whose proud boast is that no white man has
hitherto invaded his stronghold.

It was in the end of August, 23rd to the 25th,
that, smarting under the sense of their imaginary
grievances, and prompted by fanatical impulse and
senseless rage, the Afridis attacked, and eventually
captured and burned, our forts on the Khyber line :
Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid, and Fort Maude. With
minds inflamed by the preachings of their Mullahs,
and excited by the treacherous success achieved by
the Waziris in the Tochi Valley, by distorted reports
of the murderous fighting on the Malakhand, and by
the example of the Mohmands at Shabkadr, they
recklessly broke a faith they had kept for sixteen
years, and, throwing prudence to the winds, put to
the sword their own kinsmen — the levies in our pay,
who gallantly resisted their assaults — and declared
war to the knife against a Government which has
ever treated them in the past with forbearance and
with generosity.

But generosity has its limits, and the forbearance
of even an Indian Government can be overstrained.
The Bonerwals, that powerful tribe located between
the Malakhand and the Indus, had indeed been let

IV WAITING TO BEGIN 45

alone by us, though surely after the events of the 26th
July and following days — the attacks on the Mala-
khand — never had any Government better cause for
quarrelling with them. But this last outrage was
too much. Our prestige would indeed be lowered
should we shrink now from inflicting chastisement,
and exacting reparation for the blood shed, and the
mischief done ; and therefore, almost within a week
of the occurrences in the Khyber, the Viceroy's
Council had come to a decision, and the fiat for the
expedition to Tirah had gone forth.

That was in the beginning of September, and
here we are well on in chill October, and not quite
ready to begin yet. But what a busy month it has
been ! Not a day, not an hour of it, has been
wasted. Well and loyally have those toiled who
have been intrusted with the preparations which
must be completed before such an expedition can be
safely launched. Hereafter, no doubt, their names
will be honourably mentioned with those whose more
congenial task will be to lead the troops in battle
against the enemy. I have before me while I write
the revised scheme of the operations now on the eve
of commencing, and when I note for you that it
provides for the concentration of a force which in-
cludes 10 ID British officers, 491 native officers,
10,882 British non-commissioned officers and men,
22,123 native non-commissioned officers and men,
8000 horses and ponies, upwards of 18,000 baggage
animals (chiefly mules), and over 20,000 followers.

46 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chap.

etc., and involves the collection of supplies for feeding
this huge force for at least two months, then it will
be conceded that the task of the past few weeks has
been no light one, and that those who have borne
the burden and heat of the day in connection with it
will be entitled to gratitude and recognition when
the time comes to consider the question of honours
and rewards.

Meantime their labours have borne fruit, for the
force stands ready, fully equipped, and impatient to
start. Yet for a few days more, a very few, patience
must be exercised, the reason being, that unexpected
developments on the Mohmand and Bajaur side
have delayed the troops which are detailed, after
their campaign is over in the North, to come down
and join brigades destined for the operations in
Tirah. In another four or five days, however, they
will all have arrived, and then a general advance
will begin. It is needless to dilate on the spirit
which animates the troops on this occasion— officers
and men are alike keen for the fray, and eager to
start. For weeks past every one in authority, from
Sir George White downwards, has been besieged
by entreaties and appeals from individuals and
regiments to be detailed for this expedition. To
be left out of it is lamented as an irretrievable mis-
fortune. The appetite of the troops has been
whetted by the accounts of the severe fighting that
has already taken place, and by the description of
the gallant deeds already performed. So far as can

IV WAITING TO BEGIN 47

be judged it is certain that the Orakzais and Afridis
will combine to defend stubbornly their hitherto
inviolate strongholds. They are the finest and
hardiest race, physically speaking, on our frontier ;
they are known to be well armed, and they can put
upwards of 40,000 men into the field against us.
Assuredly they will face us bravely, and, the greater
the certainty of hard fighting, the keener the anxiety
of every soldier of Her Majesty in India to be pre-
sent, and to bear his share in it.

With such a spirit prevailing amongst the men
and officers, and with such a practised leader as Sir
William Lockhart, whose very name is a tower of
strength on this wild frontier, the issue should be
sharp, short, and decisive.

Camp Kohat, i 2th October,

Still waiting to begin ! After all it is one thing
to declare war against the Afridis ; it is another to
'* let loose the dogs " and start the game. But in
this instance, there are others besides the Afridis to
think of, and great allowances must be made for
those who have had the preparations to make for
the arduous campaign ahead of us. Not only is it
being undertaken on a scale greater even than that
on which we started the Afghan War of 1878-80,
but also every detail in connection with it has been
complicated by the expedition on our hands at the
same time against the Mohmands, the Waziris, the
Swatis, and the Bajauris, and by the unexpected

48 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^ chap.

developments which some of these " side-shows "
have taken at the last moment. Thus, regiments
and batteries and transport and hospitals, etc.,
destined for Tirah, have been unavoidably detained
in other quarters, and at the eleventh hour substi-
tutes have had to be found for them, and called up
from distant stations in India. All this means delay,
though it does not, of course, mean wasted time.
What has been done in the way of preparation by
the great Commissariat-Transport Department while
outsiders chafe and wonder " when are they going
to begin ? " must be seen to be believed. Our
railway from Rawal Pindi ends at Khushalgarh, on
the banks of the Indus, 32 miles from Kohat, which
is to be our base of operations. For weeks past
trains have been delivering at this terminus from
1 500 to 2000 tons of stores daily, and the Transport
Department have been moving this immense amount
of supplies, clothing, and war material to Kohat on
carts, camels, mules, ponies, and bullocks, an endless
stream, discharging on the stony plains round this
cantonment, which have now become thickly studded
in every direction with mounds of stuff destined to
feed and supply man and beast for weeks to come
in the distant wilds of Tirah. To the uninitiated,
it looks as if chaos was supreme, but, so far from
that being the case, the reception and distribution of
the convoys as they arrive, proceed without a hitch.
Every one has an appointed task, and everything
has an appointed place, and though upwards of

XV WAITING TO BEGIN 49

50,000 men and followers, and more than 20,000
animals, have to be daily provided for here, it is all
done quietly and efficiently without fuss or delay :
and that this should be so reflects great credit on all
concerned in making and working the necessary
arrangements.

But for the present, remember, we are halted.
It is true troops come and go every day, but the
marches are short ones. They arrive from Peshawar,
three marches away, and as the brigades are com-
pleted, pass on to Hangu, Kai, and Shinauri, only
four marches away. At these places, too, large
commissariat depdts have been formed, more espe-
cially at the last named, Shinauri, which for some
time to come will be our most advanced base. It
is situated at the foot of a spur of the Samana range
only some five miles from the ridge, and from it,
znd the Chagru Valley, the main advance will
eventually be made. It is then that the strain will
come, and that the commissariat-transport arrange-
ments will be severely tested. When there is little
more than a single six-foot track for troops and
animals, and that winding in and out on a steep
gradient, through darkling glens and gloomy defiles,
the question of food and shelter, sufficient and in
time, becomes a deeply interesting one! But we
know the Department. They have perhaps never
been tried so high as they will be on this occasion,
but they have worried successfully through many
a tough transport task before this, and we have little

50 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

doubt that they will overcome all difficulties in this
instance too.

Still it will be no promenade for them. Did not
the Great Duke say of campaigning in Spain, "If
you make war in that country with a large army you
starve ; and if you go into it with a small one you
get beaten ! " Well, the saying is in a sense appli-
cable here. We certainly have guarded against
defeat, for the size of the force mobilised must flatter,
if it does not frighten, the Afridis, as it certainly
surprises better-informed people. But on the other
hand, though we do not expect to starve, we think
we may sometimes have to wait a while for our
dinners !

I give you here the full text of Sir William
Lockhart's proclamation to the Tirah Afridis and
Orakzais : —

In the year 1881, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass entered
into treaty engagements with the British Government, under-
taking, in consideration of certain allowances, to maintain order
throughout the pass, to deal with offences on the road, to furnish
levies for the above purpose, and to abstain from committing
outrages in British territory. Up to the month of August last
these engagements have been, on the whole, faithfully observed,
but during that and the succeeding month, the Afridis have
broken their engagements, attacked, plundered, and burnt posts
in the Klhyber Pass, which were garrisoned by levies furnished
by themselves, and have joined the Orakzais in attacking British
posts and villages on the Kohat border.

For these offences all tribal and service allowances hitherto
granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzais
are declared forfeit, and entirely at the disposal of the British
Government to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they

IV WAITING TO BEGIN 51

may think fit. The British Government has also determined to
despatch a force under my command to march through the
country of the Orakzais and Afridis, and to announce from the
heart of their country the final terms which will be imposed.
This advance is made to mark the fact that these tribes took
part in the attacks above mentioned, and the power of the British
Government to advance if and when they choose.

The Government have neither the intention nor the wish
to inflict unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they
immediately make submission and reparation. The terms and
conditions on which such submission will be accepted will be
announced to the jirgahs of the tribes when I have arrived in
Tirah ; and I am authorised to enforce fulfilment of these terms
and conditions, and of any further terms and conditions which
opposition by any tribe or section or individuals there may
render it necessary to impose. It is therefore notified that all
who wish to live in peace with the Sirkar and desire to possess
their own country and to see it no more in the power and
occupation of the Sirkar should assist to the utmost of their
abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with my orders and
with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will
save the tribes from the further punishments which any opposition
to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring upon
them, and the tribal country from further occupation.

It is too soon to judge the effect of this
proclamation, which is the usual style of announce-
ment made when you are about to invade an
enemy's country, with this difference. It states
emphatically that until we have entered and marched
through their lands, in order to demonstrate our
power to assert our position as rulers, and to strike
how and when we like, we will listen to no over-
tures from them. Their offence has been too gross
and too unprovoked for it to be now lightly pardoned
or condoned. In the past these tribes have boasted

52 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

that we cannot and dare not enter their country.
Now the time has come to dispel that illusion once
and for all. The purdah will be lifted, the veil
that has hitherto been so jealously kept down will
be drawn aside, and "from the heart of their
country" Sir William Lockhart will announce to
the tribal jirgahs, when they come in to make their
submission to him, the final terms and conditions on
which the British Government will conclude a peace
with them.

This is of course a just and wise policy. It is
true that some of the clans, amongst the Orakzais
especially, and more than one chief of repute and
position amongst the Afridis, have already sued for
terms, and expressed contrition for their misdeeds,
each of them, more suo, protesting "it wasn't me,
sir, please sir, it was the other boy, sir." But
very rightly they have not been listened to, or even
answered, yet. A Pathan or an Afghan understands
only one kind of argument, the argumentum ad
baculinum, a good knock-down blow. Administer
that, and he will respect you, and bear you no ill-
will. But argue with him, parley or compromise
with him, and you are lost. He will give you back
words smoother than your own, he will promise
anything you want, he will greedily accept your
bribes and your subsidies, but he will despise you
in his heart, and he will betray you at the first
opportunity.

I am not concerned here to discuss this policy or

IV WAITING TO BEGIN 53

that for the management of the tribes on our frontier,
or to speculate how the present series of troubles
was precipitated, or how they could have been
avoided, though much might be written on all these
heads. But it may be safely said that, having
committed ourselves to this expedition, it should
be, and will be, carried through now in such com-
plete and stern fashion, that hereafter Afridi and
Orakzai will think twice, and hesitate long, before
they break out again into such wanton outrage.

In the meantime, it is fairly certain they will
fight. It is not at all because we have "cornered"
them, but, though there are waverers amongst them,
it is because after years of proud boasting and
absolute immunity from any punishment (if we
except the Bazaar Valley raids in 1878-79) their
reputation as the most warlike and independent
tribe on the frontier would be lost for ever, and
their " faces blackened " among all true Pathans,
if they failed to stand up to us now. But there is
no question of what they will do, and we may be
sure some hard knocks will be exchanged before the
heights are won leading into their hitherto inviolate
stronghold, the breezy uplands known as Tirah.
As a matter of fact our latest information as to
their movements points to a concentration of their
strength already in the upper KhSnki Valley, and
occupation by them of dominating points at the
western end of the Sam§na ridge, whence they can
observe our preparations at Shinauri, and even

54 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

threaten an attack on that camp itself. These
would be chiefly Orakzais, but behind them we hear
on good authority that the Afridis are collecting on
the Sampagha Pass, and it will probably be for the
possession of this point that our first big fight will
be fought, and the 28th or 29th inst will not improb-
ably be the date of it.

Before I close this letter I may refer briefly to a
matter which has been much discussed lately. It is
that we have some 2000 Afridis in our own ranks
at the present time. They are amongst our best
soldiers, and have borne themselves bravely in
many a fight on the side of the Sirkar. But it is
unquestionable that there is an uneasy feeling among
them on the eve of this expedition against their own
country. Already several have deserted, taking
their rifles and accoutrements and ammunition with
them, arguing no doubt that it is trying them too
high to expect them to march against their own
kinsmen, and assault their own villages. But this
was what no one required them to do. An army
order ^ has been published expressing confidence

^ Sttbjoined is the order referred to.

G.O.C.C., dated 8th October 1897.

The Government of India have lived at peace with the Afridi tribe and
made an agreement with them, under which the British forts in the Khyber
were intrusted to their care. Allowances were paid to the tribe, and arms
were issued so that they might be strong in their alliance and friendship with
the Government of India, and have the means of forcing turbulent persons
to keep the peace. Without any provocation the Afridis, in conjunction with
other tribes, have broken their alliance with the British Government, and
have attacked and destroyed the forts which their tribe had engaged to guard.
Further, they have waged war against our garrisons on the Samana and else-

IV WAITING TO BEGIN 55

in their loyalty, and sympathy with their peculiar
position, and announcing the decision of Govern-
ment that under the special circumstances the Afridi
companies in our service will be sent back to stations
where they will carry on garrison duties only, while
at the same time they are assured that so far as
can be managed, their own homes in Tirah will be
spared, and their people and property unmolested.
This arrangement and this assurance should restore
confidence to them. Yet such is the suspicious and
designing nature of the Afridi, so restless and excited
does he become in times of difficulty and danger,
and so little trust would he repose in similar
promises made by any of his own people under

where, killing some of the soldiers in the British service, and causing great
loss of property.

The British Government, confident in its power, cannot sit down quietly
under such defiance and outrages, and has been forced by the wanton acts of
the Afridis themselves to inflict punbhment on them in their own country,
and to send a force into Tirah to exact reparation for what has lately taken
place. The Afridi soldiers in the service of the Government have given proofs
of their loyalty, devotion, and courage on many a hard -fought field, and the
value of their services has been fiiUy appreciated by the Government of India.
After the most carefiil consideration of the circumstances connected with the
Tirah expedition, the Government of India have decided to show consideration
to those Afridi soldiers who wish to keep their engagements, and to excuse
them from service in the campaign which the Government have been forced
to wage against their fellow-tribesmen.

On these grounds alone it has been determined that Afiridi soldiers who
are serving in the regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar - Kohat
border, are not to be employed near the Tirah frontier at the present time,
but their services vdll be utilised elsewhere. The necessary orders to this
effect will at once issue. As far as possible care will be taken that the
property of those who have not taken part in the raids on British territory is
neither confiscated nor destroyed during the time that our troops are engaged
in the Orakzai or Afridi territory.

This order is to be read and carefully explained to all Afridi soldiers
belonging to regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar-Kohat border.

56 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, iv

similar circumstances, that it is doubtful if the just
and humane order of the Commander-in-Chief will
entirely quiet their fears, though it is obvious that
it was the most considerate action His Excellency
could have possibly taken.

CHAPTER V

THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI

Headquarters Camp, near Khangarbur,

22 nd October,

Long ere this arrives my telegrams will have in-
formed you that the curtain has been rung up and
the play has begun. I had hardly posted my last
letter to you when collision with the enemy occurred,
and his skill in choosing a strong position, his resolu-
tion in defending it, the numbers he can bring into
the field against us, and the efficiency of his equip-
ment and fire, as testified by the severe losses we
have already incurred, all are proof, if proof were
wanted, of the arduous task ahead — a task which
makes us rejoice that we have such a tried and
capable leader as General Sir William Lockhart,
and which fully warrants the judgment of the
Commander-in-Chief, and the decision of the
Government of India, in sending such a powerful
force into the field.

In this letter I shall be able to give you a better
idea than is possible within the limits of a telegram,
of the immense difficulties of many kinds which

58 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

beset an expedition on this wild and mountainous
frontier, of the desperate nature of the fighting, and
of the valour of our troops.

The first advance from our advanced base,
Shinauri, was fixed for the 20th, but in the mean-
time the enemy, aware of our intentions (for our
working parties trying to improve the road up to
the top of the Chagru Kotal, or ridge, and as far
as possible down the other side, had sufficiently
and unavoidably indicated our intended route), had
skilfully occupied in strength the village of Dargai
and the Narik spur, which forms the western
boundary of the Chagru Valley, and completely
dominates the road down it, by which we must
perforce descend. It was necessary, therefore, to
dislodge him from this coign of vantage as a pre-
liminary measure. Sir William Lockhart accord-
ingly ordered this to be done by the 2nd Division,
and planned that General Westmacott's brigade
should engage the enemy in front, supported by
No. 5 and No. 9 Mountain Batteries, while General
Kempster s brigade, accompanied by the scouts of
the 5th Gurkhas, No. 8 Mountain Battery, and No.
4 Co. Madras Sappers and Miners, should make
a wide detour to the west, and get round his
right flank and rear. Great secrecy was observed
in issuing the orders and making the necessary
arrangements for the attack, as it was very much
desired to find our friends "at home," but subse-
quent events have assured us that they are full of

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 59

fight, and may be depended upon to accept battle
whenever we choose to offer it. The conduct of
the operations was intrusted to General Sir Power
Palmer, as General Yeatman- Biggs was temporarily
laid up by sickness. It must be remembered that
he has been here since the beginning of August
last, and the hard work, single-handed for a long
time, and the exposure have naturally told upon
him.^

Leaving Shinauri at 4 A.M., General Kempsters
brigade, with which Sir Power Palmer himself
elected to march, commenced its circuitous climb
to turn the enemy's right flank. Westmacott
started an hour later, and by 9 a.m. had reached
the Chagru Kotal, on which at 9.20 his batteries
came into action against the ridge at Dargai, where
the enemy thickly clustered. The range was about
2500 yards, and though, of course, well within the
power of the 2.5-inch gun, a very perfect weapon
in its way, yet the fear was expressed that this
shell fire might have the not-to-be-desired effect
of dispersing the enemy too soon, and driving him
away before the infantry could get at him and
inflict severe punishment. No doubt this often has
been done, and as often regretted, for those who

^ Thb gallant officer died in January. ** He was in a very bad state of
health from the outset, but his indomitable spirit carried him through the
whole of the operations, only to die at Peshawar on the 4th January 1898.
I would fain have sent him back to India from the Samana, or subsequently
from Khangarbur, but the responsible medical officers considered him fit to
remain in the field, a decision which gratified him, though I personally could
not agree with it." — Sir Wm. Lockhart*s Dispatches,

6o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

fight and run away will live to fight another day,
and an enemy frightened away by long-range shell
fire may be likened to flies brushed off a pot of
honey by a wave of the hand. They are not hurt,
and will all settle again in the same place directly
you leave them alone. Fortunately in this instance
this was not the effect. The tribesmen were under
such excellent cover, naturally provided by the
rocks, and improved by walls, etc., built up by
themselves, that all they had to do was to lie low
and sit tight, and they soon found that the shells
did not hurt them very much. Meantime West-
macott s regfiments toiled up the steep ascent to
reach their foe, the ist Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles
leading, the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and
the Northamptons in close support (The fourth
regiment of this brigade, the gallant 36th Sikhs,
ever famous for their glorious defence of Saragheri
and Gulistan, was not out to-day.) It seemed in-
credible that any enemy could be turned out of
such a position as that occupied by the enemy now.
It literally had to be climbed up to, so steep and
precipitous was the mountain-side. In many places
the men could move only in single file, and progress
was perforce painfully slow. Sir William Lockhart,
attended by Brigadier-General Nicholson, the chief
of the staff, and by the rest of the headquarters
personnel, was on the Samana Sukh, closely observ-
ing the movement, and watches were often compared
to note how the attack was getting on. But if slow.

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 6i

it never flagged, and ere long the quick sharp cracks
of the enemy's rifles, mingled occasionally with the
louder booms of their jezails, showed that it was
coming under effective fire. At last, at twelve noon
exactly, a point was reached whence a rush across
the open must be made and the affair finished.
There was no hesitation. Gallantly led by Major
Rose, Captain Bateman-Champain, and Lieutenant
Beynon, the brave little Gurkhas streamed across
the deadly space as fast as their legs would carry
them, or the steep slope would permit. The Scottish
Borderers followed close, and with loud cheers the
crest of the hill was carried, and the enemy in full
retreat shot down as he nimbly fled over its reverse
slopes. It was a gallant action, reflecting great
credit on all engaged in it, and testifying to their
endurance as well as to their pluck. The really
dangerous zone crossed at the run was not more
than ICO yards across, but so close was the range,
and so hot the fire, that many a good soldier threw
up his arms and pitched heavily forward stricken
to death, before he reached the other side. The
Gurkhas left thirteen men killed and wounded on
this stony slope ; the Borderers six. It is quite
marvellous that this was all the loss. But the fact
is that about this time Kempster's brigade was
beginning to make the pressure of its advance felt,
and the tribesmen, ever anxious when their rear is
threatened, gave way probably with greater readi-
ness than they otherwise would have done.

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62 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

To the movements of this brigade I must now
advert. The route by which it advanced had been
reported on only by natives, and as usual their esti-
mate of its difficulties, and of the time required to
reach a given point, was much too low. As a matter
of fact, so extraordinarily bad was the track that
Sir Power Palmer, after some five miles had with
difficulty been accomplished, was compelled to send
back to Shinauri No. 8 Mountain Battery, and all
laden animals, under escort of the Dorsets, and two
companies of the 15 th Sikhs: the mountain -side
being absolutely impracticable for four-footed beasts.
And, though no effort was relaxed, for the General
well appreciated that it was Sir William Lockhart's
design that Kempster's brigade should deal the de-
cisive stroke from the rear, yet so long was the road,
and so terrific the climb, that the enemy was already
in retreat when at last Kempster's men appeared
upon the scene. They were, however, in time to
accelerate his departure with effective volleys, after
which they joined Westmacott on the captured
ridge. It was now past 2 p.m., and time to think
about returning to camp at Shinauri, fully eight miles
distant on a bad road. Westmacott's regiments
accordingly filed off at once, and between 4 p.m. and
5 P.M., when the sun was rapidly sinking in the west,
Kempster prepared to follow them. But, meantime,
the booming of the mountain guns, resounding up
and down the Khanki Valley, had spread the news
that a fight was going on, and from north and east

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 63

and west the Afridis and Orakzais hastened to the
scene of the strife, and General Kempster, who was
preparing to withdraw vi& the Chagru Kotal — ^by
the same road, that is, as Westmacott's troops — had
to make dispositions to meet them, and to cover the
movement in retreat. These dispositions were so
ably conceived, and executed with such alacrity and
spirit by the tired men, that they met with entire
success. The excellent practice of the batteries on
the Chagru Kotal, and the steady volleys and re-
solute bearing of, the Gordons, 15th Sikhs, and two
companies of the Borderers, who covered the with-
drawal from the heights, were too much for the
enemy, who, however, pressed their attack with
characteristic dash and courage. The fight was
carried on until long after darkness had set in ; but,
though the tribesmen by this time numbered several
thousands, they were steadily kept at bay and
severe loss inflicted on them, so much so that, after
passing the Chagru Kotal, the retreat was absolutely
unmolested. From that point there still remained
six long and weary miles to camp. General Palmer
reported that all the troops, British and Native, be-
haved with the greatest steadiness, but the honours
of the action must be divided between the Gordon
Highlanders^ and the 15th Sikhs, whose losses were
respectively ten and eight killed and wounded.
Amongst the former were Major Jennings-Bramly

' In this afiair, No. 2967, Private W. Rennie of the Gordon Highlanders,
shot down four of the enemy at close quarters, and obtained honourable men-
tion in General Palmer's Despatch.

64 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

killed, and Lieutenant Pears (attached from the
Scottish Rifles) severely wounded.

The towers and defences of Dargai were effect-
ually destroyed before the troops retired, and the
village itself was burned. The rear-guard reached
camp at eleven o'clock at night, having been under
arms since 4 A.M., marched between 20 and 25
miles, climbed some 3000 to 4000 feet, and fought
a severe action. It was not a bad day's work,
and on the following morning Sir William Lock-
hart telegraphed his congratulations to Sir Power
Palmer on having so successfully carried out his
instructions.

It was hoped that this action would drive the
enemy permanently from the Dargai heights, and
leave the road down the Chagru Valley open for
the safe passage of our troops ; but our expectations
were over-sanguine. The ardour of the tribesmen
was not at all quenched by their reverse on the i8th.
Reinforcements were hurried up to the enemy by
the maliks from Khangarbur and Ramadan, and the
evening of the 19th found them established in their
old position in greater strength than ever. The
question, of course, suggests itself. Why surrender
the position, having once captured it .-^ It may ^be
admitted at once that, had it been feasible, it would
certainly have been advantageous to hold the posi-
tion won, until, at least, the advance of the main
column to Khangarbur had been effected. But it
is a question if it was feasible. The water-supply

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 65

of Dargai was at a spot called Khand Talao, nearly
three miles away to the west, and the road to it was
commanded throughout by adjacent heights, so that,
in the presence of an enemy, water could not have
been obtained for the troops unless these heights,
as well as the village of Dargai, had been held in
force. Khand Talao itself was inaccessible to trans-
port animals coming either from Shinauri or from
Dargai. If at this stage it had been attempted
to occupy Dargai, and also to hold the heights
dominating the water-supply, serious delay in the
advance of the force into the Khanki Valley would
have been the certain consequence ; and the troops
engaged in the operation would not only have been
entangled in extremely difficult ground, where, until
the communications had been improved, it would have
been almost impossible to supply them betimes with
food, water, and ammunition, but also, until we had
established ourselves strongly in the Khanki Valley,
they would have been exposed to serious attack from
the north and west. Thus grave complications might
have arisen, and attention and strength would have
been diverted from the main and all-important object
(which at this time was the capture of the passes
leading into Tirah) into indecisive side-issues.

In fact, to hold Dargai alone with a small detach-
ment, as was possible laier, was impossible while
the enemy were masters of the Khanki Valley.
While to attempt the major operation of occupying
the position in force, and the heights beyond it too.

66 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

would have been a hazardous experiment in view of
the considerations stated, and a source of anxiety
and weakness rather than of confidence and strength.
The fact that the place was reoccupied by the enemy
in greater strength than ever as soon as we with-
drew from it, shows that any detachment left there
on the night of the i8th would at once have been
fiercely attacked.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the
primary object of the operations on the i8th was
to drive off the comparatively small bodies of the
enemy (Orakzai Alikhels) who at that time held
Dargai, and who constantly annoyed our working-
parties on the road below. Nothing more than this
was contemplated ; nor was it anticipated that they
would be strongly and immediately reinforced by the
Afridis, or possibly other arrangements might have
been made. But in the actual circumstances, and in
view of Sir William's orders for the 20th, to which
I shall refer presently, the requirements of the case
did not appear to justify action which, as I have
shown, would almost certainly have delayed and
dislocated the whole plan of campaign.^

To continue — On the 19th October it had been
the intention of Sir William Lockhart that the
2nd Division should resume work on the Chagru

1 I have written at some length on this matter, because no point in the
campaign has been so adversely criticised as this £ulure to hold the Dargai
heights when they had been once captured. There are always two sides to
every question, but irresponsible critics, and men with theories, will often
persist in seeing one only.

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 67

Kotal-Khorappa road. After the severe fighting,
and the losses which the Afridis had sustained on
the previous day, it was not unreasonably surmised
that the presence of our men, working under the
protection of strong covering -parties (which had
been arranged), might deter the enemy from re-
occupying Dargai. But the troops had been much
fatigued on the i8th, and had an arduous task
before them again on the 20th, when the march to
the Khanki Valley was ordered to begin, so General
Yeatman-Biggs decided to give them a rest. Sir
William Lockhart on the Samana (Headquarters at
this time were at Fort Lockhart) was not aware of
this resolution until it was too late for further action
in the matter. Otherwise, convinced of the im-
portance of having the working -parties out, he
would have ordered them to be covered by troops
from the ist Division.

We now come to the 20th, when the advance
from Shinauri into the Khanki Valley must be com-
menced in earnest, the 2nd Division leading. Sir
William Lockhart's original instructions to the Com-
mander for this advance had been to move by the
direct route, via the Chagru Kotal, and the road on
the west side of the Chagru defile. But, late in the
evening of the 19th, General Yeatman-Biggs wired
up to say that, as the Dargai heights were now occu-
pied again in strength by the enemy, he proposed
to march down the eastern side of the defile, via the
Samana Sukh and the Talia spur. This movement

68 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

would, in his opinion, avoid the loss that would
be incurred by using the other road, and engaging
the enemy on the way, strongly posted as they
were on such commanding vantage-ground.

Sir William Lockhart could not, however, ap-
prove this idea. His previous decision had been
deliberately arrived at, and was based on the fact
that he had reliable information that the road down
the Talia spur was a mere goat-track, quite unfit for
laden animals. But more than this, it was obvious
that any attempt to thus evade the tribesmen posted
about Dargai would not only have failed in its
object, but also would have, in all probability, en-
couraged them to attack us. They could easily
descend from Dargai, and, crossing the defile, vigor-
ously harass and oppose the difficult march down
the thickly -wooded and precipitous slopes of the
Talia spur; and to be caught on such ground
during a tedious processional movement, encum-
bered by long trains of baggage, supplies, and
hospitals, in a position, in fact, in which no com-
mander would willingly sustain an assault, in which
reinforcement would be difficult, and from which
withdrawal would be dangerous, was an experiment
too full of risks to be permitted.

A reply was therefore sent that night to General
Yeatman- Biggs that the original plan must be ad-
hered to, and the difficulty faced. It was intimated
to him at the same time that two battalions of the
I St Division, and one of its batteries, might be

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 69

borrowed for the day to assist in clearing the Dargai
heights, and that the Northamptons, and No. 9
Mountain Battery, from Fort Lockhart, would co-
operate from the Samana Sukh. It was further
remarked that the enemy would in all probability
evacuate the heights as soon as the advancing
troops reached the point below the Kotal— only
some two or three miles — where the Narik Darra
joins the defile, as their rear would then be
threatened.

It is thus clear that Sir William Lockhart's in-
tention was to engage the enemy in front with a
portion of the force, while other troops pushed down
the defile and threatened their rear, vid the Narik
Darra — a combination which would almost certainly
have expelled them from their position on the
heights without such severe loss as a purely frontal
attack must inevitably involve. But General Yeat-
man- Biggs held that it would be dangerous to march
men down the defile until the heights overhanging
it had been captured, and, acting on this judgment,
ordered a direct assault by the main front approach
to be delivered as soon as his leading troops had
reached the Kotal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the
20th ; and it only remains now to record how
gallantly it was carried out.

General Kempster's brigade, consisting of the
Dorsets, the Gordons, the 2nd Gurkhas, and the
15th Sikhs, was charged with the task of storming
the frowning heights, and it was strengthened for

70 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

the occasion by the Derbyshires and the 3rd Sikhs,
lent by the ist Division, and supported by the fire
of three batteries on the Kotal under Colonel Purdy,
R.A., No. 8 M.B. R.A., No. i Kohat M.B., and
No. 5 Bombay M.B., while on the Samana Sukh
No. 9 M.B. R.A., and the Northamptons, stood
ready to help if required. The tribesmen were
assembled in far greater strength than on the 1 8th.
Numerous contingents had joined them in the in-
terim. Nineteen standards were counted, represent-
ing all the principal Afridi and Orakzai clans, and it
was evident they were prepared to offer a desperate
resistance. In vain did the united batteries shower
their deadly missiles upon them. The fire was heavy
and precise, as any onlooker might see ; but on the
foe, sheltered behind rocks and sangars, the guns
could do but little execution, though doubtless it was
cheering to the infantry struggling towards the
accomplishment of their desperate task to feel that
their friends the gunners were doing their best for
them. By 11. 15 a.m. the fatal zone was reached by
the leading troops, the scouts of the 3rd Gurkhas,
under Lieutenant Tillard,^ and the ist Battalion 2nd
Gurkhas, under Colonel Eaton Travers, and, rushing
across it, these brave men, splendidly led by their
gallant officers, reached cover on the far side. But
it was a costly rush, and was met by such a hot and
well-aimed fire, that all they could do was to hold on

^ Lieutenant Tillard was afterwards actually the first man on the ridge.
His orderly, Hastbir, was a good second.

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 71

to the position they had reached, without being able
to advance farther. Major Judge was killed on the
spot by a shot through the head. Captain Robinson
was mortally wounded, and many more dotted the
slope, struck down by the leaden hail. In vain did
others attempt to follow the splendid lead that had
been given them. Their vigilance now fully roused,
the enemy poured down such a murderous fire from the
cliffs above that the head of each formation attempt-
ing the fatal passage was swept away, and Gurkhas,
Dorsets, and Derbys, suffering terribly and enduring
bravely, could get no farther. At this juncture
General Yeatman- Biggs ordered the Gordons and
the 3rd Sikhs to the front, and General Kempster,
arranging first for three minutes' concentrated fire
on the sangars by the massed batteries, launched
them to assault. The time had arrived for desperate
action, for it was now nearly three o'clock in the
afternoon, the dead and wounded were lying thick
on every side, over 100 men had already fallen, and
the enemy were shouting their defiance, waving
their standards, and beating their drums, confident
in the impregnability of their position, and certain
now of success. But the Gordons had yet to be
reckoned with. Rapidly forming his men and
addressing them in burning words,^ Colonel Mathias
dashed out at the head of his gallant regiment, and,
closely backed by the 3rd Sikhs, in a moment they

1 (< Highlanders ! The General says the position must be taken at all
cocu. The Gordons will take it ! "

72 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

were all across, carrying every one with them in the
impetuosity of their onrush, storming the ridge with
a resolution that was resistless, and beating down all
opposition. It was indeed a splendid exploit, and
thrilled the nerves of all who were privileged to
witness it.

But stay. Did I say that they were " all across" ?
Well, that is wrong. Three men of the Gordons,
including Lieutenant Lamont, dropped killed on the
spot, and forty-one more fell, more or less severely
wounded, amongst them Major Macbean,^ shot
through the groin ; Lieutenant Dingwall, severely
hit in four places; Lieutenant Meiklejohn, Lieu-
tenant Craufurd, and Captain Uniacke, all slightly
wounded ; and Colonel Mathias himself, hit in the
foot, but only slightly. Many others were shot
through their clothes or accoutrements, and had
marvellous escapes. The other regiments all suffered
heavily too. The Dorsets had nine killed and forty
wounded, including Captain Arnold, whose wound
was dangerous ; ^ the Derbys four killed, including
Captain Smith, and eight wounded ; the Gurkhas
eighteen killed and forty-nine wounded ; the scouts
two killed and two wounded ; and the 3rd Sikhs
three killed and twenty wounded, including Lieu-

^ Major Macbean was among the first to spring from coyer, and lead his
men to the attack. He was shot almost immediately, but continued to cheer
his men on while lying on the ground.

' Captain Arnold was wounded in a heroic attempt to lead his men across
the deadly space before the Gordon rush occurred. « Come on, £ Com-
pany !*' he shouted, and sprung to the front, but was struck down almost
immediately by the deadly hail from above.

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 73

tenant White, shot through the chest. This fine
corps splendidly supported the Gordons in their
great charge, and their Colonel, Tonnochy, was con-
spicuous in the forefront of the rush. The grand
total of killed and wounded was 199. This will give
some idea of the difficulty of the position, and the
severity and accuracy of the fire to which the
assaulting columns were exposed, and in a situation,
too, whence they could not reply with much effect.
The enemy's losses, too, were severe, but, as usual,
they managed to carry off most of their dead and
wounded, and it is impossible to estimate them
accurately. They, however, acknowledge defeat,
and have made no attempt since to molest the victors,
or to retake the lost position, on which the brigade
bivouacked for the night. The dead and wounded
were carried back to Shinauri, where the former
were buried with the honours which they had so
gloriously earned, and the wounded were placed in
the base hospitals, where there is every arrangement
possible for their care and comfort.

Such is the story of the fighting on the i8th and
20th of October, and, whatever criticisms may be
passed on the why and the wherefore of it, it will
always remain a noble monument to the valour of
our troops, and to the splendid heroism of British
officers as troop leaders.

Before dismissing this subject, I must narrate two
or three incidents connected with the Gordons' grand
attack, which are worth placing on record.

74 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

The first is, that they were headed in their
memorable rush by their pipers. One of these,
named Findlater, blowing his loudest and best, was
among the first to show the way across that deadly
strip of ground above described, and when, after
traversing but a few yards, he was laid low, shot
through both legs, he managed to prop himself up
against a boulder and continued with unabated
energy to play "The Cock o' the North," ani-
mating his comrades by the familiar and stirring
music of his beloved pipes. This hero has been
recommended for the Victoria Cross, and we all
sincerely hope he will get it, for it has been grandly
earned.

Another is that, as the Gordons breasted the last
stiff ascent, Colonel Mathias, no longer quite in his
first youth, was somewhat short of breath, and said
to Colour -Sergeant Mackie, alongside whom he
found himself at this moment — *' Stiff climb, eh,
Mackie? Not quite — so young — as I was — you
know.'' '^Nevermind, sir/'' answered the gallant
Sergeant, giving his CO. a hearty slap of genuine
admiration on the back, which almost knocked his
remaining wind out of him — ''Never mind, sir!
Ye' re gaun verra strong for an auld man / "

I must add, that when the ridge was captured the
Gordons of their own accord lined up and gave three
cheers for their gallant Colonel, and officers, British
and Native, of Sikhs and Gurkhas, crowded round
to shake him by the hand.

V THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI 75

The only other incident I would mention is, that
on the 22nd Sir William Lockhart had the Gordons
paraded, and addressed them with reference to their
dashing conduct on the 20th. " Your records," said
Sir William, ** testify to many a gallant action per-
formed by you, and you have now added to them
another which may worthily rank beside those that
have gone before. There is more hard work ahead
for us all, and I am confident you will do your share
of it well when the time comes to call upon you
for a fresh effort." Sir William thanked Colonel
Mathias personally, and the assembled officers, for
their gallant leading, and the parade was then dis-
missed. The men were immensely pleased by the
prompt and kindly praise bestowed by the Chief

CHAPTER VI

IN THE KHANKI VALLEY

Khangarbur, 27M October,

At daybreak on the next day, the 21st, the 2nd
Division commenced its advance to the Khanki
Valley according to programme, Sir William Lock-
hart and staff accompanying the movement, but
marching independently from Fort Logkhart, down
the Talia spur, with the Northamptons, the 36th
Sikhs, and No. 9 Mountain Battery. The reports
previously received on the state of this road were
amply confirmed now. The baggage of even this
small force did not reach Khangarbur until late on
the 22nd, and some of it not until mid-day on the
23rd. The first intention had been to move on this
day only as far as Khorappa, but that locality, situated
at the junction of the Chagru defile with the Khanki
river, is so commanded on every side by overhang-
ing heights, that the advance was continued another
two and a half miles up the valley to a spot nearly
opposite the large fortified village of Khangarbur,
where an extensive plateau on the north bank of

CHAP. VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 77

the Khanki afforded the necessary space for the
large force assembling, and, by its remoteness from
the nearest commanding ground, promised fair
security against those prowling marauders (com-
monly known as snipers) whose chief amusement is
to fire into your camp all night.

Khangarbur was full of Afridis, who briskly
opened fire upon the leading brigade — General
Westmacott's — but No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A.,
promptly coming into action, pitched some shells
into the village, and the enemy decided not to
remain. Some infantry who were pushed to the
front quickened their retreat, and they were soon
out of sight in the hills to the north. There were
no casualties on our side, and probably very few on
theirs.

The march from Shinauri to this place (Khan-
garbur) is a very long and trying one, fully thirteen
miles up hill and down dale, along what in many
places is a rough track barely a foot wide, and for
the last four or five miles is merely the stony bed
of a ravine. Where men, and mules, and guns, and
baggage animals have to follow such a trail in single
file it is easy to imagine how the column is stretched
out. The tail of it is hardly clear of the old camp
when the head is arriving at the new. Then
supervenes darkness, with all its attendant discom-
forts and dangers and risks. All calculations as to
time and space are simply set at naught by con-
ditions such as obtain in a country like this. A

78 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

wretched mule falls down, and the road is blocked
at once. A check of this kind, occurring not once
but a hundred times probably in the course of the
day, multiplies in effect in geometrical progression
as it passes from front to rear, and causes delays and
fatigues which it is simply impossible to describe in
words.

The difficulties of this country must be seen to
be appreciated, and it must also be remembered
that it produces nothing in the way of supplies
except here and there a very moderate amount of
forage for the transport animals. Hence everything
must be carried with us. Then consider what our
numbers are. There are now assembled on this
ground 6800 British ranks, 10,200 native ranks,
17,000 followers, and upwards of 25,000 animals!
The daily requirements of this multitude in the way
of food alone (and they have other needs) amount to
3000 maunds* weight of stuff at a moderate esti-
mate (i maund = 8o lbs.). But the road from our
base at Shinauri is at present so long and- winding,
and narrow and steep, and so crowded with troops
and traffic, that supplies can only be very gradually
brought up, and are consumed here almost as soon
as they arrive ; while to crown our difficulties, it is
almost impossible to send back to Shinauri the
unladen transport animals, because of the extreme
narrowness of the track, on which two mules can
hardly pass each other, except at a few points.
Needless to say, sappers and pioneers have been,

"A wrelchtil mukf.i

VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 79

and are, toiling without ceasing to improve it, and
every day has made it better, but their work is
dreadfully interrupted by the ceaseless stream of
traffic. In fact, it has been a case of stopping the
traffic or stopping the work.

The consequence of such extraordinary difficulties
is, of course, that we have remained here longer
than was anticipated to let the columns close up.
But the I St and 2nd Divisions are assembled now;
and as we are here within six or seven miles of the
foot of the Sampagha Pass, it will, after all, be
attacked on the 28th or 29th, as I advised you some
days ago.

I have gone into all this at some length by way
of explanation of our long halt here, which no doubt
is criticised and commented upon adversely in many
quarters, and perhaps by some who ought to know
better. But an army must be fed, and it would be
more than rash to attempt hasty movements in
advance, and reckless enterprises, against a hardy
and daring enemy, without being assured of ample
supplies for man and beast, and feeling confident
that every position gained can be maintained and
supported.

But if we can satisfactorily account to ourselves
for this long waiting, we cannot make the why and
wherefore of it clear to the Afridis. They, of
course, put it down to hesitation and fear, and in
proportion to the timidity which we (in their
estimation) display, do their own courage and

8o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

confidence increase, and their numbers too. If
happily we could have attacked the Sampagha
Pass within a day or two of arrival here, we should
probably have found it not a very hard task to
capture it, for it would not then have been defended
by more than half the men that hold it now. But
our unavoidable delay has been the tribesmen's
opportunity, and they have made the most of it.
Our latest information is that all the Afridi clans
are now fully represented on the Sampagha, and
that, combined with the Orakzais, there are not
less than 10,000 or 12,000 of the enemy in our
immediate neighbourhood. We also know from
political reports — reconnaissances and spies — that
they have been busy for some time past in adding
to and strengthening the defences of the pass,
building walls and sangars to command all likely
approaches, digging trenches and rifle pits, and
erecting obstacles. Amongst them are hundreds of
old pensioned soldiers, many of whom have served
their time in our sapper companies, so they know
the business well, and are now turning to excellent
account the training they have had in our ranks.
So the storming of the Sampagha Pass will be
something to achieve ; but there is only one feeling
among the troops in regard to it, and that is eager-
ness to begin, and anxiety to be in the leading
brigades.

But besides these reports of the gathering of the
clans, and of their preparations to defend vigorously

IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 8i

the first of the great gateways of their country, we
have other evidence of their numbers, activity, and
boldness : for day by day our foraging parties have
been harassed by them, and night by night our
camp has been surrounded and fusiladed with
increasing audacity and severity. On the night of
the 23rd particularly the enemy's onset amounted
almost to an attack, and some of the picquets were
heavily engaged from dusk until after midnight. A
few star shells were fired with good effect, and the
blood-stains found the next morning in many direc-
tions, with a few bodies actually retrieved within
only 30 or 40 yards of our lines, attested at once
the boldness of our assailants, and the fact that they
had not gone away unpunished. Our own casualties
were insignificant.

The night of the 24th passed in comparative
quiet But on the 25th the foe seemed to have
recovered his spirit, for all our foraging parties on
that day, though strongly guarded by guns as well
as by infantry, were much harassed by crowds of
Afridis, who followed them up with amazing energy
and intrepidity as they returned to camp, and
excited general comment and admiration by the
skill with which they skirmished on the mountain
side, and by the accuracy and judgment with which
they delivered their fire. There was more than one
instance of their waiting with coolness until our
infantry had to show themselves on the sky-line as
they crossed the crest of some ridge, and then

82 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap.

delivering a volley, at a range of 1000 yards some-
times, and invariably knocking some one over.

As darkness came on they closed in on the
camp, and their marksmen, establishing themselves
in coigns of vantage, began to make it extremely
unpleasant for us. I do not know anything more
uncomfortable than this whistling of bullets round
one from hidden enemies. The fire cannot be
replied to, nor can you escape from it, for it comes
from all directions, and you are as much exposed in
one spot as another. On this particular evening
the casualties were numerous among men and
followers and animals, some twenty odd being hit.
Captain Badcock, D.S.O., 5th Gurkhas, Field
Intelligence officer, was shot in the left arm just as
he sat down to dinner, and Lieutenant -Colonel
Hadow, 15th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Crocker,
Munster Fusiliers, orderly officer to Brigadier-
General Kempster, were wounded. Many other
officers had very narrow escapes, bullets just miss-
ing them, or going through their tents. Poor
Badcock was hit by a Snider bullet, which shattered
the bone so dreadfully that amputation was necessary
at once. He has borne the operation well, and, we
hope, will soon make a good recovery. Two distant
hills from which the fire on the camp seemed to be
chiefly directed, one to the east and the other to
the south-west, were occupied last night by our own
troops, a wing of the 3rd Gurkhas holding one, and
the Nabha Infantry, with admirable spirit, volunteer-

VI IN THE KHANKI VALLEY 83

ing to hold the other. The consequence was we
were left in comparative peace, and slept the sleep
of the just

I told you by wire of the five men, Afridis, who
came in on the 24th and gave themselves up to one
of our picquets, saying they wished to be loyal and
would not fight against us. They proved to be a
subadar and a sepoy of the 26th Punjab Infantry,
and three pensioned native officers of other corps,
all of whom, as it was at once remarked, might very
well have come in weeks ago without hindrance had
they really wished to prove their loyalty. But
arriving on the eve of a general engagement, and
coming straight from the enemy, strongly posted
within six miles of us, it does seem as if there was
more in it than meets the eye. For surely the
Afridis would not have let them pass over to us
with the chance that they might reveal all their
plans and dispositions and strength, unless they had
some ulterior design in letting them go. If, how-
ever, they reckoned that we should receive them
with open arms, pat them on the back, and give
them liberty to come and go as friends, they mis-
calculated, for the five men were carefully blind-
folded while being conducted into Sir William
Lockhart's presence, and are detained as prisoners
pending the development of events.

The Queen s gracious message of approval of
the valour of her troops, of sympathy, and of tender
inquiry after the welfare of the wounded, has been

84 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, vi

greatly appreciated by all ranks and has gladdened
many hearts. The feeling that Her Majesty is
watching the progress of events on this wild frontier,
as attentively and anxiously as any of her subjects,
animates every soldier in this force to render the
best service of which he is capable.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS

Camp in the Mastura Valley, 30M October,

At last we are fairly under way. It was a week of
weary waiting at Khangarbur, but it was inevitable,
and I have fully explained why. But the time was
not wasted. Reconnaissances and foraging parties
were sent out daily, good exercises for men and
officers, resulting in the acquisition of useful informa-
tion regarding routes, etc., and in the accumulation
of a considerable quantity of fodder for the transport
animals, and a limited amount of grain. Also, as
there were constant skirmishes with the enemy,
without serious loss on either side, and as, moreover,
after each encounter we always perforce retired to
our camp, he was gently encouraged, so many of
us fondly hoped, to believe himself equal, if not
superior, to us, and so we imagined would make a
bold stand on the Sampagha, and give us a chance
to beat him there handsomely. In this expectation,
however, we have been deceived, as the sequel will
show. Finally, during the week that we were

86 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

reconnoitring, and foraging, and skirmishing, the
commissariat were busy pouring supplies into Khan-
garbur, the road to which from Shinauri has now
been so much improved by the strenuous exertions
of the Engineers, that even camels can traverse it ;
and on the 26th and 27th a convoy of 3CXX) of these
animals, which carry loads of 4CX) lbs. each, came
safely through to our camp. Thus, by the evening
of the 27th, Sir William Lockhart was prepared to
resume the advance in earnest, and to the joy of all
the long-looked-for orders for the move were issued
on that date.

The march to Gundaki was a very short and easy
one on paper, barely three and a half miles ; but it
meant a good deal more than that for the troops
engaged in it. From Khangarbur the route lay
almost due north up a broad and undulating valley,
fully one and a half miles wide at the start, but
narrowing just beyond Gundaki to barely one-third
of that distance. It is bounded on the east and
west by low hills, which had to be cleared of the
enemy and crowned by our infantry before the force
could advance. On the east particularly lay some
heights which had been regularly held by the Afridis,
and on which, on the evening of the 2 7th, we could
count five or six standards and see crowds of men.
The 36th Sikhs and the Northampton Regiment
were accordingly ordered to start at 5 a.m. and turn
them out, and this was effected without more trouble
than was involved in an arduous climb. For your

VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS 87

Pathan is not an early riser. He will say his evening
prayer with fervour, and eat his evening meal with
gusto, and then, fortified in the spirit and in the
flesh, he will sling his rifle on his back, stick his
knife into his belt, and start out for a few hours' real
enjoyment before he turns in : which means that up to
about II P.M. (or later, if the sport is good) he will
amuse himself by shooting into his enemy's camp, or
by stalking and cutting up stray camp followers or
belated convoys. But about midnight, conscious of
duty thoroughly done, he will retire to his eyrie in
the rocks, curl himself up, and sleep if allowed until
the sun has topped the horizon, and its rays have
warmed the chill morning air. Consequently, he is
not infrequently caught napping, if only he be sought
early enough. And so it happened on this occasion.
Before the Afridis were fully aware of the manoeuvre,
the column, under Colonel Chaytor, was upon them,
and hastily bolting, their movements quickened by a
few volleys, they abandoned their vantage ground,
and the right flank of the force was made secure for
the day.

Similarly, the hills on the left of the road were
cleared by troops (the Yorks, half- battalion 4th
Gurkhas, and half- battalion 3rd Sikhs) detached
from the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee's), and by
9 A.M. the force was in full march up the valley, the
First Division on the left of the line, the Second
on the right, both preceded, of course, by strong
advanced guards. Sir William Lockhart himself

88 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

rode at the head of the main body of the First
Division.

The opposition offered by the enemy to this
advance was practically «z7, and there were only
some ten or twelve casualties incurred in the skir-
mishing on the flanks. On arriving on the ground
on which it was proposed to encamp for the night,
or rather bivouac (for the force is without tents), the
troops were halted, and piled arms, while the baggage
and rearguards closed up. In the meantime. Sir
William Lockhart, from commanding ground well to
the front, examined the approaches to the pass, and
arranged the plan of attack for the following day.
Up to the point now reached, the ground had been,
as I have said, undulating and easy, and with a
gentle rise towards the pass. But directly the
Kandi Mishti stream was crossed, which here lay at
our feet, it was roughly broken up by ravines and
nullahs, between which long rugged spurs ran out
from the mountain side, ending many of them in
precipitous slopes, which could only be ascended in
single file and at particular points. The road up the
Sampagha Pass was in full view, zigzagging up one
of these spurs. To the east of it (on our right, that
is, as we stood facing the position), on an adjacent
spur, was the village of Nazeno, which appeared to
be full of armed men ; and to the west the village of
Kandi Mishti was similarly held. High up on the
zigzag path, sangars and walls could be seen, and
everything pointed to a stout defence and a sharp

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vii THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS 89

fight on the following day. It was not to be, how-
ever, notwithstanding that reconnaissances were fired
on briskly, and that our picquets this night were
sharply attacked, particularly on the left flank, inci-
dents all tending to confirm the belief that the enemy
meant to fight.

The plan of attack was as follows, omitting
details : —

The honour of leading the direct attack by the
main approach to the pass was intrusted to the
2nd Brigade (General Gaselee s), the Gurkha scouts
of the division co-operating. This brigade was to
leave its bivouac at 5 a.m., and it was reckoned
would be across the Kandi Mishti stream, and
established on the far side of it by daylight. By
the same hour, the massed batteries of the two
divisions, thirty-six guns, under Brigadier-General
Spragge, and the rocket detachment, under Captain
Browne, R.A., were to be in position on a flat-
topped spur beyond the stream, almost opposite
the centre of the position to be attacked. The
4th Brigade (Westmacott's) was to support the 2nd,
particularly on its right flank, and the 3rd Brigade
(Kempster's) was to follow it in reserve. The ist
Brigade (General Hart's) was distributed to protect
the batteries, and to co-operate with, and support
the whole movement by detaching a regiment to
assail the village of Nazeno on the right flank of
our advance, and another to attack Kandi Mishti
on the left flank. I may say here that the Devons

90 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

on one side, and on the other the 2nd battalion ist
Gurkha Rifles (who, by the way, had their colonel,
Sage, severely wounded in a reconnaissance the
previous evening) carried out these operations very
successfully. The baggage was left in camp ready
for loading under suitable guards, which included
the Nabha Infantry, and a squadron of the i8th
Bengal Lancers, with instructions that it was to be
brought on directly a helio message was sent back
to it.

Such were briefly Sir William Lockhart's dis-
positions for the attack on the Sampagha Pass, to
which every one has been so keenly looking forward
for so many days past, and, notwithstanding some
small delays caused in the beginning of the opera-
tions, they were entirely successful. The morning of
29th October was dark and cold, but still and clear.
General Hart's Brigade was the first to move off,
and had occupied its allotted positions in good time
to protect the batteries as they took up their ground,
and to cover the general advance. But in such a
difficult country, and in the dark, it is particularly
easy to lose your way. The batteries of the First
Division got blocked on the road, and thus were
somewhat late in coming into action ; and General
Gaselee's Brigade took a wrong turning in one of
the ravines through which it was threading its way,
and lost a little time before it recovered its right
direction. But these mistakes were soon put right.
By 7 A.M. the attack was fairly launched on the

VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PAS^ 91

lines designed by Sir William, and it soon became
evident that the enemy did not mean to fight very
seriously, for they could be seen vacating positions
in many directions, and wending their way up to
the very crest of the pass, as though it was there
they had determined to make their stand.

At one important point, however, on the zigzag
road, there was a large sangar which evidently held
some determined spirits; and as the Queen's and
the 4th Gurkhas, who led the advance (their
General with them) in capital style, approached it,
a smart fire was opened on them, and several men
were knocked over. The fire of the batteries of
the Second Division was, however, turned on to
this sangar with such effect that, after standing
about twenty minutes of it, its occupants, some
hundred or so, bolted, and the shells knocked many
of them over as they fled up the hill-side. After
this the infantry advance was nowhere opposed by
anything like an organised defence, though a
sputtering fire was aimed at it from many points,
and casualties occurred here and there. The
Queen's had one man killed and eight wounded
(including their commanding officer. Major Han-
ford Flood), the Gurkhas two, the Yorkshires
four, the 36th Sikhs two men killed and two
wounded. No. 8 M.B., R.A., three men wounded;
No. 5 Bombay M.B. lost its commanding
officer. Captain De Butts, killed by a shot in the
abdomen, and there were a few other casualties.

I©©©] %l

92 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

But the total was insignificant in proportion to
the size of the force engaged, the magnitude
of the enterprise, and the great natural strength
of the position held by the enemy. Had they
defended it with one - quarter of the determina-
tion shown by them on the Dargai heights on the
20th inst, no doubt the loss of life would have
been far greater. Let us be thankful that they
did not. The fact is that, on this occasion at all
events, they seemed afraid to face the artillery fire.
The practice made by the batteries was certainly
excellent. Their shells appeared to burst with
beautiful precision just where wanted, and their
handling generally on this day was admirable.

By 9.45 A.M. the leading troops of General
Symons's division had arrived on the crest of the
ridge, and the pass was captured, but it was some-
what later — II. 1 5 is, I understand, the official time —
when the enemy had been entirely driven off, and
firing had ceased. Sir William Lockhart himself,
attended by General Nicholson, Sir Richard Udny,
Lord Methuen, and the rest of his staff, had by this
time arrived on the summit, whence a heliogram
was at once despatched announcing the news to the
Commander-in-Chief, and to his Excellency the
Viceroy. The troops had all acquitted themselves
admirably, for the climb had been a most arduous
one, and though the opposition had not been very
serious, yet the attack had been carried right
through from start to finish without a check. The

VII THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS 93

summit of the pass is 6700 feet above sea-level, so
an ascent of fully 2000 feet was included in the
morning s work.

The Mastura Valley now lay smiling below us.
Its general level is only some 800 to 1000 feet
below the crest of the pass, so the descent into it
by a terribly stony, but very gently graded, road
was a very simple matter. The troops were pushed
on at once, the Yorks and the 3rd Sikhs remaining
on the pass for the night, to protect the transport
with which the road was now blocked, and Brigadier-
General Hart's Brigade halting at Kandi Mishti to
maintain communication with Gundaki.

We have all been much struck by the appear-
ance of this valley. It is wide, flat, well watered
even here at its head, fairly timbered with apricot
and walnut trees about the villages, which are very
numerous and well-built, and evidently inhabited by
an industrious and well-to-do people. A great deal
of land is under cultivation, the fields are carefully
terraced, and signs of plenty and comfort are
abundant. But the inhabitants, of course, have all
fled. With their families, their flocks and their
herds, they have betaken themselves across the
mountains to some remote fastnesses, or possibly
across the Afghan border, until this time of tribula-
tion be overpast.

The last two days have been such a tax upon
the transport that to-day, the 30th, Sir William has
decided to halt, partly to rest the animals, and partly

94 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, vix

to reconnoitre the onward road. The Arhanga Pass
is now within five miles of us. It leads us into
Tirah proper, the inviolate home of the Afridis.
Will they defend it like men, or will they scatter
and scuttle before our advance, as they, and their
neighbours, the Orakzais, did yesterday ? That is
the question of the moment. Another twenty-four
hours should see it answered.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS, AND THE

OCCUPATION OF TIRAH

Headquarters Camp, Maidan, Tirah,
5 /A November*

Here we are in the promised land at last ! A land
not exactly flowing with milk and honey, but ex-
tensive, fertile, highly cultivated, and capable of
much development under a settled government.
But of this more presently. The past week has
been an eventful and important one, and I must
hark back to its commencement and take up the
thread of my narrative where I last dropped it.

I closed my last letter on the 30th October in
the Mastura Valley, the day after that on which
the Sampagha Pass was captured. Sir William
Lockhart would gladly have gone on at once to the
attack of the Arhanga Pass, and the troops would
have cheerfully responded had he called on them
for this effort, which at one time was at all events
considered. But prudence dictated a halt for at
least twenty -four hours. In the first place, the
distance to the pass was uncertain, and its difficulties^

96 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

based altogether on native report, a matter of con-
jecture. In the next, it was absolutely necessary to
let the transport close up, and give the Commissariat
time to push up supplies. Many regiments, so
great was the block on the Sampagha, did not get
their baggage on the evening of the 29th, and spent
the night d la belle itoile with only their greatcoats
and the rations carried in their haversacks.^ For
these reasons Sir William decided to halt one day
to rest the troops and the baggage animals, to
allow supplies to come on, and to reconnoitre the
approaches to the Arhanga, whose heights no
European had heretofore scaled.

Thus, while the reconnaissance was proceeding
on the 30th, the Commissariat and Transport Staff
devoted their best energies to keep the stream of
laden mules and ponies flowing throughout the day
from Gundaki over the Sampagha into the camp at
Mastura. Sappers and Miners and Pioneers toiled
unceasingly to improve the road, and the whole of
the I St Brigade, under General Hart's personal
direction, exerted itself to press on the important
work by helping to control and direct the traffic.
There were some who thought it would be im-
possible, so great was the block on the road, to
make such arrangements by the evening as would

1 '* My great difficulty was the want of food, some corps having absolutely
nothing in hand, and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the
arrival of supplies. But by redistributing what there was, and making use of
what could be collected from neighbouring villages, each man was eventually
provided with two days* rations." — Sir William Loekharfs Despatcka,

▼Ill THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 97

justify a forward move on the 31st. But Colonel
Christopher, the Commissary -General with the
force, is a resourceful man and a masterful. His
spirits, too, are never-failing, and his way of always
taking a rosy view of things, and of making the best
of a situation, has the effect of reassuring his sub-
ordinates and making them cheerfully put their best
work into the task of the moment. In Major
Mansfield, too, the head of the Transport, he has
a most efficient assistant; and it was enough for
General Nicholson, the chief of the Staff", to
intimate what were Sir William Lockhart's wishes
regarding the advance on the morrow for Colonel
Christopher to determine that, so far as his
department was concerned, it could be arranged.^

In the meantime, Sir William Lockhart himself,
attended by the principal officers of his Staff", and
escorted by General Kempster's Brigade, and a
battery of artillery, rode out to view the road and
examine the approaches to the Arhanga Pass, and,
as far as might be, the enemy's dispositions. The
party was fired on soon after leaving camp, but the
enemy fell back as our skirmishers advanced, and
careful observations were made almost up to the
foot of the pass, on which Sir William was able to
plan the attack for the morrow. The whole distance
from camp to the summit of the pass is only about
four miles.

^ ** Thoroughly acquainted with their work, and foil of resource, these
officers never raised unnecessary difficulties, and were always ready to meet
military requirements." — 5t> William Lockharfs Dispatches,

98 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

It was at once obvious that this pass was an
easier one to attack than the Sampagha. The ap-
proaches to it were not broken up by such frequent
and deep ravines, there was more favourable ground
for turning movements, and opposite the centre of
the position was a low hill, which, at a range of
barely 1300 yards from the crest of the pass, formed
an ideal position for artillery. On the other hand,
no enemy, certainly not an enemy with the reputa-
tion and the rifles of the Afridis, should have
allowed himself to be driven from such a position as
that formed by the Arhanga heights without in-
flicting terrible loss on the assailant. Behind the
rocks and sangars on the crest-line, or sheltered on
the reverse slopes of the mountain, they could not
after all be very much hurt by shell-fire ; while from
their lofty vantage-ground they could note, and, if
they willed it, prepare in good time to meet, every
disposition made for the attack ; while almost from
the foot of the laborious ascent the troops advancing
against them would be exposed to their effective
rifle-fire. Thus there was certainly no balance of
advantage on our side, and notwithstanding that
they had not shown much spirit at the Sam-
pagha, it was confidently expected that they would
rally on the ramparts of the Arhanga, and defend
desperately the last avenue leading to their cherished
Tirah.

But again we were disappointed — pleasantly dis-
appointed, if you will — because no one wants to see

{■'\

VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 99

a long list of casualties, which may indeed be a
proof of desperate fighting, but is not necessarily
evidence of good generalship. The Afridis, in our
own service, and under the leadership of British
officers, have often shown themselves dashing and
brave soldiers. But left to themselves, they are no
better than any other wild tribe, and decidedly in-
ferior to some — the Waziris, for example. More-
over, it is impossible not to doubt that they have
been much impressed by the valour of our troops,
and the splendid leading of the officers, on the
Dargai heights, on the i8th and 20th October,
while all reports tend to show that their own losses
on those occasions were much heavier than has
been generally supposed. So now, when from their
eyries in the rocks they noted the General's skilful
dispositions, the steady unwavering advance of the
men, the numbers launched against them, and the
deadly precision of our artillery fire, their hearts
failed them, and they went.

Let me explain now what Sir William Lockhart's
dispositions for attack were, and how they were
carried out. The 2nd Division was to lead, General
Yeatman- Biggs commanding. The advanced guard
was formed by the 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General
Westmacott), supplemented by the 3rd Gurkha
scouts and a company of Sappers. Its special
function was to drive in any outlying picquets of
the Afridis, and take possession of the low hill in
the centre, previously mentioned, in order to let the

loo THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap.

massed batteries of the two divisions occupy it.
The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier- General Kempster),
also with a Sapper company, followed the 4th, and
its orders were, after the artillery had come into
action, to work round to the left of Westmacott's
battalions, and demonstrate against the enemy's
right flank. Next came Major-General Symons,
commanding the ist Division, with the 2nd Brigade
under Brigadier- General Gaselee, to which was
assigned the important duty of turning the enemy's
left flank. This brigade, too, was accompanied by
a company of Sappers, and the remaining Sapper
companies, with the 28th Bombay Pioneers, followed
close in rear of the centre, ready to push forward
and commence work on the road over the pass
directly opportunity offered. The ist Brigade
(Hart's) of General Symons' Division concentrated
this day, the 31st, in the Mastura Valley, where it
stood in reserve as a strong point cCappui between
the two passes. The baggage of the advancing
troops, as at the storming of the Sampagha, was
stacked, and left in camp ready for loading, with
orders that it was to be brought on directly a mes-
sage to that effect was heliographed back.

Such were Sir William Lockhart's dispositions
for the attack on the Arhanga, and as the Afridis
noted the quiet business-like way in which they
were carried out, the numbers sent against them,
the menace to their flanks, and the searching fire of
the guns, they must have considered their plight a

VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS} loi

hopeless one from the first. By 5 a.m. the force
was under arms and ready to move off from its
bivouac, and by 7 o'clock the skirmishers of the
advanced guard were in contact with the enemy, a
few of whom had been thrown out as scouts as far
as the foot of the slopes leading to the crest of the
Arhanga. These were at once driven in, the low
hill in the centre (called Unai, from the village on
it) was occupied by the Borderers, and by 7.45 a.m.
the three batteries of the 2nd Division (No. 9
British, No. 8 British, and No. 5 Bombay), under
Colonel Purdy, R.A., had come into action on its
summit, and were making excellent practice against
the enemy, visible in groups here and there on the
sky-line of the pass. The batteries of the ist
Division (No. i British, No. i Derajat, and No. 2
Kohat), under Colonel Duthy, R.A., arrived very
shortly afterwards and prolonged the line to the
right, so that Brigadier-General Spragge by 8.15
had a well-posted line of 36 guns pouring a most
deadly fire on the Afridis (the range was never out-
side 1 300 yards), under cover of which the infantry
now advanced to the attack.

The order of the attack I have already ex-
plained. It practically devolved upon Brigadier-
General Gaselee's Brigade to deal the stroke that
should be decisive. Accordingly, while the guns,
and Westmacott's Brigade, held the enemy in the
centre, and while Kempster diverted attention by
demonstrating against his right, the battalions of

I02 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 189798 chap.

Gaselee's Brigade (with whom for the day were the
5th Gurkha scouts, some eighty in number, under
Captain Lucas and Lieutenant Bruce) climbed
steadily up the ravines on his left, and at ten
minutes to ten exactly their leading files reached the
crest of the hill. The ascent was a very steep one,
though well sheltered the greater part of the way
from direct fire, and there was admirable rivalry for
the honour of being the first to top the summit.
As nearly as possible the Yorkshire Regiment and
the 5 th Gurkha scouts arrived at the same time,
but the Queen's, the 3rd Sikhs, and the 4th Gurkhas
were all close up, and the performance of the whole
brigade was excellent.

The Afridis did not wait for the full development
of this flanking movement. They were already in
full retreat, **over the hills and far away," by the
time that it was accomplished, and firing at once
ceased. By 1 1 a.m. Sir William Lockhart was him-
self on the top of the pass, troops were being pushed
down it into Tirah as fast as the narrow and pre-
cipitous road would permit, and the good news had
been flashed back direct to Fort Lockhart^ on the
Samana range, for transmission to the Viceroy and
to the Commander-in-Chief, that the pass was in our
possession.

The strength of the enemy on this occasion, or
their losses, it is impossible to estimate. It was
expected that they would muster in thousands for
the defence of this particular pass, and that here, if

VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 103

anywhere, they would make a great and gallant
stand. But it may be doubted if even 1000 of them
were actually in line when we attacked. The
remainder were probably more concerned in remov-
ing their families and flocks and herds to places of
safety and refuge than in meeting us in fair fight.
It may be supposed that, as they have had weeks of
warning, they might have done this sooner, but
procrastination is characteristic of all Orientals, and
possibly they could not bring themselves to believe,
until literally the eleventh hour, that after centuries
of inviolate seclusion, we should dare, or should be
able, to ** lift the purdah,'* and penetrate into their
sacred valley. There can be no question, at all
events, that they quitted in haste, for evidences of
the fact abound. Their houses, for example, are
full of grain and walnuts and potatoes, etc., which
they might easily have removed at leisure had they
thought of it ; and they will soon feel the want of
these things, for wherever they have gone, they
cannot live on their neighbours very long. And if
their strength on the Arhanga be represented by Xy
their losses may be expressed by y. They are
absolutely unknown, and it is futile to guess what
they may be. Blood splashes were found in many
places along their line of defence, and undoubtedly
some of them were killed and others wounded,
chiefly by the artillery fire, but the actual numbers
placed hors de combat must be a matter for con-
jecture.

I04 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

To turn to our side, our casualties were practi-
cally nil. Captain Searle, of the 36th Sikhs, was
wounded severely by a chance shot quite at the
commencement of the proceedings, and there were
four or five men hit — soldiers or battery drivers —
during the attack. That was all. It is only to be
accounted for by the reasons I have already indi-
cated ; but the insignificant losses do not in any
degree detract from the credit due to the General,
and to the troops, for the success attending a plan
skilfully designed and resolutely executed.^

From the crest of the Arhanga Pass we looked
down on the promised land, Tirah, or rather on that
part of it known as Maidan. The Mastura Valley,
which we had just left, is also a part of Tirah, but is
Orakzai Tirah ; Maidan and the next valley to the
north of us, Rajgal, which no doubt we shall visit
shortly, constitute Afridi Tirah proper. No Euro-
pean has penetrated into these valleys hitherto,
though one or two may have traversed the fringes
of them, and it has been the proud boast of the
Afridis from time immemorial that no enemy of
whatever race or creed has ever attempted to cross
the mountain barriers which shut them in, and to
meddle with them in their own fastnesses. Well,
we have changed all that now. The veil of their

^ <* That a more formidable resistance was not offered in the passes lead-
ing respectively into Orakxai and Afridi Tirah I attribute to the lesson taught
those tribes at Daigai in the actions of the i8th and 20th October. They
then learnt that their strongest positions could not avail them against the
valour of British and Native troops." — Sir William Lockkarfs Despatches*

VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 105

temple has been rent in twain, and the mysterious
interior has been rudely revealed. There was no
lingering on the Arhanga when once the enemy had
been driven off. Troops at once poured down the
northern slopes to the fertile valley below ; sappers
and pioneers were at work on the road before the
last reverberations of the guns had died away among
the mountains; and the baggage being " helio'd " up,
the stream of it set in with such violence that,
unfortunately, on this and the succeeding night,
some of the trains were overtaken by darkness, and
raided by the enemy, with most serious loss to
ourselves in men and material, as I shall relate
immediately.

The place selected for encampment of the force
was a locality about three miles due north of the
Arhanga, near a hamlet, in about the centre of the
Maidan district. There are no villages here strictly
so called, nor in the Mastura Valley. But there are
innumerable houses dotted all over the country.
They occur every quarter of a mile or so, and are
large, strong, substantial buildings, generally includ-
ing a tower or keep, and capable of a strong defence
so long as artillery is not brought against them.
Guns would, of course, knock them to pieces at
once. In each of these houses lives a family, or a
group of blood relations; in one, for example,
several brothers, with their wives and children, and
fathers and mothers, etc. ; in another a petty chief,
with his immediate following, his sisters, cousins,

io6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

and aunts, and so on. But, needless to say, they
are all empty now. With one accord the people
have fled before our approach, and we have the
valley to ourselves.

But not the surrounding hills. They are full of
houseless and prowling marauders, and no party
can leave camp in any direction without a skirmish,
or an exchange of shots with them. Of all the
Afridi clans the Zakka-khels are the most numerous,
the most powerful and influential, and the most
notorious for daring raids and treacherous attacks.
They inhabit all Southern Maidan and important
strips of country in Maidan, and in the Bara, Bazar,
and Khyber Valleys. A glance at these places on
the map will show that they hold a geographical posi-
tion in Afridiland which gives them superiority and
pre-eminent consideration in all Afridi councils. At
present they are our immediate neighbours to the
south, and, in fact, our line of communications with
the Mastura Valley, ind the Arhanga Pass, lies
through Zakka-khel territory.

This fact was rudely brought to our recollection
by the occurrences of the nights of 31st October and
I St November, which I will now describe. I have
said that immediately the pass was captured on the
31st, the baggage was helio'd for from the rear, and,
most unfortunately, on two days running, such a
crowd was allowed to stream over the pass that it
could not be cleared out of the dangerous defile on
this side before darkness had set in. This was the

VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 107

Zakka-khels' opportunity. Swooping down from
the crags, on which all day they had kept patient
watch, they rushed the weary trains and tired
escorts at various points, and were only too suc-
cessful in their raids on both occasions. The
Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) lost on the
second night three men killed and four wounded,
ten boxes of Lee-Metford ammunition (iioo rounds
in a box), three rifles, and some 350 kits, together
with 71 baggage ponies, which were carrying them,
and which stampeded in the darkness as soon as the
firing and shouting began. On the first night nine
drivers were killed and wounded, and 188 kits
belonging to the 15th Sikhs were carried off.

These were very unfortunate events. Not only
were the losses serious, but the moral effect of them
was bad. They ought not to have occurred. But
the confusion attendant on a rapid advance after a
successful action is unavoidably great, and the strict
control necessary at points in rear, which must often
cause a commander and his staff more anxiety than
the enemy in front, is frequently lacking for the first
day or two. However, the strictest measures have
since been taken to prevent convoys and baggage
from being benighted, and we must hope that some
early opportunity may be afforded of getting even
with the Zakka-khels.

In the meantime the force has settled down and
is enjoying a few days* well-earned rest pending
the next development of the situation. This will

io8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

probably take the form of some discussion with the
tribes. In Sir William Lockhart's original procla-
mation to them he said that from the heart of their
country he would announce to them the final terms
of the British Government. The heart of their
country is now reached, and as soon as the political
officers can get into touch with their maliks these
terms will be announced. The usual way of pub-
lishing announcements in similar circumstances is to
send out copies by hand to the various clans and
sections ; but they are an ignorant, illiterate people,
and the documents thus distributed must then be
read and interpreted to them by their Mullahs, who
can, of course, and do, explain, suppress, add to, or
distort their contents, as they please, and to suit
their own purposes. For these reasons, the occa-
sion being an important one, instead of sending out
proclamations by messengers, the tribes have been
summoned to send in their jirgahs, in order that
they may be plainly told by ourselves what are the
terms imposed. The jirgahs of the Samil Orakzais
(who from the first have been ready to treat with
us), and of at least three of the Afridi clans — the
Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Kuki-
khels — may be expected to arrive almost im-
mediately; but it is doubtful if the Zakka-khels
will have any dealings with us just yet At the
same time, seeing us in possession, occupying their
lands and devouring their stores; and noting our
determination and our power to punish ; with the

VIII THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS 109

winter, too, coming on while they are wanderers
on the bleak mountain -sides ; they must see the
hopelessness of prolonged resistance, and we may
reasonably hope that, within a measurable period of
time, we shall induce them to meet us and to agree
to terms. The temper of these wild tribes is, how-
ever, a factor varium et mutabile sempery and it is
too early yet to forecast what line they will take.

Meanwhile, the troops pass the days in frequent
reconnaissances and in foraging. The former are
always accompanied by officers of the Intelligence
Branch, and of the Survey Department, and, under
the superintendence of Colonel Sir Thomas Hol-
dich, R.E., and Colonel More-Molyneux, A.Q.M.G.
for Intelligence, the whole of the country we pass
through or occupy is being rapidly mapped and
exploited. The foraging parties are worked on a
regular system, and with great success. Half the
valley is allotted, for foraging purposes, to one
division, half to the other. Each division then tells
off particular sections to each brigade, and each
brigade in turn points out particular lines to be
worked by each regiment. Thus there is no con-
fusion, and no waste of power or time. Strings of
mules go out every day, with sufficient escorts, and
return in the evening laden up with forage, which
abounds, and with sacks of potatoes, wheat, Indian
corn, pumpkins, walnuts, etc., of all of which enough
is found to appreciably lessen the strain of supply
on the commissariat. The fodder is taken straight

no THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH. 1897-98 chap.

to the transport lines and stacked ; the food stuffs
are deposited in the brigade store depots of each
brigade, whence the commissariat officer in charge
reissues them as rations in due course.

The foragers not infrequently find odds and ends
of booty which they annex for themselves — to wit,
oXdijezailSy swords and daggers, and Korans. These
are retained by the finders as mementoes of the
campaign. Of Korans there are two kinds — the
one printed in Peshawar or Lahore, and of no par-
ticular interest or value ; the other hand-written, and
generally illustrated and illuminated. These are
rare, and are very precious finds indeed. A few,
however, have been taken.

One expedition from camp, undertaken on the
day after our arrival here, was of more than passing
interest, and I will briefly refer to it. There is a
place a short three miles west from this spot called
Bagh. It is simply a mosque, or musjid, surrounded
by a small grove of trees, but it is notorious as the
place where the Afridis hatch most of their raids and
forays ; it is the spot where the present uprising was
originated and decided on ; and it has always been
known as a centre of intrigue and fanaticism. Sir
William Lockhart decided, therefore, to pay Bagh
a visit, to demonstrate to the Afridis our power
to reach them anywhere, and to punish their mal-
practices how and when we please. A small column,
consisting of the King's Own Scottish Borderers,
the I St Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles, and No. 8

viii THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS iii

Mountain Battery R.A., the whole under the com-
mand of Colonel Dixon, King's Own Scottish
Borderers, the senior officer, was accordingly de-
spatched to carry out Sir William s orders. A few
of the enemy were on the hills on our right as the
column marched out, and they managed to knock over
four of the Gurkhas before a few well-directed shells
from Major Shirres's battery cleared them out. The
famous mosque was then approached. In appear-
ance it is a mean building, little better than a cattle-
shed. It is, however, a place of worship, and
therefore, as a matter of course, respected. It was
not touched ; but, as a permanent mark of the
Sirkar s wrath and punishment, the trees surrounding
it were all " ringed," which means that they will all
be dead within the year. If the party had carried
axes they might have been felled at once, but we
had only the Gurkhas' kukris. These, however,
served every purpose, and no doubt, now that the
accursed Feringhi has made his mark on Bagh, the
place will lose its importance and sanctity.^

^ Captain T. G. Maclaren of the Borderers was slightly wounded in this
reconnaissance.

CHAPTER IX

LIFE IN TIRAH — THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER

Maidan, Tirah, 8/A November,

We entered this valley on 31st October ; we are here
still ; we may remain indefinitely. This is a situa-
tion which raises reflections. It cannot be regarded
as a satisfactory one, from the soldier's point of view.
So long as we were on the move, advancing, attack-
ing, gaining ground, defeating and driving off the
enemy whenever encountered, it was all plain
sailing, and every one was happy. What though
we had to take some hard knocks, and to rough it
not a little? You cannot make omelets without
breaking eggs, and you cannot make war in kid
gloves. Our losses and our fatigues were all in the
day's work, and were cheerfully endured. But now
has come the unsatisfactory part of the business, the
halt while we try to negotiate, and consider ways
and means, and we are conscious that the delay and
inaction involved thereby are as mistaken as to the
motive for them (by our enemies) as they are irk-
some and unpleasant in their consequences to our-

CHAP. IX LIFE IN TIRAH 113

selves. It is, however, unavoidable that we should
rest here on our oars for a while, as there is a
political as well as a military aspect of the campaign
to be considered ; and a halt is necessary while
knotty points are discussed in all their bearings —
Simla and the Foreign Office taking part, no doubt,
in the discussions. But a savage and untutored
enemy does not always understand why we halt, so
I may usefully state some of its immediate effects
upon him, and some of the considerations to which
they give rise.

The first and immediate effect, then, of this pause
in our active operations is that the Afridis recover
their wind and their frightened senses, and bethink
themselves to seek reprisals, and to get even with us
as best they may for the defeats inflicted upon them,
and for the insults and injury resulting from the
invasion and occupation of their country. They are
no simpletons, these Afridis. They know very well
now that they cannot meet us in open fight. They
recognise our superiority in organisation, in equip-
ment, in leading, and above all in guns, and they
give way as we advance, without attempting to offer
an opposition which they feel would be fruitless.
But when we halt and form big camps, and begin to
think rather of feeding ourselves, and of maintaining
safely our long line of communications, than of
following and attacking them, then the Afridi sees
his opportunity, and says softly to himself, ** It is my

turn now ! There goes a convoy ; let us ambuscade

114 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

it ! There, my brethren, starts a foraging party ;
let us rush it ! There marches a reconnaissance ;
let us harass it! There overhead is the wire on
which these accursed infidels talk to each other ; let
us cut it! And, finally, there is their huge camp,
which is eating us up, with its fields of billowy
canvas, and its long rows of thousands of baggage
animals ; who wants a fairer mark for his rifle ?
Come, let us fire into it!" And all these things
they do, and have done, with more or less success,
during the last ten days. Almost every night since
we have been here the telegraph wire has bee^ cut,
and a mile or two of it carried off. Convoys coming
over the Arhanga have been raided; and recon-
naissances and foraging parties are fired on when
only a mile or two out of camp, and in some instances
have even been rushed by swordsmen, and sustained
serious loss. As to firing into camp by night, it has
been a common occurrence, and it is miraculous
that the casualties are not greater. It is extremely
unpleasant, this whizz and spatter of bullets
while you are at dinner, or trying to enjoy a
pipe round a camp fire before turning in. If you
have got to be shot leading your men in action, that
is all right, and a proper and honourable way of
being shot. You take, in fact, a legitimate risk
which no soldier objects to. But to be potted in the
dark is autre chose. There is neither glory for
yourself, nor gain for your country, in achieving
such an end to your career, and, as I said before, it

The Picquets on the Northern Slopes of the Arhanga Pass.
November. December 1897

From a Sketch by Major A Bemcke Copley, KK. Sif C
0A QM6 fill- loiBlligence
2'^0' r.£.F.

A.B.C.O.E.r Might and Day picqatts. strongly intrtacheif

b. c . d . a f Daji pic f nets.

Z.Z. Points from which enemy aoaght to atttck conroys On the road.

The arrows show the groom/ corered by the fire of the pie foot*.

ix LIFE IN TIRAH 115

is extremely unpleasant to hear the ping of the
shots, to see men knocked over (I was sitting
opposite Captain Badcock when he was hit), and
to feel that it may be your turn perhaps next.

To those who have not soldiered in these wild
mountains it may seem astounding that measures
cannot be devised to stop this night firing, and to
render camps perfectly secure during the hours of
darkness. Something, of course, can be done, and
you may be sure that such precautions as are pos-
sible are not neglected. In a country like this it is,
however, quite impracticable to put a camp down
in a locality which is not commanded from at least
two or three spots. These commanding spots are
held by picquets, as a rule ; but their posts may be,
in their turn, so completely under fire from some
adjacent height as to be almost untenable. Again,
these tribesmen, wily, bold, and active as they are,
think nothing of getting in on dark nights between
a picquet and the camp, and in such a position three
or four men with Martini- Henry rifles can easily
** brown" the camp with forty or fifty shots before
they can be dislodged. The whole country is a
network of ravines, nullahs, and rugged hills, and
is admirably adapted to the guerilla tactics which
they profess and excel in, and so long as we are
stationary we must put up with a certain amount
of annoyance and loss from this night firing. On
the night of the 6th it was unusually bad about
dinner-time, 7 p.m., and amongst other casualties

ii6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^8 chap.

Lieutenant Giffard, of the Northampton Regiment,
was killed, and Captain Sullivan, 36th Sikhs, severely
wounded by a shot through the left forearm. Poor
Giffard had been sitting at the head of the table,
and as the fire became hot, he shifted his seat to
one which seemed a little more sheltered, saying,
laughingly, **This isn't good enough; I'm going
to move." He had hardly reached his new place
when he was shot dead. It was very sad. His
funeral the next day was attended by Sir William
Lockhart, with the headquarters staff, and all the
officers in camp not on duty. Captain Sullivan's
luck in being hit was very bad. He was not long
ago invalided to England from Suakin, but managed
to pass the Board, and hurried out to India as soon
as he knew his regiment was going to the front.
He had succeeded in overtaking us this very day
(the 6th) at about 11 A.M., and was shot, and of
course placed hors de combat for the rest of the
campaign, at six the same evening. Such is the
fortune of war! On the next night but one, the
8th, Captain Watson, of the commissariat depart-
ment, was shot dead by a stray bullet in the same
way. He was a first-rate officer, and the best of
comrades, and, I sorrow to say, leaves a widow and
four children to lament his fate. War is indeed
cruel ! But it is not any pleasanter to be shot when
out foraging or reconnoitring. Yet our casualties
incurred on these duties since we came here on
31st October are steadily mounting up. I explained

IX LIFE IN TIRAH 117

in my last letter the system on which the collection
of forage and supplies is conducted, and I might
have added what is the fact, that these parties
never go out without encountering marauding bands
of Afridis, and becoming engaged with them more
or less seriously. Success in one or two raids
makes these men extremely bold, and they are as
cunning and clever as they are audacious. They
show much patience in watching and waiting for
their prey, and great dash and impudence in their
attacks when they make them. Nearly always
they are beaten off, but sometimes drivers will get
frightened, mules will stampede, and escorts will
get separated. So that almost daily we lose a few
men killed and wounded in these inglorious combats.
It is doubtless true that we kill and wound some of
them too, but we rarely have the satisfaction of
being able to speak with any certainty on the
point ; and, after all, they hold life very cheap, and
think they have done well if at the cost of a few
lives of their own they have slain some of us and
have captured some of our mules and baggage. In
any case, actions of this class are fought by us on
the defensive. All the moral advantages and ela-
tion pertaining to the attack are theirs ; all the dis-
advantage and depression ours.

The question, then, of the hour, is Qtiousgue
tandem ? How long is this situation to last }
When will it change ? In what direction will the
next development be .^ It is understood that as

ii8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

soon as representative jirgahs of the tribes can
be assembled the terms of Government will be
announced to them. But we must first catch our
jirgahs. At present they show small sign of coming
in to parley with us. Some of the Samil Orakzais
certainly have arrived, and it is said that some of
the Afridi clans are also on their way in. But the
most important and powerful of all of them, the
Zakka-khels, openly defy us to do our worst, and
urge the others, many of whom have reason to fear
them, not to yield. Accordingly, we are doing our
worst to them. Sir William Lockhart has hitherto
issued the strictest orders to spare the houses and
villages in the country we have passed through
and in the valley in which we are halted. But the
Zakka-khels do not understand clemency of this
kind. They put it down to weakness. It is known
that they are the mainspring of the revolt. They
were the leaders of the unprovoked attacks on our
forts in the Khyber, and carried off from them the
bulk of the loot; and they are the section which
has principally opposed our advance, raided our
convoys, attacked our foraging parties, and fired
into our camps. For these very sufficient reasons
Sir William Lockhart has decided not to allow the
Zakka-khels any more law, and all their fortified
houses in Maidan, from the loop-holed walls and
towers of which we are fired on daily, are to be
burned and levelled to the ground. Whether this
measure will have the effect of making them yield

IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 119

their submission, or whether it will exasperate them
into making a big attack on our camp, time alone
can show. We should all prefer the latter ; but as
to the justice of their punishment there cannot be
two opinions.

loth November.

The events of the last two days have been such
as to accentuate all that I have already written. I
have, in fact, to record now an occurrence so unfor-
tunate that the term disaster may almost be applied
to it. An outline of what happened has, of course,
been wired to you, but the fuller details one can
give in a letter will not be without interest There
is a mountain a short five miles north-east of this
camp, named Saran Sar. Its height is about 8000
feet. A rough but evidently much used road leads
over it into the Upper Bara Valley, and by this road
when we first arrived, and almost daily since, Afridis
have been seen going and coming — going, that is,
on our approach, and coming, when they think they
safely can, to remove from their villages and houses,
at the eastern extremity of the valley, the grain, etc.,
left behind when they first hastily fled. Sir William
Lockhart decided to pay Saran Sar a visit on the
9th inst., partly to look up these tribesmen, Zakka-
khels all, and destroy their fortified houses and
towers, and partly to have the adjacent country sur-
veyed and mapped. Accordingly, Brigadier-General
Westmacott was nominated to command the expe-
dition, and the following troops placed under his

120 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

orders for the day : — The Northamptons and the
36th Sikhs, of his own brigade, and the Dorsets
and the 15th Sikhs, of the 3rd (Brigadier-General
Kempster*s) brigade ; also the following Divisional
troops: — No. 8 British M.B. R.A., No. 5 Bombay
M.B., and No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and
Miners. Sir William Lockhart himself rode out
with his staff to witness the operations.

The troops breakfasted early and started at about
7 A.M. Within about two miles of camp they en-
countered opposition, and dispositions were made to
attack. The artillery, escorted by the 15th Sikhs,
climbed a steep hill on the right, and, coming into
action against groups discernible on the lower slopes
of the mountain, speedily dispersed them. The
Dorsets were sent to the left to make that flank
secure, the Northamptons and Sappers advanced in
the centre, and the 36th Sikhs on their right. The
enemy, as usual, gave way before this direct attack,
and by II a.m. the summit of the mountain had
been gained with only trifling casualties. The survey
party at once got to work, and Sir William Lock-
hart arrived later and joined Brigadier - General
Westmacott on the crest of the ridge, whence a fine
view was obtainable of the country beyond. So far
so good. If only we could always advance and
never retire! So long as we front our foes, and
attack them, and press them, no matter what the
odds, so long do they acknowledge our superiority
and yield to the inevitable. But our first movement

IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 121

in retreat is the signal for them in turn to become
the assailants. And so it was now. At 2 p.m. the
retirement commenced. The Sappers and the 36th
Sikhs were first sent back to a position in rear, fol-
lowed later by three companies of the Northamptons.
Thus five companies of this regiment were tem-
porarily left on the crest by themselves, more than
enough to hold their own against any number of
Afridis, for there was still plenty of daylight, and
support was close behind. At this time hardly an
enemy was in sight, but as these companies were
gradually withdrawn the tribesmen appeared as if by
magic, and, pressing on their heels, delivered a hot
fire at close range, causing at once many casualties
in the rearmost company, commanded by Captain
Parkin. The men, however, rallied bravely round
their officer, and, with great courage and coolness,
kept the foe at bay, while all the wounded were
picked up and brought along. Sergeant Lennon of
this company particularly distinguished himself by
his deliberate shooting, and set an excellent example
of steadiness in a trying situation, which had the
best effect. The result was that the supports in rear
were at last safely reached, and the casualties up to
this time were only ten or twelve men wounded.
The 36th Sikhs, well posted now, allowed the whole
of the Northamptons at this point to pass through
them, and, when they had given them time to reach
the foot of the hill, followed them down, easily keep-
ing the enemy at arm's length, and incurring no

IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 123

march. Shortly after 7 p.m. he reached camp with
his regiment.

In the meantime a tragedy had been enacted in
the centre. A body of Afridis, who had from the
slopes above marked the situation, swooped down
on the Northamptons entangled in the ravine, and,
firing from the high banks on the western side, they
shot down the stretcher-parties who were nobly en-
gaged in carrying off and protecting their wounded ;
and though officers and men battled bravely for
honour's cause, yet they were not fighting on equal
terms, and the desperate struggle went heavily
against them. At this juncture a company of the
36th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Van Someren (not one
of those that had been with Colonel Haughton, but
one that had previously been detached to support
the guns), returned to their aid, and, taking the
enemy in flank and rear, extricated the North-
amptons from their perilous plight. On reaching
camp, at about half-past seven, the roll was called,
and it was found that Lieutenant Waddell and six
men were killed, Lieutenant Trent and twenty-nine
men wounded, and Lieutenant Macintire and eleven
men missing. I may say here that these "missing"
were all killed A search party found their bodies
the next day in the ravine where the fight occurred.
They had, of course, been stripped of clothing and
arms, and some of them slashed with swords, but
their bodies had not otherwise been mutilated.

The further casualties incurred on the 9th were :

IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER I2S

known to them all, and was the most direct road
back to camp ; and that with a number of wounded
to protect, and believing probably that it was flanked
on the right and left by other corps, it was natural
perhaps that he should choose it to retire by.

Also, in justice to the gallant Northamptons, it
must be recorded that the way in which they stuck
to their wounded, and brought them through that
terrible nullah, was a display of heroism and devotion
worthy of a regiment that fought at Albuhera.
Surrounded by the enemy, exposed to a galling
fire from the high banks to which they could not
effectively reply, with dead and dying men on every
side, and the horror of their desperate situation
accentuated by the gathering darkness, they fought
on resolutely and bravely, and sacrificed themselves
without hesitation to protect and save if possible
their wounded comrades who could not help them-
selves.

I cannot do better than conclude this chapter
with some extracts from the Pioneer of Allahabad,
which bear testimony to the noble conduct of officers
and men on this memorable occasion.

The following extracts (says the Pioneer) are
from a private letter written by one who was in the
thick of the fray : —

Tirahy Maidan^ \oth November 1897 : . . . Yesterday we had
a fearful day, had to attack a pass and got there without any loss,
but in retiring to camp the enemy seemed to rise up from the
ground, and gave G Company of the Northamptons, which was

126 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

the rear company, an awful basting. As luck would have it,
there were C, D, F and K Companies close by, and they at once
went to the assistance of their comrades. It was here that
Lieutenant Waddell and Sergeant Goffey were killed Sergeant
Litchfield was shot through the knee and will lose his leg :
Sergeant Underdown slightly wounded. Colour-Sergeant Hull
shot through the ankle; he must lose his foot Lieutenant
Trent wounded in the thigh. It was too awfiiL The bullets
rained about me like hailstones, and in retiring I had to keep
covering the unfortunate wounded men so as to get them alive
and if possible safely into camp. It was terrible to see their
sufferings: they were bad enough when we could carry them
comfortably, but when they had to be carried anyhow you can
imagine what they went through. Sad to tell. Lieutenant
Macintire, Sergeant Luck, and eleven men are missing. The
battalion went out to look for them this morning, and I will not
close this till to-morrow to wait for the battalion's return. . . .
Sad news. The whole of the party missing are killed Total
killed, twenty; wounded, twenty-eight They have brought in

the bodies, which are to be buried to-night is fearfully cut

up. I never saw any one so terribly affected as he was at the
loss his regiment has sustained. . . . The only consolation their
relations have is that they died protecting our wounded men.
No one can say enough in praise of the men of the Northamptons
who were in the engagement They were literally fired at from
every side at once, but they were as cool and deliberate as if they
were on an ordinary field day. General Westmacott in command
of our brigade is fuU of praise of the Northamptons, and sajrs, *' I
never could have believed a regiment could have under such cir-
cumstances behaved with such pluck and coolness."

Again : —

Lieutenant Trent was hit; there were only three stretchers
with the company and they were all full, but one man who was
only slightly wounded said he could walk, and Lieutenant Trent,
who was shot in the thigh with a Lee-Metford Dum-Dum bullet,
was put in. Lieutenant Macintire, a sergeant, and eleven men,
were now the last of all, and they were urgently ordered to retire,

IX THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER 127

but Macintire said he could not leave the wounded, to whom he
stuck, and he and all his men were killed. By this time the rest
had reached the village, and there was not a man left to return
the fire of the enemy, every man being either wounded or carrying
a wounded man on his back or a stretcher. They therefore made
a slight detour to avoid the village, and while doing so the
stretcher in which Lieutenant Trent was being carried broke;
the men carrying it put it down, and cooUy repaired it under a
hail of bullets, one man having a button of his coat on his chest
shot off, and the other two bullets through his clothes. The be-
haviour of the Northamptons that night was truly magnificent,
calmly returning over open ground, carrying their wounded men
under a galling fire without being able to retaliate.

CHAPTER X

STILL IN TIRAH — THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS — THE

AFFAIR OF THE i6tH NOVEMBER

Maidan, Tirah, I2th November.

In order to get even with the Zakka-khels, to
continue the destruction of their fortified houses,
and to complete the survey of the eastern portion of
this valley, Sir William Lockhart ordered Brigadier-
General Gaselee's brigade,^ supported by artillery,
to visit the Saran Sar again yesterday. Sir William
again himself accompanied the troops. On this
occasion there was no mishap of any kind. General
Gaselee, long well known as the Colonel of the 5th
Gurkhas, and an officer of vast experience in frontier
fighting, directed the movements with great judg-
ment, and though the Afridis again followed up the
retirement, they never got a look in at all. The
Queen's shot uncommonly straight, the artillery
too; and the 3rd and 4th Gurkhas, with the 3rd

1 Scouts : 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's R.W. Surrey Regiment,
the Yorkshire Regiment, the 4th Gurkhas, and the 3rd Sikhs. The 3rd
Gurkhas moved out in the afternoon to co-operate in the retirement. The
batteries out were No. I, M.B. RA., and No. 2 (Derajat) M.B.

I30 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

live in, picquets are placed over them for their pro-
tection, and supplies are sent to them from our camp.

The proceedings opened by Sir William Lock-
hart rising, and requesting Sir Richard Udny to
say that, now that we had established ourselves in
the heart of their country, the terms offered by
Government would be announced to them, and to
explain that they must be fully complied with within
fourteen days ; also, that in any event he intended
to visit every part of their country, and that it would
depend upon themselves whether he came as a friend
or as an enemy.

Sir Richard Udny, who is a most practised and
fluent Pushtu scholar, fully explained all this to the
jirgahs, and clearly and with emphasis announced
the terms of Government to the expectant throng.
These were : —

I St. Full restoration of all arms and property,
etc., looted from the Khyber forts, or taken from us
on any subsequent occasion.

2nd. Surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles.

3rd. Payment of a fine of 30,000 rupees.

4th. Absolute forfeiture of all subsidies and allow-
ances granted to the tribes in the past.

5th. Formal submission to be tendered in durbar.

The Maliks listened with marked interest and
attention while these terms were announced to
them. But it was not to be gathered from their
countenances, or from anything they said, whether
they thought them severe or lenient There can be

X THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS 131

no question that, considering the unwarrantable and
unprovoked nature of the outbreak, the loot carried
off, and the damage done to life and property, and
the enormous expense that Government has been
put to in the effort to restore order and re-estab-
lish its authority, the conditions imposed are ex-
tremely easy. I shall be very much surprised if they
are not promptly accepted.

This was the whole of the ceremony. The
jirgahs withdrew as they had come, and the pro-
ceedings terminated. If the Orakzais submit now, as
it may be reasonably hoped they will, it is improbable
that the Afridis will continue the struggle much
longer by themselves. There are indications, indeed,
that they have already had enough of it. They
cannot doubt our power, or that whatever petty
successes they may here and there score, in the long
run we must beat them and bring them to their
bearings. For the last three nights not a shot has
been fired into our camps, and even the telegraph wire
has not been touched, so perhaps a little ray of light
can be seen ahead, and the outlook is more hopeful
than when I commenced this letter.

15/A November.

The Orakzai jirgahs have come and gone. They
are allowed until the 26th inst. to comply with the
terms offered them. Opinion is a good deal divided
as to whether they will accept and comply with them
or not. Personally I have little doubt that their
answer will be affirmative, and that they will do their

132 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

best to carry out the conditions imposed within the
time fixed. There can be no question that they
were all immensely relieved to find that their country
is not to be permanently occupied or annexed by
us ; and, assured of their independence, they are not
disposed to haggle now over any minor point, their
punishment being, as a matter of fact, an extremely
lenient one. They have now asked our political
officers to help them to divide fairly between their
Gar and Samil factions the amount of the fine, and
the number of the rifles demanded ; because, left to
themselves (they say) they would certainly quarrel,
and never come to an amicable agreement as to the
share to be produced by each. Accordingly, Mr.
White King, under whose special political charge
the Orakzai clans are, aided by Messrs. Hastings,
Donald, and Blakeway, having talked the matter
over with the leading Maliks of each faction, a
decision was speedily arrived at, that each should
pay half, they being practically equal in numbers,
in importance, and in wealth. They then dispersed
to their homes, and it is to be sincerely hoped that
within the next few days we shall receive from them
some substantial proofs that they are earnest in
their expressed desire to "kiss and be friends."

Meantime, on our side. Sir William Lockhart,
anxious to be conciliatory, and to show consideration
to those evincing any disposition to yield or to treat,
has let it be generally known that from this time,
and until some definite answer is submitted by the

X THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS 133

jirgahs, payment will be made for all forage and
supplies taken by the troops, or collected, or brought
in for their use by the tribes. This is a wise and
considerate measure, and should have a good effect.
But, on the other hand, they have been given to
understand that the supplies and forage we must
have, and that if any obstruction is offered to the
collection of it, or if our parties are fired on, swift
and severe punishment will most assuredly follow.
Although up to the present it is only the Orakzai
jirgahs that have been admitted to an audience, yet
the same method has been extended to those Afridi
clans whose jirgahs are in waiting — viz., the Malik-
din-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Adam-khels ;
and as " they are a most avaricious race, desperately
fond of money" — vide "Official Gazetteer" — the
hope of gain may for the time being keep them
quiet and make them ready to help.

But there is no reliance whatever to be placed on
the word of an Afridi : —

Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder,
are to him the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest child-
hood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge,
nothing can ever change him. As he has lived — a shameless,
cruel savage — so he dies. And it would seem that, notwith-
standing their long intercourse with the British, and the fiict that
very large numbers of them are, or have been, in our service, and
must have learnt in some poor way what £uth, and mercy, and
justice are, yet the Afridi character is no better than it was in the
days of his fathers. . . . Much has been said of their fidelity in
fighting against their own people for us, but when it is remembered
that an Afridi generally has a blood feud with nine out of ten of

134 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

his own people, the beauty of this attachment fedes. They have
always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than
to fight On the whole (says Elphinstone) they are the greatest
robbers among Afghans, and have no faith or sense of honour
whatever.

A cheerful picture, is it not ? but not, I fancy,
overdrawn.

The boom of guns and the crack of rifles, showing
that in some directions, at all events, our foraging
parties are not finding it all plain sailing, are
punctuating my sentences as I write. Still, there
are indications that even the Afridis have had
enough of it now, and would be glad to see our
backs ; and motives of self-interest may prompt
them to climb down at no very distant date. They
know by this time that we do not mean to annex
their country. That, no doubt, has been their great
and haunting fear. Other considerations are of a
secondary importance to them. The money fine,
whatever it may be, the rendition of loot, and the
surrender of arms, they will put up with without
much fuss. The forfeiture of all subsidies will, of
course, be a nasty pill to swallow, because the sum
paid them by Government in the past, for maintain-
ing order on the Khyber route, has been consider-
able, about 100,000 rupees per annum ; and of this
aggregate, the Zakka-khels, our present bitterest
opponents, have been used to take the largest share.
But, great as may be the sacrifice involved by
giving up this grant, it is better than being kept
indefinitely out of lands and homes, and seeing their

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 135

defences levelled, and their substance devoured,
with the certainty that they must be beaten in the
long run, and that their eventual punishment will be
the severer the longer they resist.

For these reasons, there is some room to hope
that ere long we may see our way to some settle-
ment which will enable us to withdraw from this
inhospitable country. We cannot expect the present
fine dry weather to last much longer, and a change
to rain or snow will at once send large numbers of
men and followers into hospital. Moreover, the
strain on the Commissariat and Transport is daily
becoming more severe, and the question of feeding
this large assemblage of men and animals is con-
stantly assuming a more serious aspect; so for
every reason we shall be glad to cast out our shoes
over Tirah, and bid the Afridi a long farewell.

I Tth November,

Since the above lines were penned an event has
occurred which distinctly discounts the sanguine
expectations expressed. The future, it is written,
is always full of "precious possibilities," and no-
where can this saying be more applicable than on
this wild frontier amid these savage surroundings,
where truly no man can say what the next twenty-
four hours may not bring forth. I have already
told you that when conveying to the jirgahs the
terms on which Government would accept their
submission and pardon their offences, Sir William

136 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

Lockhart informed them that, in any event, he
intended to visit every part of the Afridi-Orakzai
country, and that it would depend upon their own
behaviour whether we came as friends or foes.
Partly in pursuance of the policy thus declared,
partly to carry out survey operations, and partly to
continue the punishment of the Zakka-khels by
destroying more of their fortified villages, and
notably the residence of the Mullah Say id Akbar,
Aka Khel, the principal leader of the revolt,
Brigadier-General Kempster was sent on the 13th
into the Waran Valley, vid the Tseri Kandao Pass,
with a force which comprised the Gordon High-
landers, the Dorset Raiment, the 15th Sikhs, the
2nd Gurkhas, No. 8 British Mountain Battery,
No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, No. 4 Madras
Sappers and Miners, and No. 4 Company Bombay
Sappers and Miners. The 36th Sikhs, now well
known to fame as the brave defenders of Forts
Gulistan and Saragheri on the Samana range in
September last, were also placed at General
Kempster's disposal to hold the Tseri Kandao
Pass during the two or three days during which
he would be absent, and to preserve communication
between him and the main column in Maidan.

There was practically no opposition to the
advance of this force. The tribesmen, as usual,
allowed it to proceed to its destination without
offering serious resistance, preferring to harass it
when settled down in its camp, and to attack in

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 137

earnest whenever it should commence its return
march. These are their invariable tactics. The
point aimed at by General Kempster was only a
short four miles down the valley east of the pass,
and, as it was only about four miles from this camp
(Maidan) to the summit (it is quite a low pass), the
whole march was only some eight miles. Yet such
are the extraordinary delays and difficulties attendant
on moving with mule and pony transport on a
single narrow hill road that, although a start had
been made from Maidan at daylight, the last of the
baggage and the rearguard were not in the new camp
until half-past nine o'clock at night. The four miles
of road on this the western side are'pretty fair going,
because our Sappers and Pioneers have been at
work on them, and have ramped the ravines and
nullahs, and improved and widened the bad places.
But on the far side the country was a terra incognita,
and the track (for it was nothing more) was stony,
steep, narrow, and difficult, dipping after the first
mile suddenly down into a boulder-strewn, dry bed
of a torrent between high, precipitous banks, beyond
which on either side the hills towered up to a
considerable altitude. These heights, of course,
had to be held while the main body and baggage
passed through the defile I have described, and thus
the march was a difficult and trying one, though its
actual length was insignificant

However, it was safely accomplished, and that
night, though one or two shots were fired into it.

138 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

the camp was practically unmolested. During the
next two days, the 14th and 15 th, the survey of
the adjacent country was completed, and recon-
naissance and foraging operations were successfully
carried out. Several Zakka-khel fortified houses
were destroyed, also some belonging to a section
known as Zia-ud-din-khels ; and the residence of
the notorious Mullah Sayid Akbar, the chief in-
stigator of the revolt and preacher of rebellion and
sedition, was visited and levelled. The mosque
attached to it was, however, let alone. Before
destroying the Sayid s house it was searched to
discover whether it contained anything of interest
or value. Little was found, however, except a
certain amount of correspondence, which was taken
charge of by the political staff, ^ and a mimbar^ or
kind of rude pulpit, from which, no doubt, the
Mullah used to make his frenzied addresses to his
rude audience. It is fitted with a staff on one side, on
which is fixed an iron bracket intended, apparently,
to hold a lamp or light of some kind. It was
brought away, and will be kept as an interesting
memento of the visit.

To resume. On both these days, the 14th and
1 5th, there was some skirmishing when the troops
were out On the latter date the enemy were
numerous and vigorous in their movements, but
the brigade was well handled, and all went well,

^ Some of the letters found are extremely interesting, and will repay
perusal Translations have appeared in some of the Indian papers ; selections
are given in an appendix to this chapter.

• ^ ■ •. «

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 139

while the casualties were trifling. The camp was
a good deal fired into on the nights of the 14th and
15th, and three or four casualties resulted.

On the 1 6th the brigade returned to Maidan to
rejoin the main column, and this was not a success-
ful day. The whole of the baggage was fairly
started by 9 a.m., the main body with it. The
rearguard, under the command of Colonel Eaton
Travers, of the 2nd Gurkhas, collected its outlying
pickets at about half-past nine, and shortly after-
wards commenced its movement in retreat. Colonel
Travers had with him his own regiment, the 2nd
Gurkhas, one company of the Gordon Highlanders,
one company of the Dorsets, five guns of No. 8
British Mounted Battery, and the 3rd Gurkha
Scouts — a sufficient and compact force for the
purpose in hand. The enemy at this time were
visible in groups here and there on the adjacent
heights, but contented themselves with long shots,
and the retirement proceeded without serious
interruption for about a mile and a half, when,
finding he was gaining ground too quickly, Colonel
Travers took up a strong position across the valley,
which he maintained until about one o'clock in the
afternoon, when, noting that the main column was
now well on its way up the final ascent, he resumed
his retrograde march. The enemy now for the
first time displayed some vigour in pursuit, and the
left of Colonel Travers' line was severely pressed.
The Gurkhas who were here, were, however,

I40 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

thoroughly steady, and, though they were under
a hot fire and had several casualties, they held the
Afridis in check until the summit of the pass was
gained safely by about 3 p.m.

It was shortly before the summit was reached that
poor young Wylie of the 2nd Gurkhas was killed.
He was the brightest and best of boys, a great
favourite in his regiment and out of it. Shortly
before he was hit he had been exposing himself
somewhat recklessly, but, in deference to a friendly
suggestion from his colonel, had got under cover,
lying flat behind a rock. In this position he in-
cautiously raised himself on his elbow while he
turned round to speak to his men a little in rear
of him. His head must have shown above the rock,
for he was instantly shot through the brain, and, of
course, killed on the spot. Captain Macintyre, his
great friend in the regiment, seeing him drop, at
once went out under a heavy fire and brought in his
body, which was carried into Camp Maidan the
same evening.

When the force under Colonel Travers reached
the top of the Tseri Kandao Pass it was much
exhausted, for, though the direct distance from camp
was short, yet the ground was extraordinarily diffi-
cult, and the necessity for continually occupying
commanding heights to the right and left of the
route, to say nothing of the watchfulness and vigour
necessary to stave off the enemy's incessant attacks,
had added immensely to the fatigues of the day.

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 141

All this had been foreseen by General Kempster,
and it had been pre-arranged, therefore, that from
this point the 15th Sikhs, under Colonel Abbott,
should cover the retirement. They were, in fact, in
position on the heights north and south of the pass
when Colonel Travers and his troops arrived. These,
accordingly, passed through now, and followed the
main column to camp, and the 15th Sikhs took up
the rearguard duties.

These duties at once claimed their pressing atten-
tion, for the Afridis now swarmed down from the
heights of the Saran Sar, and, skilfully availing
themselves of the screen provided by the timber
which is thick on the northern side of the pass,
closed round the 15th with a determination and
boldness which compelled them to stand fast, and
think rather of defending themselves and their
numerous wounded with resolution, than of risking
any movement in retreat until assured of some
support. The fire of the mountain guns at this
juncture would have been welcome music to this
gallant regiment, but an order sent by the General
for a battery to come into action at a particular spot,
where it would certainly have rendered signal service
to the hard-pressed infantry, was misunderstood, and
no help came from this quarter. But the brave Sikhs,
splendidly led, fought on with grand resolution. Their
comrades, the 36th Sikhs, under Colonel Haughton,
were already retracing their steps to support them,
and, encouraged by the approach of this reinforce-

142 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

ment, they battled bravely against the hordes that
assailed them ; and, inflicting on the enemy losses
more than equal to those sustained themselves,
they gradually withdrew from their advanced posi-
tion. It was about this time, between 4 and 5 p.m.,
that, elated by the offensive rdle they were assuming,
some hundred Afridis left the shelter of the trees
and attempted to rush the retreating 15th. They
were met by such a well-aimed and steady fire, and
such a prompt counter-attack, that few of the hundred
lived to regain the protection of the wood ; and prob-
ably in no engagement since this expedition started
have their losses been so severe as on this occasion.
The 36th had now come up, half the battalion
only, under Colonel Haughton, and with them a
handful of the Dorsets under Lieutenant Cowie. The
other half was still behind, under Major Des Vceux.
Colonel Abbott had been severely wounded in
the face and neck by gunshots in the fighting
above described ; the command of the party, there-
fore, devolved now on Colonel Haughton. It was
rapidly getting dark, the ground was precipitous,
broken, and difficult, the enemy thick on every side,
and the camp still four miles distant. Moreover, the
supply of ammunition was running short. The situa-
tion was, therefore, distinctly serious, and its gravity
was suddenly accentuated by a volley from a cluster
of four houses ^ directly in the path of the retiring

1 These houses had been burned earlier in the day, and were still
smouldering, their outline showing a dull red against the darkness.

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 143

column. There was only one solution of this
difficulty. Colonel Haughton at once gave the order
to fix bayonets and charge. This was promptly
done, and, with loud shouts and cheers, the hamlet
was bravely carried, the enemy in it shot, or bayon-
eted, or driven out, and the place captured. It was
in this operation that Captain Lewarne, of the 15th
Sikhs, was killed, and Lieutenant Munn, of the 36th,
wounded. Captain Custance, of the 36th, had been
shot through the thigh some little time previously.
As the wounded were now numerous, some five-and-
twenty altogether, and as darkness had now set in.
Colonel Haughton decided to stay where he was for
the night. Under his orders all at once set to work
to make their position as secure as possible, and
to do what they could to render first aid to the
wounded, and to make them comfortable for the
night. Fortunately, from this time the enemy's fire
became desultory, and by about 11 p.m. his attack
died away, so that the night was passed in com-
parative peace. This fact alone is sufficient proof
that the Afridis had been very roughly handled, for
otherwise they would never have let the troops alone.
I must explain here that Major Des Vceux, with
the rest of his own battalion, and a weak half-com-
pany of the Dorsets, under Captain Hammond, who
had come up in time to take part in the gallant
charge above referred to, had seized a house across
a nullah, about 400 yards away from Haughton*s
party, and at once intrenched himself as well as he

144 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897^ chap.

could. Hardly were his rough preparations com-
pleted, when the Afridis swarmed up out of the
nullah, hoping to occupy this very house, from which
they could have effectively enfiladed Colonel Haugh-
ton's position. They met, however, with such an
unexpected and hot reception that they soon drew
off, shouting threats against Major Des Vceuxs
Pathan servant, whom they apparently recognised,
and promising to cut his throat when they got hold
of him !

But there had, unhappily, been serious misfortune
in another direction. When the 36th Sikhs had
been sent back to help the 15th, two companies of
the Dorset Regiment had been at the same time
detached to support the 36th. One and a half of
these companies were ordered by the senior officer.
Captain Hammond, to take post in a house on the
line on which the Sikhs were presumably falling
back. The other half-company, with Captain Ham-
mond and Lieutenant Cowie, went on and, as we
have seen, joined, some Colonel Haughton, and some
Major Des Vceux. These men thus got through
the night safely. But the others were shortly after-
wards attacked, and, considering their position
untenable, they, unfortunately for themselves, left
their post and attempted to retreat to camp. In
the gathering darkness they missed the road, got
entangled in ravines, very much as the Northamp-
tons did on that fatal 9th, and, assailed on all sides
by the Afridis, were soon broken up into little

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 145

knots and groups, which defended themselves indeed
with courage and desperation against their savage
assailants, but, as may be imagined, with small chance
of success. On such ground, and in such circum-
stances, the Pathan is probably a better man than the
Britisher ; and the result of this deadly struggle in the
dark was that in twos or threes during the night a
poor remnant of these Dorsets struggled wounded and
weary into camp, their blood-stained bayonets and
battered gun-stocks attesting the desperate nature of
the conflict in which they had been engaged. But
eleven of them, including their two officers. Lieuten-
ants Crooke and Hales, were left behind dead, and the
rifles of these men fell, of course, into the hands of the
Afridis, who by this time have got quite a good stock
of our Lee-Metfords, and plenty of ammunition.

It is only fair to say, when speaking of companies
being detached, that I am informed on the best
authority that the party with Lieutenants Crooke
and Hales consisted of only twenty-eight men all
told.

The actual casualties on this i6th November
were : —

Dorsets. — Killed, Lieutenant Crooke (attached
from Suffolk Regiment), Lieutenant Hales (attached
from East York Regiment), and nine rank and file ;
wounded, ten rank and file.

15th Sikhs. — Killed, Captain Lewarne, and seven
men ; wounded, Colonel Abbott, three native officers,
and fifteen men.

146 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chaf.

36th Sikhs. — Killed, six men ; wounded, Captain
Custance, Lieutenant Munn, and seven men.

2nd Gurkhas. — Killed, Lieutenant Wylie, and
three men ; wounded, five men.

At daybreak on the 17th Brigadier - General
Gaselee's brigade went out to meet Colonel Haughton
and his gallant Sikhs, and found them already on
their way in, with all their wounded.

In the evening the officers and men killed were
buried on the outskirts of the camp. Sir William
Lockhart, and every one off duty, attending. It
was sad to see the long procession of stretchers
carried past, but after all, to die in battle "facing
fearful odds'* is a befitting death for a soldier, and
events march too rapidly here, and casualties have
been too frequent, to admit of much time being spent
in vain regrets. Hardly, in fact, had the remains
of our late comrades been committed to the grave
when the usual firing into camp commenced, and
each of us was reminded that their fate to-day might
be ours to-morrow.

I should mention that before the funeral (which
did not take place until dusk). Sir William Lockhart
saw the Dorsets and Northamptons on parade, and
addressed them a few words of commendation for
courage in most trying circumstances, and of en-
couragement and advice for the future. ** We must
remember," said Sir William, "that we are opposed
to perhaps the best skirmishers, and the best natural
shots, in the world, and that the country they inhabit

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 147

is the most difficult on the face of the globe. The
enemy's strength lies in his thorough knowledge of
the ground, which enables him to watch all our
movements unperceived, and to take advantage of
every height and every ravine. Our strength, on
the other hand, lies in our discipline, controlled fire,
and mutual support. Our weakness is our ignorance
of the country, and the consequent tendency of
small bodies to straggle and get detached. The
moral of all this is that careful touch must be main-
tained, and that if by mischance small parties do
find themselves alone they should as much as possible
stick to the open, and shun ravines and broken
ground, where they must fight at a disadvantage,
and run every risk of being ambuscaded and cut
off. I trust," said Sir William in conclusion,
" that we may soon meet the enemy and wipe out
all old scores with him, and I am confident that
when that time comes you will all behave with a
steady courage worthy of the best traditions of your
corps. In the meantime there is no occasion to be
depressed because some of us have been surprised,
outnumbered, and overwhelmed on bad ground."

Afterwards addressing the Sikhs and Gurkhas,
Sir William Lockhart praised them highly for their
gallant conduct, and said he was proud to have such
regiments under his command. He explained to
them, too, with what interest and sympathy the
Queen personally watches the progress of events in
these wild regions (and, indeed, Her Majesty's

148 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

frequent and gracious inquiries are warmly appreci-
ated by all ranks), and said to them, as he had said
to the British regiments, that he hoped they would
soon have an opportunity of meeting the enemy
again on better terms, and paying off all old scores
with interest.

P.S. — The following extracts from a private note
written for me by an officer who was present
throughout this affair, will be read with deep
interest : —

Meanwhile darkness had come on, and it was exceedingly
difficult to keep touch with each other. The ground was cut in
high terraces, down which we clambered as best we could, the
men tripping, sliding, and falling over each other, for no path
existed, and it was too dark even to distinguish the drop from
one terrace to the next The difficulty of bringing our wounded
along, under such circumstances, may be imagined, but cannot
be described.

• •••••

The Afridis were completely taken aback by our sudden
charge and onslaught, just when they thought they had got us on
the run, and very few waited for the bayonet, but Munn, who was
the first man to reach the centre house, got his sword through
one of them, and several more were shot as they bolted. The
scene of excitement and confusion at this moment was indescrib-
able. The only light came from the smouldering houses, and it
was almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe. When we
had pulled ourselves together, and were able to look round, the
situation was not very encouraging. There was practically no
cover ; the enemy were still firing at us from three sides, and
casualties continued to occur, and many of us had narrow escapes,
bullets going through our helmets or clothes. However, it would
have been madness to attempt any further move, so Colonel

X THE AFFAIR OF THE i6th NOVEMBER 149

Haughton made the best dispositions he could under the circum-
stances. The men were made to lie down in groups round the
house, and the wounded were placed in the only bit of cover
available, between a high bank and the smouldering ruins of the
house, the warmth from which undoubtedly helped to save some
of their lives. Wherever it was possible we made rude stone
breastworks, etc., but materials were sadly wanting, and many of
the men were wholly unprotected on the eastern side, whence the
enemy still kept up a desultory fire. Fortunately the darkness
prevented their aim being good, and most of their bullets whizzed
harmlessly overhead. About 11 p.m. they left us altogether, and
we settled down to endure a long and bitter night as best we
could. The cold was intense, and the men had no greatcoats
with them ; and nothing to eat, for we had expected to reach
camp that evening. The only way they could get any relief was
by taking it in turns to huddle together on the still warm rubble
which had fallen from the burning houses. It was an anxious
time for the officers, for it was anticipated that the enemy might
find courage to make another attack when the rising moon should
reveal the weakness of our position. But the coolness and con-
fident bearing of Colonel Haughton kept us all in good heart,
and made us feel perfectly certain that we should come out right
side uppermost

Still it was with feelings of intense relief that we saw the pale
gray dawn appear, and knew that we could soon be up and
doing. Communication was at once opened with Des Voeux,
across the nullah, and all the ground near by was carefully
searched to see if any of our men had been left behind, killed or
wounded, in the hurry and tumult of the events of the night.
Then we commenced our movement on camp, sending on the
wounded first under a strong escort The enemy opened fire on
us from the surrounding hills at once, but in the uncertain light
their aim was bad, and no one was hit We sent the wounded
along the main nullah running past the camp, and covered them
on one side with the 15th Sikhs, and on the other with a
company of the 36th Sikhs and the few Dorsets who were
with us. These latter, a mere handful of men, showed great
gallantry and steadiness all through the affair, and although they

ISO THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, x

suffered much from the cold and exposure, responded cheerfully
to every call made upon them.

We had not gone far when we met a force coming out from
camp to help us ; and right glad we were to be able to march
straight in without any further trouble.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS
(^From the ''Pioneer'' of Allahabad)

The following are translations of letters found in
Saiyid Akbar's house in the Waran Valley : —

Translation of a letter from the Mullah of Adda to the Mullah of
Sipak, the Mullah of Aha Khel, Badshah Sahib, Malih
Amin Khan^ Malik Sher Muhammad Khan^ the Kamar
Khel, Khambar Khel and Aha Khel MaUks, Maliks Yar
Muhammad^ Feroz^ Walt Muhammad Khawas, Samandar
and other people of Tirah^ dated the ith Rabie-us-Sani
1 3 1 5 /^ = $th September 1897.

After compliments. — On the ist Rabie-us-Sani 13 15 H.=
30th August 1897, I detennined with a Ioshkar to go out for a
holy war and defend the religion of the Holy Prophet When I
reached Lashkar Killa, and was staying there for the night, I
received a "firman" from " Zia-ul-millati-uddin," the King of
Islam, in reply to my petition, and understood its contents, which
were to the following effect : —

" You should wait for a few days in your former place, so that
I may hold a consultation with the Khans, Maliks, chiefs, and
respectable men about ghata and decide what steps should be
taken. I will then either come myself or send to you my son
iox jehady with our victorious troops and supplies, such as rations
and food, and will let you know again. I will, with the greatest

152 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

pleasure, make exertions in the way of jehad,^^ I therefore write
to you people that I have postponed my intentions for the reasons
given above, but that you should, on receipt of this letter, consult
among yourselves and let me know faithfully of your decision, so
that I may come to you with the Mohmand people, the Khan
of Nawagai, and other Mussalmans. You should try your best
to save the religion of the Prophet. I shall await your reply.

Translation of a letter^ without date, from the Daulatzai and
Sturi Khel Mullahs to the Aha Khel Mullah and other
Afridi Mullahs,

After compliments. — We attacked the Muhammadzai post on
Thursday and destroyed it. We killed many Government
servants and returned with success to Ublan. Our casualties
were two wounded, who have not yet died. Please let us know
whether we should stay on here committing raids on Kohat, or
should dismiss the lashkar to their homes, because we have no
supplies here. Please also let us know by the bearer if we are
wanted there, or if you will send us reinforcement here. The
Shia Sipahs are afraid lest their property may be looted. We
have stood surety to them that none of the Afridis or Zia-uddins
will cause them any injury. We have made peace with the
Sipahs in order that they may join us in the ghaza, and you
should see that none of the Sipah property or animals are inter-
fered with.

Translation of a letter, without date, from the Mullah of Adda to
all the Mullahs and elders of the Afridi and Orakzai
tribes.

After compliments. — The Kafirs have taken possession of all
Mussulman countries, and, owing to the lack of spirit on the part
of the people, are conquering every region. They have now
reached the countries of Bajaur and Swat, but, though the
people of these places showed want of courage in the beginning,
they have now realised their mistake, and having repented and
become ashamed (of their former deeds), they attack them (the
Kafirs) day and night, and have quite confounded them. I have
myself informed the people of Lughman, and Kunar, and the

X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS 153

Mohmands, Ningraharis, and Shinwaris, and they are all prepared
to take part in the fighting. They are simply waiting for the
summer to pass, as the country of Bajaur is without water and
shade, and common folk cannot afford to arrange for the
necessaries oi jehad. It is difficult for them to fight in summer.
I inform you also that you may try your best to further the cause
oijehad^ which is the best of all devotions, and the truest of all
submissions, so that we may not be ashamed before God on the
day of judgment, and be glorious before His Prophet. Though
these men have no means, yet as the holy verse runs that
" victory and triumph rest with God," it is possible that God may
give us victory and power to recover the country of Mussalmans
from the hands of Kafirs, but, if we fail, we shall have done our
best, and can bring a reasonable excuse before God on the day
of judgment, because God does not expect a thing from a man
which is beyond his power. I have deputed Mullah Abdulla
Akhundzada of the Mohmand country, to attend on you, and,
God willing, he will reach you. Please let me know whatever
decision you may unanimously arrive at, so that it may be acted
upon. If you decide to send for me there, I am willing to come ;
but, if you wish to come here, I also agree. If you choose to
commence fighting there, and desire me to fight in this direction,
I am ready to do so ; but it is necessary to fix the time and day
of fighting, so that, by the grace of God, the work be accom-
plished. And as it is said that the only thing a man can do in
a matter is to try his best, and that the accomplishment of the
matter rests with God, so to leave everything in the hands of
God is the best thing of all, and all Mumins (true believers) must
trust in God. May God, the Almighty, lead us all to the path
of virtue at our last moment, and save us from the punishment
of the next world. And may He enable us to do an act which
may be acceptable to Him. Peace be upon all believers 1

Translation of a Utter from Sufi Sahib to the Mullah Sahib of
Sipah, the Mullah of Aha Khd {Saiyid Ahbar), Badshah
Sahibf Malik Amin Khan^ Malik Sher Muhammad Khan^
Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan^ Ftrot^ Wall Muhammad
Khan^ Klutwas Khan^ Samandar^ and the Maliks of

154 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chap.

Kamar Khel^ Khambar Khel^ Aka Khel and other MaUks
and people of Tirah, dated the ith Rabi-us-Sani 1315/^ =
15M September 1897.

After compliments. — I started with the people of the Kot
Valley, of Mohmandarra, of the Hisarak Valley and of the whole
of Ningrahar, for jehad in that direction, but on reaching the
limits of Batikot with the lashkar^ I received a letter from my
spiritual leader, the Akhundzada Sahib (of Adda), the perusal of
which gave me pleasure, and I understood its contents. He
wrote to say that I should return to my residence, with the
Ningrahar iashkar, and should wait for a few days, when, he said,
he could let me know again. In compliance therefore with his
instructions I returned to my place. I now write to say that on
receipt of this letter you should assemble together, exert yourselves
in the way oijehad^ and let me know faithfully of the result (of
your meeting), so that I may understand it. God willing, the
" Pir Sahib " (Adda Mullah) with his lashkar of Bajauris, the Khan
of Nawagai, and the people of the Nigrahar, and myself too, will
start at once in that direction and will try our best to save the
religion of the Prophet. Consider it an urgent matter.

Translation of a letter from Fakir Shah (f probably some Afghan
official in Ningrahar) to the (Aka Khel) Mullah (Saiyid
Akbar\ dated the i^th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 If, ^ 12th
September 1897.

After compliments. — I received your letter and understood
its contents. I hope you will write daily the news of that side
and send it to Mullah Idris, who will forward it to me, so that I
may remain informed of the state of affairs in that direction, and
sympathise with the Prophet Rest assured in every way from
this side, and always send us news of that side.

Translation of a letter from Adam Khan {Khambar Khet) to his
brother Muhammad Zaman Khan (sent from Kabul)^
dated the iSth Jamadi-tU-Awal 1315 If,-i$th October
1897.

After compliments. — I also joined the Afridi and Orakzai
jirga^ which was well received by the Amir. His Highness

X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS 155

asked us about the causes which led to the quarrels between the
Afridis and the British Government We stated that the British
Government were day by day violating the former agreements,
were forcibly encroaching upon our limits, and were realising
fines and compensations from us for the arms which were stolen
in the Khyber by their own servants, and that these naturally led
to the disturbances. His Highness said that if he could he
would try to make peace between us and the British Government.
We stated that, if the British Government agreed to give up all
frontier territories forcibly taken possession of by them, and did
not ask for the return of arms looted by us in fair fight, we would
make peace. The Amir then communicated our statement to
the British Government, and a reply to that is awaited. We are
staying here, and every consideration is paid to us by the Amir.
Rest assured. Till the result (of our mission) is known, take
care that you are not deceived by the English, whom you should
not believe.

Translation of a letter from Kazi Mira Khan^ and other Adam
Khels composing the Afridijirga at Kabuly to Mullah Saiyid
Akbar^ Aka Khel^ dated the 2S th Jamadi-td-Awal 131 5
ff. = 2$th October 1897.

After compliments. — Let it be known to you that having been
appointed by you and other Mussalman brethren as a jirga to
attend on His Highness the Amir, we arrived here, and held an
interview with His Highness, who advised us not to fight with
the British Government, and this was, and has been his advice
ever since. We said we accepted his advice, but that our wishes
ought to be met by the British Government. We were ordered
to record them in detail, when His Highness said he would,
after consideration, submit them to the British Government, and
see what reply they would give. We put down our wishes in
detail, and presented them to His Highness, who submitted
them to the British Government, but no reply has yet been
received. We shall see what reply comes.

There is a British Agent at Kabul who has on his establish-
ment many Hindustani Mussalmans. One of these became our
acquaintance. This roan is a good Mussalman and a well-wisher

156 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

of his co-religionists. He has given us a piece of good and
correct news, which is to the following effect : —

"You, Mahommedans, must take care lest you be deceived
by the British, who are at present in distressed circumstances.
For instance, Aden, a seaport, which was in possession of the
British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez
Canal, through which the British forces could easily reach India in
twenty days, has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and
has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces
now require six months to reach India. The friendly alliance
between the British and the Germans has also been disturbed,
on account of some disagreement about trade, which must result
in the two nations rising in arms against each other. The
Sultan, the Germans, the Russians, and the French are all in
arms against the British at all seaports, and fighting is going on
in Egypt too against them. In short, the British are disheartened
nowadays. The Viceroy, and the Generals who are to advance
against you, have received distinct orders from London that the
operations in the Khyber and Tirah must be brought to an end
in two weeks' time, as the troops are required in Egypt and at
other seaports. In the case of the Mohmands, and people of
Gandab, who had killed ten thousand British troops, and had
inflicted a heavy loss of rifles and property on them, the British,
in their great dismay, concluded a settlement with them for
twenty-four rifles only, whereas thousands of rifles and lakhs of
rupees should have been demanded. This peace with the
Mohmands is by way of deceit, and when the British get rid of
their other difficulties they will turn back and demand from the
Mohmands the remaining rifles, and compensation for their
losses. They will say that, as the Mohmands have become
British subjects by surrendering twenty- four rifles, they must
make good the remaining loss too. The British are always giving
out that their troops will enter Khyber and Tirah on such and
such dates, but they do not march on those dates and remain
where they are. This is deceitful on the part of the English,
who wish to mislead Mussalmans by a payment of 5 rupees and
seek for an opportunity to make an attack by surprise. I have
thus informed you of the deeds and perplexities of the English."

X THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS 157

We, the jirga people, consider it necessary to inform you of
this, so that you may be aware of the distress, confusion, and
deceitfulness of the British, and may communicate the informa-
tion to all the Mussalmans of the lashkar^ in order that they may
be on the alert against being cheated by the British in any way.
You should also send us daily news for our information, and see
that no attacks are made on you by surprise. Also appoint a few
clever men as messengers to bring us daily news and letters from
you and vice versa. Send us by the bearers all news of that side,
and in future, too, send us fresh news daily by other messengers,
as it is important that we should know about each other.

Translation of a letter from Sherdil Khan and Abdul Rahim^ son
of Malik Sinjab Khan Orakzai (of Barki)^ to Malik Sinjab
Khany dated the 2%th Jatnadi-ul-Awal 1315 -^ = 25 M
October 1897.

The Amir received our jirga of the Orakzais and Afridis with
great honour and respect. He asked the causes which led to
the commencement of the hostilities between the Orakzais and
Afridis on the one side, and the British on the other. In reply to
his inquiry we stated that the British had encroached upon our
frontier limits by taking forcible possession of the Samana and
other like places, and that they (the British) were demanding
compensation and fines from us for the arms stolen in the
Khyber by their own troops from the middle of their own army,
and that these were the causes which naturally led to the quarrels
between the two parties. The Amir then said that if he could
he would try to effect peace between us and the British Govern-
ment Upon this we said that, if the English gave up our
frontier territories, and abandoned the idea of re-occupying them,
and would not demand the restoration of arms taken by us in
action from British troops, we would make peace. After this
the Amir, for the welfare of Mussalmans, communicated all that
we had stated to the British Government, and a reply to this is
expected. We are now staying here, and the Amir treats us
with great consideration. You must therefore rest assured for us.
Do not negotiate with the British, and take care that you are not
taken in by them. Do not believe them. For the rest all is well

CHAPTER XI

THE MOVE TO BAGH — TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS —
THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI

Bagh, Tirah, 26M November,

Still in the Maidan Valley, but at last, we are
thankful to be able to say, on the move. It was a
weary wait of nearly three weeks in the last camp,
Maidan. But our halts and our marches are dictated
not so much by the military exigencies of the situa-
tion as by political considerations. It is for "the
powers that be " in Simla and at the India Office to
order, for us to obey ; and it is to be presumed that
the long halt in Maidan was arranged, partly, to
allow Government to make up its mind as to what
terms should be exacted, and what policy pursued ;
and partly, in the hope that, seeing us in possession,
the Afridis would throw up the sponge, and come
in. We know now that anything like annexation
is not, and probably never was, contemplated ; and
we also know now that to wait for our friends the
Zakka-khels to climb down was a mistaken and
vain idea. So far they have not only defied us, and

CHAP. XI THE MOVE TO BAGH 159

held their own against us with quite a fair measure
of success, but also they have had influence enough
with other sections of the tribes, notably with the
Kuki-khels, the clan next to themselves the most
numerous, and the most powerful, to prevent them
up to date from even offering to make any terms
with us.

At the same time, our prolonged sojourn in one
spot has been their opportunity. It has resulted in
daily skirmishes and rearguard affairs in which they
have often got the best of it. They have absolutely
nothing to learn from us, these Afridis, in irregular
methods of fighting. Contrariwise, their dashing and
bold attack, the skill with which they take advantage
of ground, the patience with which they watch for a
favourable moment, and their perfect marksmanship
— all these qualities have again and again won our
admiration, and made a sensible impression upon
our men. And as the proof of a pudding is in the
eating, so if we go through the record of our three
weeks at Maidan, and total up our gains and losses,
moral as well as physical, and estimate what theirs
have been, and then strike a balance, I fancy it will
not be very much in our favour. Our actual casual-
ties in battle up to the present time, including those
sustained by the Peshawar and Kurram columns (an
insignificant percentage), are well over 650, and if
an equal number of the enemy have been put hars
de combat by us, we have not the satisfaction of
knowing it. And when we consider, in addition, the

i6o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

rifles and ammunition we have lost, the baggage
that has been raided, and the transport animals, etc.,
that have been carried off, then it becomes obvious,
and outside argument, that in the class of warfare
involved by sitting down in a stationary camp, and
trying to keep open a long and difficult line of com-
munications, and to live (to a great extent) by
forage, we are at a great disadvantage compared
with our savage foe.

Let us be glad, then, that that trying period is
past. The force broke up from its old bivouac on
the 1 8th. On that, and the next three days, the
whole of the troops, and an enormous accumulation
of stores were moved to this present spot, Bagh,
mentioned by me in my letter of 5th November
(Chap. VIII.), and described as the place famed for
its musjid and sacred grove, in which the Afridi
rebellion and the Khyber raid were planned, and in
which fanaticism, intrigue, and sedition have always
been hot-bedded and nourished. Bagh is rather in
Khambar-khel and Malikdin-khel country than in
Zakka-khel territory, and only a short four miles
west of our late camp. But short though the march,
and notwithstanding that the jirgahs of the two
sections named came in recently, the flanks of the
route had to be strongly guarded during the move-
ment, and the new camp was laid out under a per-
fect mitraille from sharpshooters ensconced under
cover in every adjacent house. There were numer-
ous casualties, of course, but fortunately no officer

i62 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

hausted, or after seven or eight casualties have
occurred on either side, the quarrel is generally
settled by an interchange of marriages !

These fortified houses have, therefore, been a
standing danger to us, and as the troops have been
repeatedly fired on from them, and serious losses
sustained, Sir William Lockhart reluctantly ordered
them — that is, all those groups of them adjacent to
our camp, or to our main communications with the
Mastura Valley, vid the Arhanga Pass — to be de-
stroyed. The houses have accordingly been burned,
and the towers blown up by the Engineers, and if
the consequence be to punish some innocent with
the guilty, it must be borne in mind that the
measure was not prompted by anger or malice,
but dictated by stern necessity, and the instinct of
self-preservation.

Just before leaving camp Maidan, Sir William
Lockhart once more specially addressed the 15th
Sikhs to bid them good-bye, and to assure them
that he sent them back only in their own interests.
The regiment is sadly reduced in strength in officers
and men, as it has been in the forefront of all the
fighting in this part of the world since August last,
and has suffered many casualties. Its companies
were barely twenty files strong as it stood on parade
now. Sir William, speaking in Hindustani, again
referred to the splendid endurance and pluck shown
by all ranks on the i6th inst. (fully described in my
last letter), and told the men they were worthy

XI TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS 163

representatives of the great Sikh Khalsa, and that
in placing them temporarily on the line of com-
munications he was only giving them a well-earned
rest, but that should occasion require it he would
gladly send for them again. The gallant 15 th
were visibly gratified by the Chief's appreciation
and soldierly praise, and cheered loudly as he
concluded.

The 30th P. I., who have all this time been hold-
ing the twice-captured Dargai heights, are coming
up in their place. The 2nd P.I. are also on their
way to the front, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers too,
their places being taken on the line of communica-
tions by regiments from the reserve at Rawal
Pindi.

On the 2 1 St Sir William Lockhart received the
jirgahs of four Afridi clans — the Malikdin-khels,
the Khambar-khels, the Adam-khels, and the Aka-
khels. The Zakka-khels and the Kuki-khels were,
of course, conspicuous by their absence ; but news
travels quickly in the East, and it would not be
many hours after the dismissal of the four jirgahs
named before the terms imposed by Government
would be known to all the absentees. These terms,
as announced by Sir Richard Udny, were : —

1. Restoration of all arms, property, etc., plun-
dered at the sack of the Khyber forts, or on any
other occasion.

2. Surrender of 800 breech-loading rifles.

3. Payment of a fine of 50,000 rupees.

i64 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

(The foregoing terms to be fully complied with
in seven days.)

4. Formal tender of submission in open durbar.

Further, the jirgahs were told that Government
reserved the right to decide hereafter the question
of the management and administration of the
Khyber Pass route, but that whatever order they
might give in the matter the tribes would be re-
quired to comply with it. Sir Richard Udny, who
is a fluent and forcible speaker, then went on to say
that amongst the letters found in the Mullah Sayid
Akbar s house in Waran was one foolish one from
their own deputation in Kabul informing them that
the English were in a bad way, that they had lost
Aden and the Suez Canal (!), that their trade was
ruined, and that they were threatened by complica-
tions at home and abroad which required the speedy
presence of their troops elsewhere.^ The Afridis,
therefore, might continue to fight against the Eng-
lish confident that they could not do them much
harm, and that they would very soon have to
evacuate their country, willy-nilly. Sir Richard
begged them, if they had ever placed any reliance
on this precious effusion, to believe now that it was
an utterly mendacious statement. We had come
into their country with deliberation and purpose,
and they might rest assured that we had the power
and the intention to remain in it until our just
demands were complied with. With this exhorta-

^ See Appendix to Chap. X.

XI TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS 165

tion the proceedings came to an end, and the
members of the jirgahs dispersed to their homes.
Amongst them were men who had seen service in
our own ranks, and one old fellow had no less than
four medals on his breast — Afghanistan, 1878-80;
North- West Frontier, India, 1887 ; and the Egyp-
tian and Khedive's medals, 1882.

Although the political officers are not very
sanguine in their present estimate of the situation,
I cannot help thinking there is room to hope for an
early and amicable settlement. It may be true that
the Zakka-khels, thanks chiefly to their geographical
situation in relation to the other sections, are the
most powerful of all the Afridi clans, and that they
still defy us and continue recalcitrant. Also, that
the Kuki-khels, another strong division, have not
'*come in "yet. But these Khambars and Malik-
dins, who have come in, are almost as important,
and numerically very nearly equal to the two first-
named, and there can be no doubt that they are
sincere in their desire to make terms with us, and
to see us depart. We have no final answer from
them yet — there has not been time for that ; but I
quite expect that when received it will be a friendly
one, though doubtless they may ask for a little more
time for compliance with the conditions imposed :
and that will not be unreasonable, as the looted
arms and property, for example, must be scattered
over a wide area, and will take time to collect. In
the thorough destruction of the Zakka-khels' towers

i66 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

and defences, and of many of their own too, they
have received now a stern object-lesson, and they
are convinced of our power to give further illustra-
tions if they drive us to it. Moreover, we daily
receive fresh evidence that in the memorable fight
on the 1 6th inst., described in my last letter, the
losses inflicted were very severe indeed. Reliable
reports place them at 293 killed and wounded ; and
independent testimony from the Peshawar side has
reached us fully corroborating this estimate, and
speaking of the engagement as the most costly in
life to them that they have yet been engaged in.

There is, therefore, good reason to believe that
ere long submission will be generally tendered,
particularly as the tribesmen note the steady deter-
mination with which Sir William Lockhart is carry-
ing out his publicly-announced plan to visit every
part of their country in turn, it resting with them-
selves whether he comes as a friend or an enemy.
We were no sooner established here (Bagh) than a
three days' expedition was arranged to visit the
Rajgul Valley and look up the Kuki-khels. Sir
William himself accompanied this party, the com-
mand of which was intrusted to Brigadier-General
Westmacott, whose troops included the King's Own
Scottish Borderers, the 3rd Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 28th
Bombay Pioneers, No. 4 Company Madras Sappers,
No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers, the Gurkha
Scouts, and No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. The
idea was to march to Dwatoi (lit, the two rivers)

XI THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI 167

on the 22nd, reconnoitre and map on the 23rd, and
return to Bagh on the 24th. The district to be
visited was absolutely unknown, but it had been
ascertained that the road to Dwatoi lay through a
long, dangerous, and difficult defile, and it was fairly
certain that the Kuki-khels, who chiefly inhabit
Rajgul, would oppose the movement. The troops
therefore moved on the lightest possible scale,
taking nothing but their great-coats, water-proof
sheets, and a couple of blankets, one day's rations
in their haversacks, and two more carried for them
on mules ; officers ditto ; while Sir William Lock-
hart was attended by only one A.D.C. ; and of his
staff only Brigadier -General Nicholson, Captain
Haldane, Sir Richard Udny, and Lord Methuen
accompanied him.

The distance to Dwatoi proved to be about
seven miles, but it is almost impossible in words to
adequately describe the difficulties of the road to it.
Within a couple of miles of Bagh it suddenly plunges,
following the stream which drains the Maidan basin,
into a deep gorge formed by precipices which in places
rise up sheer several hundred feet on either side, and
are topped by rugged heights which, on the day of the
movement, were crowned by the Yorkshire Regiment
on one hand, and by the 2nd Gurkhas on the other.
To call it a road now is only a fofon de parler. It
is a mere stony track scrambling along the river bed,
sometimes on the right bank, sometimes on the left,
and as often as not in mid -stream in ice-cold

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i68 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

water up to the knees. The water was nearly two feet
deep now. After rain, when the stream is in flood,
this route must be quite impassable for hours, or
possibly days, together. Sometimes the gorge
opens out a little, and the road runs out of it on to
higher ground, when, needless to say, the troops or
transport following it at once come under fire from
the heights above. There are about three miles of
this pleasant walking, and then the worst part of the
defile is past, the last mile and a half into Dwatoi,
though still following the river bed, running through
a more open and an easier country.

To force a defile like this, and take a strong
brigade through it with its baggage, requires cir-
cumspection and dash. The first step was, of
course, to crown the heights on either side, and
drive off the enemy who held them. This was done
in excellent style by the specially detailed troops,
the Yorks and 2nd Gurkhas, who started in the
bitter cold before daylight, and, breasting the climb
in gallant fashion, accomplished their task with but
few casualties, which, however, included Lieutenant
Jones, killed, and 2nd Lieutenant Watson, severely
wounded, both of the Yorks, while bravely leading
on their men. The heights being thus in our hands,
Westmacott's Brigade advanced, the Gurkhas lead-
ing the way, and by four in the afternoon Dwatoi
was occupied, the enemy offering throughout a
desultory resistance, which, as usual, such excellent
long shots are they, cost us a few men wounded.

XI THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI 169

Sir William Lockhart himself, and some of his staff,
did not escape by any margin to speak of, from
being picked off by some sharp-shooters who had
securely established themselves in an eyrie on the
rocks above, whence they made one particular
crossing on the road below them extremely dan-
gerous. Four of the Borderers were knocked over
on this one strip, and eventually Sir William sent
up his personal escort, a few files of the 3rd Sikhs,
to dislodge these marksmen, which they did.

But though the troops, after a most toilsome and
exhausting march, had reached Dwatoi, their
baggage did not arrive, and such were the extra-
ordinary difficulties of the road that none of it came
in that night. It was five o'clock on the following
afternoon before the last of it, escorted by Colonel
Haughton and his splendid Sikhs, the 36th, reached
the bivouac. Consequently the General, and his
staff, and the men, all alike, had to lie out on the
hill-sides during that bitter night, the thermometer
registering 20 degrees of frost. Every one, be it
remembered, was wet to the skin almost up to the
waist, and, arriving on the ground only a little
before sunset, there was no time to dry even one's
socks and boots ; while as to fires, a few well-directed
bullets from the enemy soon scattered the shivering
groups that had crowded round them.

As a matter of fact, the largest proportion of the
men had at once to climb the adjacent ridges, drive
the enemy off, and hold them during the freezing

170 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

night. This they did with a cheeriness and dash
which were admirable. The Borderers in particular
were sharply engaged before they established them-
selves on their ground, and were conspicuous by the
resolution and spirit with which they attacked and
captured their point. It was not a cheerful night
either for the baggage, away some two miles in
rear, and it was an anxious time for the rear-guard
commander. When darkness came on Colonel
Haughton parked all the mules on some terraced
fields, and, placing strong picquets round them,
like St. Paul, "waited for the day." Owing to
the good arrangements made, neither the baggage
nor the main body was seriously attacked during
the night.

During the 23rd reconnaissances were made in
various directions, and valuable mapping was carried
out by survey parties, all of it under fire, for on all
sides the enemy were active and evidently collecting
for attack. During the night the camp was a good
deal fired into, but not much harm done ; and long
before daylight on the 24th the baggage was loaded
up and the return march to Bagh commenced. The
intensity of the cold, which was accentuated by a
wind that pierced like Rontgen rays, may be
imagined from the fact that the spray from the water
splashed up by wading, froze as it fell, while
moustaches became mere blocks of ice, and the
horses' tails as they swished them about in the
stream were covered immediately with long spiky

XI THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI 171

icicles. Several cases of frost-bite occurred before
camp was reached.

The heights on either side of the defile previously
described were still held by the Yorks and 2nd Gurk-
has, who never quitted them after capturing them
on the 22 nd, until the returning troops had all passed
safely through ; and the rear-guard of the brigade
was composed of the 3rd Gurkhas and 36th Sikhs,
with two companies of the Borderers, the whole under
the command of Colonel Haughton. The enemy,
of course, pressed these troops severely during the
retirement, and many casualties occurred, particularly
amongst the 36th, on whom the brunt of the
fighting fell. But the men, admirably handled by
Haughton, bravely led by their officers, and en-
couraged by the presence of Brigadier - General
Westmacott, who was constantly with them through-
out, were as steady and cool as if they were man-
oeuvring on a field-day, and returned the Afridis' fire
with a judgment and precision that most effectually
disconcerted them, and kept them at arm's length.
It is quite impossible to describe the difficulties and
risks of taking a long baggage train through a
long and dangerous defile such as this is. Nothing
but individual courage, high training, perfect disci-
pline, and calm judgment will pull troops through
successfully, when acting as rear-guard in such a
country, and opposed to such an enemy. All these
qualities were exhibited now in a high degree by
commander and men alike, with the result that the

172 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, xi

enemy were eventually beaten off, leaving for once
in a way some of their killed behind them, and
allowing even three of their rifles to fall into our
hands. Before sunset the whole force was safely in
camp, and a most interesting expedition had been
brought to a most successful conclusion.

The manner in which the Yorks and 2nd
Gurkhas were withdrawn from the heights on the
flanks was also admirable. Sir William Lockhart
was extremely pleased with the soldierly spirit
shown by all ranks on this occasion. There was
enough fighting, hardship, and exposure on these
three days to satisfy the keenest warrior; but
everything was faced and endured with patience,
pluck, and cheerfulness, and General Westmacott,
who was in command of the brigade, is to be con-
gratulated on the complete success of the enter-
prise.

The casualties during this retreat were: 36th
Sikhs, two men killed, twelve wounded, and one
officer. Captain Venour, 5th P.I. (attached to the
36th), slightly wounded ; Borderers, two wounded ;
3rd Gurkhas, one killed and three wounded.

CHAPTER XII

THE 1ST BRIGADE IN MASTURA — THE PUNISHMENT
OF THE CHAMKANIS — PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE
TIRAH

Bagh, y^d December.

I MAY refer now for a moment to the doings of
the I St Brigade, which, it will be remembered, when
we advanced into Tirah, was left in the Mastura
Valley to keep an eye on the Orakzais, and to
maintain communication between Khangarbur in
the Khanki Valley and the headquarters in Tirah.
Under Brigadier-General Harts vigorous adminis-
tration, the Mastura Post, as it was called, was soon
converted into a strong position, and large convoys
of stores and supplies coming up, and of wounded
and sick going down, were passed through daily
with ease and regularity. Foraging parties were
sent out frequently, and successful reconnaissances
were freely pushed in all directions (notably one on
the 25th November to the summit of the Torsmats
Pass, 7970 feet high), which resulted in the acquisi-
tion of much valuable information regarding the

174 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

surrounding country, which has now been all
thoroughly explored and mapped. The Orakzais
in the Mastura Valley were not so aggressively
hostile at this time as the Afridis in Tirah. Still,
skirmishes with them were of constant occurrence,
and the troops had plenty of practice in fighting
and marching, to prepare them for the sterner work
which this brigade, with the rest of the ist Division,
under Major-General Symons, was shortly to under-
take.

On 8th November, for example, a party of the
1st Gurkhas, on duty on the southern slopes of the
Arhanga Pass, succeeded in surprising some of
the enemy who were lying in wait to attack convoys
near the village of Unai,^ and inflicted heavy loss
upon them ; and on the 1 3th, when some hundreds
of Orakzais pressed an attack upon one of our
foraging parties in the valley, close to the Mastura
Post, they were repulsed decisively, with many
casualties to them, and at the cost of only six
wounded to ourselves ; which included, however,
two officers. Captain Bowman of the Derbyshires,
and Major Money, i8th Bengal Lancers. The
troops on this occasion were commanded by Major
Smith- Dorrien, Derbyshire Regiment, who handled
his force with considerable skill.

In my last letter I described the reconnaissance
to Dwatoi. Sir William Lockhart rejoined head-

1 This was oar artillery position in the attack on the Arhanga Pass. See
Chap. VIII.

XII THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CHAMKANIS 175

quarters at Bagh on 24th November, and allowing
himself only two days for office work and corre-
spondence — and it is astonishing how even in the
field papers and telegrams do accumulate in a very
short time — started again on the morning of the
27th for a longer and more extended tour through
the Chamkani-Massozai-Mamuzai country. These
are sections, lying due west of our present camp,
about two or three marches only, but separated from
this valley by a range of precipitous hills called the
Durghai Ghar, across which there are several un-
explored and difficult passes, between 7000 feet and
8000 feet in height. The Chamkanis and the
Massozais — the latter particularly — were, ^in -the
beginning of this trouble, exceedingly bumptious and
aggressive. When Sir William Lockhart published
his first proclamation to the tribes, announcing his
coming and his purpose, the Massozais sent an
insolent reply, stating that they had their own orders
from their Mullahs ; that they protested altogether
against the occupation of the Khyber, Samana, and
Swat ; and that they would certainly oppose our
advance. They have since fully kept this promise,
and have throughout been actively hostile in the
Khurmana Valley,* keeping us constantly on the

^ Here I may mention that on 7th November Colonel Hill, commanding
the Kurram column, made a reconnaissance in force from Sadr, through the
Khurmana defile, to Hissar, in order to explore the ground through which his
column would move in the event of operations being subsequently undertaken
against the Chamkanis. The following troops accompanied him : — Central
India Horse, 100 lancers mounted, 100 dismounted; 12th Bengal Infantry,

176 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

alert at Sadda (or Sadr), and regularly firing on our
patrols and picquets whenever they got the chance.

For these reasons, as well as because it is Sir
William's declared policy to visit and explore
thoroughly every part of their country, it was
essential to look up these Chamkanis and Massozais
and Mamuzais, who, notwithstanding that their
jirgahs had been received, and that they had practi-
cally agreed to the conditions imposed, showed no
disposition to submit and pay up their fines.

The command of the troops in this expedition
was intrusted to Brigadier-General Gaselee, who
started on the 26th with the Gurkha Scouts of the
3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's Royal West

100 men ; 5th Gurkhas, 250 men ; Kapurthala Imperial Service Troops, 100
men ; Kurram Militia, 400 men ; and the maxim gun, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

The defile was found to be seven miles in length, and passable for cavalry.
The enemy being taken by surprise did not oppose the advance.

On the return of the column to Sadr the same day, the enemy, who mean-
while had collected in considerable numbers, followed up the rear-guard, but
being driven back with heavy loss by the 5th Gurkhas, discontinued their
attack, and the last five miles were traversed without a shot being fired. Our
casualties, so far as known at the time, consisted of two native soldiers killed
and four wounded, but the next day, the O. C. Kapurthala Infantry reported
that one native officer and thirty-five men of his regiment were missing.
It appears that a picquet of fifty men had been directed to occupy a hUl
on the flank of the colunm, and when recalled by signal, which was duly
acknowledged, it moved oflf to join the rear-guard. Thirty-five men with a
Subadar, taking what the native officer must have believed to be a short cut,
became entangled in bad ground, and found their further progress barred by
a jungle fire which had been lighted early in the day. They turned back to
regain the road by which they had ascended the hill, but the enemy had dis-
covered their predicament, and assembling in strength, succeeded in shooting
down the whole party. In the meantime, the remainder came in safely, and
believing the Subadar and his party to have arrived ahead of them, a report
of '* all present " was made to Colonel Hill, who knew nothing of what had
happened until the following day.

XII THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CHAMKANIS 177

Surrey Regiment, the 3rd Sikhs, 4th Gurkhas, 28th
Bombay Pioneers,^ No. i Kohat Mountain Battery,
and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Bombay Sappers and
Miners — a very compact little force. But this was
not the whole of it. It was only intended on this
first day to advance about five miles up to the foot
of the Kahu, or Durbi Khel Pass, 8700 feet, leading
into the Massozai country, for it was known that
the road would require a lot of improving both up
to that point and beyond it; hence the large pro-
portion of Sappers and Miners accompanying the
brigade. So Sir William Lockhart, in order to
gain an extra day for his own work in camp, left
Bagh himself, with his staff, on the 27th, taking on
with him the York Regiment, a wing of the Royal
Scots Fusiliers (who had only marched in the day
before), the 2nd Gurkhas, and No. 2 Derajat
Mountain Battery. These troops overtook General
Gaselee in the forenoon of the 28th, and the com-
bined column, under his orders, crossed the pass
safely, with all its baggage, the same day. There
was no organised opposition, but between Bagh and
the summit of the pass the country is thickly studded
with houses and towers, and some of these on both
days had to be cleared of the enemy's sharp-shooters
before the main body could proceed.

As the road entered the low hills fringing the
foot of the pass, the ground was all in favour of the

^ This regiment returned to BSgh after completing work on the road to the
foot of the Durbi Khel Pass.

178 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

enemy and several casualties occurred. But our
men and officers are now every day improving in
the skirmishing attack and defence methods essential
to success in this kind of warfare, and they steadily
drove the Afridis before them, shooting several as
they ran, and burning the houses from which we
had been fired at. At one point on a rocky ridge
some of the enemy had sangar-ed themselves
strongly, and held their ground very doggedly.
But a company of the Queen's, led by Lieutenant
Engledue, went for them in dashing style, and
made them vacate at the bayonet's point, killing six
of them actually in the sangar, and securing their
rifles, rare trophies with us. Our total casualties on
the two days were one man of the Queen's, and
two of the Yorkshires, killed, and eight Yorkshires,
one Royal Scots Fusilier, four 4th Gurkhas, two
Gurkha Scouts, two Sappers, and one doolie-bearer
wounded.

On the 28th all the troops and baggage had
crossed the pass, and the force concentrated the
following day at Dargai. The Massozais, who had
hitherto blustered exceedingly, were apparently
startled to find themselves suddenly invaded, and
their principal village occupied by our troops : and
almost as we marched in their jirgahs appeared on
the scene, and tendered submission. Their country
seems extremely fertile, with much pasturage, and
many well-built villages, which no doubt they were
anxious to save. There are also splendid forests of

XII THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CHAMKANIS i79

oak, fir, birch, and walnut. The jirgahs promised
to pay up their fines at once, and, as a matter of fact,
brought in an instalment of thirty rifles the next day.^
The Khani Khel Chamkanis, however, further
to the west, showed no sign of coming in, so Sir
William arranged to look them up without delay.
Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Spurgin, Royal Scots
Fusiliers, in command at Dargai, with one battery,
a wing of his own regiment, the Yorkshires, 2nd
Gurkhas, and the two Sapper Companies, with
orders to improve the road to Khanki Bazar, in
which direction it was intended to march later, Sir
William himself, with Brigadier-General Gaselee,
and No. I Kohat Mountain battery, the Queen's,
the 4th Gurkhas, the 3rd Sikhs, and the Gurkha
Scouts, marched to Hissar, and there joined hands
with Colonel Hill,* with whom helio communication
had been opened the previous day, and who had
come up from Sadr, through the Kharmana defile,
in compliance with orders previously sent him from
headquarters.

^ A few shots were fired into the headqnarter's ctmp on the night of the
29th, and two of Sir William's personal escort were wounded : also his
extra aide-de-camp, Sir Pratap Singh of Jodhpur. The following reference
to this incident is from Despatches: — "I take this opportunity of expressing
my thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel His Highness the Maharaj Dhiraj Sir
Pratap Singh, G.C.S.I., who was attached to me throughout the expedition
as extra aide-de-camp. This very gallant Rajput nobleman was wounded on
the 29th November, and characteristically conoealed the fact until I discovered
it by accident some days after the occurrence."

^ Colonel Hill had with him lOO mounted men and 300 dismounted of
the 6th B.C, and the Central India Horse ; 400 rifles 12th B.I., 200 rifles
5th Gurkhas, and 200 rifles Kapurthala In&ntry.

i8o THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chaf.

It had been quite expected that the Mamozais
and the Massozais would show fight, and that the
Chamkanis, a small and insignificant section, would
submit quietly. But, as is often the case, it was
the unexpected which happened. The Massozais
and Mamozais tendered their submission, and paid
up their fines, as soon as our columns appeared on
the scene ; while the Chamkanis, on the other hand»
hurled their defiance at us, and promptly dared us
to do our worst! They were accordingly tackled
at once (on ist December), their punishment beings
intrusted to Colonel Hill.

Colonel Hills force consisted of 200 of the 5th
Gurkha Rifles, 12th Khelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, the
Kapurthala Infantry, the 4th Gurkha Rifles, 400
dismounted cavalry (6th B.C. and Central India
Horse), the Kohat Mounted Battery, two Maxims
(Royal Scots Fusiliers), and last, but not least, the
Gurkha Scouts. His objective was the principal
Chamkani settlement of Thabi, about seven miles to
the north-west of Hissar, and his orders were to
burn and destroy every fortified post and tower either
in it or on the road to it. This programme was
not, however, fully carried out on the ist, because^
owing to the extremely difficult country, and the
stubborn resistance offered by the enemy, un-
expected delays occurred ; and, thorough co-opera-
tion between the two columns, into which for the
purpose of attack Colonel Hill had divided his
troops, did not take place : moreover, it was

XII THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CHAMKANIS i8i

necessary to return to Hissar during daylight, to
avoid the risk of an attack on the rear-guard after
dark by the Massozais. The casualties on our
side on this day were eight killed and seventeen
wounded. Amongst the former was Richmond
Battye, of the 6th B.C.,^ and in the latter were
included Villiers - Stuart, 5th Gurkhas, severely
wounded ; Vansittart, 5th Gurkhas, and Pennington,
1 2th B.C., slightly wounded.

On the next day, the 2nd, Sir William directed
a fresh attack to be made, Colonel Hill again
commanding, taking with him half a battalion
of the Queen's, and half a battalion of the 3rd
Sikhs, the 4th and 5th Gurkhas, the Gurka
Scouts, and the Kohat Mountain Battery. On this
occasion complete success attended the operations.
Some commanding heights, from which the attack-
ing columns had been much harassed on the pre-
vious day, were scaled in great style by the
Gurkhas, the Scouts leading ; and though the
Chamkanis fought well they were driven from ridge
to ridge and suffered heavily, leaving many of their
dead behind them, so hot-foot in pursuit were the
Scouts under the bold leading of Captain Lucas and
Lieutenant Bruce. Mirak Shah, the chief Malik of

1 With reference to the death of Lieutenant Battye, the Piotuer wrote : —
** It is now almost a tradition with the Battyes that all shall die on the battle-
field ; but one may nevertheless regret the death so early of yet another of
this gallant family. Richmond Battye was a young officer of only eight
years' service, eager, active, alert, and conscientious in the discharge of his
duties, of a sound understanding, and full of a generous enthusiasm for his
profession."

i82 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

the Khani Khels, and Mahmud and Saidu, two
other important Maliks, are said to have been
among the slain. The defences of Thabi were
razed to the ground, and the return march to Hissar
was unmolested. Our own casualties on this day
were nominal.

The Chamkanis having been thus effectively
punished, Colonel Hill, with the troops of his own
command, and taking with him all the sick and
wounded, was directed to return to Sadda (or
Sadr), where he arrived on the 5th without in-
terruption by the way, and resumed his duties
as Warden of the Kurram Valley while these
frontier disturbances last ; and Sir William Lock-
hart, marching leisurely vid Khanki Bazar ^ and
the Chingakh Pass (7700 feet), returned to Bagh
on 6th December.

Here, in accordance with instructions previously
issued, every preparation had been by this time
completed for the evacuation of Tirah. For the
cold here is already intense, and winter is coming
on us now with rapid strides. Directly snow falls
it would be impossible to maintain ourselves in
these bleak highlands, which the Afridis themselves
always abandon during the winter months. It was

^ At Khanki Bazar a column joined which had come up the valley from
Khangarbttr, with supplies for Sir A^lliam Lockhart's force. It consisted of
the 30 P. I., 2nd P. I., 4 guns, Kashmir Mountain Battery, and a squadron
18 6.L., the whole under the command of Lieutenant-G>lonel Maisey.
No opposition was encountered by the way. When Sur William Lockhart
marched for Bagh^this column returned to Khangarbur, with the exception
of the 2nd P. I., which now joined Brigadier-General Gaselee*s brigade.

XII PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TIRAH 183

decided, therefore, to move to a milder clime while
the weather continues fine, and by sending off well
beforehand, vid Shinauri and Kohat, all heavy
baggage and surplus stores, all sick and weakly
men, and even all Staff and departmental officers,
and officers not absolutely required on the march
with the headquarters of the army, or of divisions,
it was arranged that everything should be ready for
a start the day after Sir William Lockhart's return
from his excursion into the Chamkani-Massozai
country. The troops remaining would then move
on the lightest possible scale, without tents, as the
success of the impending manoeuvres must depend
largely upon the mobility of the columns engaged
in them. The scheme is, briefly, to change the
base of operations from Kohat to Peshawar. The
2nd Division, General Yeatman- Biggs command-
ing, and Sir William Lockhart and Staff accom-
panying, will march, vid Dwatoi, down the Bara
Valley, to Barkai. General Symons, with General
Gaselee's and General Hart s Brigades, will start
from the latter s camp in the Mastura Valley, and
move down the Mastura, destroying on the way the
defences of the Aka Khel villages, in the Waran
Valley : thence they will cross the Sapri Pass, and
join the 2nd Division near Barkai or B§ra Fort.
Here the whole force will link up with General
Hammond s " Peshawar column," and be within
easy reach by a good road of Peshawar itself ; and
at Bara, also, we should pick up again all our heavy

i84 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

baggage, etc., and be rejoined by all those who are
now travelling round by Shinauri-Kohat-Pindi to
Peshawar.

Finally, the Peshawar column, which hitherto
has remained in the vicinity of Peshawar, has been
directed to advance as far as Barkai by the 8th
December, and there to select camping-grounds and
store supplies, for the main column, and to improve
the roads between Barkai and Bara fort^

By thus sweeping down the Mastura and BSra
Valleys (Waran being visited en route) the whole of
the Afridi-Orakzai highlands will be explored from
end to end : and, on the completion of the march,
the force will be concentrated about Barkai -Bara-
Jamrud, conveniently close to Peshawar, in a posi-
tion to operate with effect against the Afridi settle-
ments in the lower Bara and Bazar Valleys, and to
reoccupy the Khyber.

Seeing us thus established in positions dominat-
ing their country, and within striking distance of
those lower valleys into which they themselves are
driven by the approach of winter, the Zakka-khels,
the most implacable of our foes, must see the futility
of prolonging a struggle so disastrous to themselves,
and which, if persevered in, will in all probability
result in a permanent weakening of their power by
depriving them of the premier position which un-

^ *<On my arrival at Barkai on the 14th December, I found that my
instructions on these heads had been most thoroughly carried out" — Sir IVm,
Lockharfs Despatches,

XII PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TIRAH 185

doubtedly they hold now, and always have held in
the past, among all the Afridi clans. For amongst
most of the other sections there appears to be a
genuine inclination to accept our terms, and to bury
the hatchet ; and should the Zakkas, by obstinate
resistance to the bitter end, protract the anxieties
and hardships and sufferings of all, it is quite on
the cards that the Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-
khels, and others (between whom and the Zakka-
khels there is no love lost) will make separate terms
with us, and, as the quickest way of relieving their
country of our presence, will combine with us to
compel compliance by the Zakka-khels.

These, however, are only what the gifted "Ali
Baba " used to describe as " precious possibilities."

It only remained at this juncture to notify to the
tribes why we were leaving Tirah, and the subjoined
proclamation was accordingly circulated among the
clans by special messengers sent out by the political
officers : —

" I am going away from these highlands of Maidan,'' wrote Sir
William, " because snow is coming, and I do not wish my troops
to be exposed to the cold of winter. But I am not going to
leave your country. On the contrary, I shall remain in your
country until you fully comply with the terms of Government ;
and it is my intention to attack you in your other settlements
during the winter. \Vhatever your evil advisers may tell you, I
say that the Afridis attacking the English is like flies assailing a
lion ; and, as an old friend of many of you, my advice to you is
to submit, and so let your wives and families return from the
cold mountains to their homes."

CHAPTER XIII

THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN, AND DOWN

THE BARA VALLEY

Mamanai, 1 5M December,

Leaving to our friends the Zakka-khels, and others,
this document to think over, the movement, vi& the
Dwatoi defile, down the Bara Valley was commenced
on 7th December. The force, which consisted only
of the Second Division, under General Yeatman-
Biggs and Army Headquarters, had been cut down,
as I have explained, in the way of baggage to the
lowest possible scale, and was rationed only up
to 14th December, by which date therefore it was
essential that a junction should be effected with
Brigadier - General Hammond and the Peshawar
column somewhere about Barkai. The whole dis-
tance to be traversed was only about forty miles,
and but little was known about the road except that
it was bad ; opposition throughout its length was
certain ; and a margin had to be allowed for delays
in getting through the Dwatoi defile, and for an
expedition en route to attack the Kuki-khels in

CH. XIII THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN 187

Rajgul. Thus, to take only seven days' supplies
with the column was cutting it rather fine, but the
difficulties of transport are a ruling factor in all these
matters, and, carrying only this small provision, the
baggage animals with the troops numbered nearly
1 2,000 mules and ponies.

The advance was led by Brigadier-General West-
macotts Brigade, Sir William Lockhart and staff
accompanying. I have described before the defile
between Bagh and Dwatoi. My first estimate of
its vast natural strength and appalling difficulties is
not diminished, but rather strengthened and con-
firmed, by a second inspection of it. Literally one
might say of this place —

In yon strait path a thousand
May well be stopped by three.

But, most fortunately, our passage through the most
dangerous portion of it was not opposed by the
enemy at all. The Malikdin-khels, who claim lord-
ship over the country through which lie the first
few and worst miles, had been happily squared by
our energetic political officers,^ and on the promise
that their houses in the neighbourhood should be
spared they agreed not to obstruct our march. Not-
withstanding, no military precaution to insure a safe

' Colonel Waiburton's influence is very great with all Afridis, and, chiefly
through his eflbrts, eight of the Malikdin Maliks came in on the erening of
the 6th, and promised to post unarmed picquets of their own men on the
heights through which our road lay to Dwatoi. This they did, and for three
days and two nights, that b, until our troops were clear of the defile, not a
shot was fired in iu

i88 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

transit was neglected. The thermometer registered
2 1 degrees of frost on the morning of 7th December,
but long before daylight the troops of the advanced
guard, under Lieutenant - Colonel C. Pulley, 3rd
Gurkhas, had scaled the towering heights on either
flank of the advance, and made secure the most
important points. Colonel Pulley's force consisted
of his own splendid battalion, half a battalion of the
2nd Punjab Infantry, the 28th Bombay Pioneers, a
company of Madras Sappers, and a Mountain Battery,
which last, of course, had to follow the river bed.
The Pioneers and Sappers worked at the road as
they went along, while the flanking parties were
furnished chiefly by the Gurkhas. Close behind
the troops of the advanced guard came the rest of
Westmacott's Brigade, and then followed the trans-
port of the division, a surging mass of struggling
animals and shouting drivers that blocked the narrow
pass for miles and for hours, or rather for days, but
which came through safely, nevertheless, by the
evening of the 9th, under the protection of General
Kempster's Brigade, which formed the rear-guard of
the division.

I may mention here that, as General Kempster's
Brigade left Bagh for Dwatoi, General Gaselee's
Brigade (just returned with Sir William Lockhart
from the Massozai country) started, vid the Arhanga
Pass, to join its own division (under Major-General
Symons) in the Mastura Valley; so that on 9th
December the evacuation of Maidan was completed,

XIII THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN 189

and General Symons with his division commenced
his march down the Mastura simultaneously with
our movement down the Bara.

To resume. Although the passage of the defile
was not opposed by the enemy, yet we were fired
on as soon as we emerged from it and headed for
our camping -ground. A brisk advance, however,
under General Westmacott's own direction, soon
drove the enemy off, and strong picquets were at
once posted on all the surrounding heights, while
the main body occupied their bivouacs, and the
transport slowly filed on to the ground. Night by
this time had come on, but there was nearly a full
moon, which made it as bright as day. This was all
in our favour, and enabled our tired troops to stave
off successfully every attack made on them (and
they were numerous up to midnight),^ and prevented

^ **We (F. Company, K.0.S.Bs.) rushed this position (heights above
Dwatoi) with pipes playing. The enemy now retired to another satigar in
a clump of trees, slightly below us, about 300 yards away, and held other
sangars beyond, and commanding it We had to lie close here, as bullets
were coming in thick. As this was to be our post for the night (it was
now only 3 P.M.)» we entrenched ourselves as well as we could, and Captain
Macfarlane, who commanded us, posted one section under Sergeant Watson
in a small sangar about sixty yards to our right. We left loopholes in the walls
we built up, so that the sentries could look out without exposing themselves.
It was a bitter cold night, and we were all wet through with wading during
the day.

*< When it got dark the Afridis began to fire at us, but we didn't reply.
Suddenly one of the sentries called out, < Stand to ! The3r*re on us I ' We
all sprung to our posts, and opened fire independently on a mob of men who
were charging down with loud shouts. Some of them were within twenty yards.
Our fire checked them, and they drew off. We could hear groans, and the
noise made by bodies being dragged and carried away. One dead man was
left within ten yards of our walL

*' They now established themselves under cover all round us within vciy

I90 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

much of the loss and confusion amongst the trans-
port which otherwise would have ensued from being
benighted on the road.

On the next day, the 8th, our fine weather
deserted us at last. There had in fact been a drizzle
during the night, and when we roused in the morn-
ing the hills all round us were dusted with snow.
The highlands of Tirah had not been evacuated a
day too soon. It would have been disastrous indeed,
to be caught up there by the snow, which lies thick
in a severe winter for weeks together, and we con-
gratulated ourselves that we were well out of it

The only incident of note on the 8th was a
brilliant little dash by a detachment composed of
3rd Gurkhas and 36th Sikhs, supported by the fire
of some mountain guns, to capture a peak about a
mile up the stream, which was strongly held by the
enemy, and which completely commanded the road
up the valley by which it was intended on the follow-
ing day to push a punitive reconnaissance. The
men had already been marching and fighting for

short ranges, fired frequently, shouted abuse in Hindustani^ and threw stones,
by which several of us were hit We took no notice, by Captain Afacfiulaiie's
orders, but waited to give them the bayonet should they come on.

** Twice men were seen by the sentries trying to crawl up close ; and eadi
time as the sentry rose to bayonet them, he was shot dead through the head
by marksmen who were on the look-out The men killed in this way were
Privates Waits and Young. Up to 10 p.m. we were much harassed, and
constantly threatened by rushes, but after midnight they let us almost alone.
It then came on to snow. At daylight they fired briskly again, but none of
us were hit ; and later in the day, when the Gurkhas and Sikhs captured a
hill which commanded their position, they cleared out altogether. We were
relieved at noon by H. Company." — From a letter by an Officer witk iks
Picquet.

xiii THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN 191

more than thirty-six hours at a stretch when they
were ordered to fall in for this attack, but they
started at once light-hearted and cheerful, and,
splendidly led by Lieutenants West and Van
Someren, breasted the tremendous climb in the
most gallant style and captured the hill-top right
away, with a loss of only four men killed and
wounded.

On the 9th, General Kempster's Brigade having
come in and taken over the picquets. General West-
macott marched his brigade up the Rajgul Valley,
Sir William Lockhart accompanying, with the
object of mapping the country, which is all a terra
incognita to our surveyors, and of punishing the
Kuki-khels by destroying their towers and defences.
I speak of the Rajgul Valley, but in reality it is
throughout its length (three or four miles) more
a defile than a valley. Shut in on either hand
by lofty hills, whose wooded spurs run down until
they almost meet in the stream at their feet, it is a
place in which troops must be handled with the
greatest caution. But the 4th Brigade are seasoned
warriors now, quick to* understand their generals
instructions, and alert and resolute in carrying them
out ; and so, without a hitch or falter, they worked
steadily up the valley, crowning height after height
on the flanks, taking advantage of the ground like
the practised skirmishers they are now, driving the
enemy back with only trivial loss to themselves, and
holding them in check until the Sappers and Pioneers

192 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

behind them had accomplished their work of destruc-
tion and the survey parties had finished their maps.
The mountain guns again were well to the front and of
the greatest service in expelling the enemy from the
shelter of their sangars, and supporting and cover-
ing the infantry attack. The batteries out on this
day were No. 8, under Major Shirres, and No. 5,
under Captain Money, and the accuracy of their fire
was the subject of general remark.

The retirement to camp was as usual actively
pressed by the Afridis, but the handling and work-
ing of the troops were admirable, and the enemy
made no impression on them whatever ; while their
own losses must have been severe. The 3rd '
Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 2nd P. I., 28th Bombay
Pioneers, Scottish Borderers, and two companies
Royal Scottish Fusiliers were the troops engaged.

And now, on the loth, commenced our difficult
and arduous march down the Bara Valley. The
stages were — Dwatoi to Sandana, eight miles; to
Sher-khel, ten miles ; to Narkandai, eight miles ;
and to Swaikot-Mamanai (about one mile east of
Swaikot) eight miles.

From the above you will see there were only four
comparatively short marches to make before joining
up with General Hammond and the Peshawar
column. It sounded so simple, but I think most of
us understood that it meant four days of the sternest
work and stiffest trial that the force has had yet.
For though we knew well enough that our march

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 193

was not, in the accepted sense, a movement in
retreat, yet it was quite certain that such was the
construction the enemy would put upon it. We knew
very well that we were sweeping down the Bara and
Mastura Valleys merely by way of carrying out part
of a thought-out programme, that the march Pesha-
war-wards was only reculer pour mteux sauter^ and
that the measure was only preliminary to fresh raids
up the Bazar and Khyber Valleys. But the Afridis,
intelligent though they be, would not look at our
ulterior aims. They would only consider the situa-
tion of the present and the opportunity of the
moment. Their Mullahs would tell them that we
were flying from their country, defeated, and un-
successful in our venture, and would urge them to
follow close on our tracks, and to strike hard for
vengeance' sake, and for their faith.

And, indeed, they did all this, and played their
own game throughout the retirement with a deter-
mination and boldness and skill which often com-
pelled our admiration, although it cost us dear. But
I must not anticipate.

Our march commenced at daylight on the loth.
The general arrangement was that the 4th Brigade,
Westmacott's, should lead the way, and the 3rd
Brigade, Kempster's, bring up the rear, the whole
of the baggage and hospitals, etc., moving between
the two brigades. The BSra Valley is nowhere a
mile in breadth, and in many parts narrows in to
very much less than that. Down the centre of it

194 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

runs the Bara stream, a muddy torrent almost knee-
deep, 30 to 40 feet wide, brawling over a rocky bed,
winding like a great red snake backwards and for-
wards from one bank to the other, anon breaking up
into a dozen smaller branches, and then collecting
again into one channel as it rushes through a rocky
gorge. The average width from bank to bank of
the river-bed is less than half a mile, mostly laid
out in terraced rice-fields, and though above the river
on the left bank there is a narrow bridle-path, the
whole of the transport was kept below, partly be-
cause of the broad front on which it could there
move, and partly because of the protection afforded
by the banks. Beyond the river banks are rice-fields
again in terraces, and beyond these again the hills,
rising abruptly into peaks and ridges which run up
to 9000 and 10,000 feet, all thickly covered now with
recent snow. Throughout its length, therefore, the
valley is commanded by the heights on either side,
and as every yard of our progress was fiercely con-
tested, it is easy, or, rather, it is not easy — to realise
the tremendous exertions, and I may add, risks,
involved in clearing these, mile by mile, in holding
them while the baggage passed through, and, finally,
in withdrawing from them.

It must be remembered that never before on our
North- West Frontier have we had to deal with an
enemy armed with long-ranging breech-loaders, as
these Afridis are. It may be much argued where
they got them from, but the fact remains that they

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 195

possess them. The majority have Martini- Henry
rifles, with which they shoot very straight up to
1 200 and 1 500 yards. But in addition they have a
few Lee-Metfords, fifty or sixty probably, taken or
stolen from us at various times, notably on the 9th
and 1 6th of November, and their supply of am-
munition is apparently unlimited. Consequently,
the work thrown on flanking parties now is ex-
tremely heavy. In the days when the enemy had
nothing better than the jezail and a few Enfields
and Sniders, it was practically enough to keep them
a good half-mile clear of the line of march. Now
the flankers must go much farther afield than that,
and points have to be occupied and held fully a mile
away on either hand before the road can be con-
sidered safe.

To accentuate the difficulties of the march under
the conditions I have indicated, it rained and sleeted
and snowed throughout the night of the 9th and
during the loth ; and that rain made a cruel differ-
ence to the wretched transport animals, and shiver-
ing drivers, and hospital kahars, who (like every
one else, for that matter) had to lie out in it without
tents or shelter. For it not only drenched them to
the bone, and froze them to the marrow, but it also
converted the rice-fields, across which they had to
plough their way, into veritable bogs, and in these
many a poor beast plunged up to his girths, and,
too exhausted to get on his legs again, was left
behind and lost The ice-cold river, too, had to be

196 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

forded ten or a dozen times in every mile, and long
before Swaikot was reached many unhappy followers,
frozen by the cold, and terrified by the bullets
whistling overhead, collapsed and died by the way,
in spite of the efforts of the escorts to keep them all
together, and bring them safely along.

However, we had to take the country as we
found it, and the weather as it came, and war cannot
be waged without losses of this kind occurring. As
a matter of fact, on this first march, on the loth, the
casualties were not very numerous, either amongst the
troops or the followers — about twenty only in the two
brigades amongst the former. It was on the next
day, the 1 1 th, that the weather was at its worst, the
fighting more severe, and the losses considerable.
The enemy seemed to realise that they had a great
chance now, and they attacked the rear-guards, who
were terribly delayed and embarrassed by the trans-
port, and particularly by the hospitals, with great
determination. The wretched kahars, hardly able
to carry the doolies when empty, seemed quite
unable to bear them when loaded with the weight
of a wounded man. Yet they had to be brought
along, and the troops had often to fight desperately
to hold the savage pursuers at bay while the dooly-
bearers got safely away with their precious burdens.
At last night came on while the tail of the rear-
guard was still nearly three miles from its bivouac
with the main body. It consisted at this time of
70 men of the Gordons, 220 of the 2nd Gurkhas,

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 197

30 of the 2nd P. I., and 30 of the Dorsets, and was
commanded by that good soldier Major Downman,
of the Gordons.

Encumbered as he was at this time with twenty-
one wounded men, and with darkness approaching,
while scores of the enemy surrounded him on every
side, Major Downman promptly decided to seize a
house, and intrench himself for the night. A clump
of huts on the right bank of the river seemed to
afford the shelter sought for, and his little column
made for them. The enemy, noting his intention,
attempted to forestall him in the possession of this
vantage-ground, but Captain Uniacke, with a hand-
ful of Gordons, made a brilliant dash and got in
first. The rest of the party soon followed, and the
detachment was safe for the night. They had been
fighting from daylight to dark, and were thankful to
get some rest The men had behaved with steadi-
ness and resolution in the most trying circumstances,
and the officers had set a most brilliant example of
courage and endurance. Among the wounded this
day were Lieutenant Williams, Hants Regiment,
transport officer, and Captain Norie, 2nd Gurkhas,
whose left arm was shattered into matches by a bullet
which struck it high up near the shoulder.

When day broke on the 1 2th Major Downman
heliographed in for help to Sher-khel, and General
Kempster went out with a couple of regiments and
a battery, and brought his gallant little detachment
in. The total casualties on the nth were not less

198 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

than fifty or sixty amongst the troops ; and, owing
to the inclement weather and the dreadful state
of the flooded country, there is no doubt that a
number of followers were lost, and that consider-
able quantities of stores and baggage and animals
were abandoned, and fell into the hands of the
enemy.

On the 1 2th Sir William Lockhart halted. A
rest was imperatively necessary, for, what with con-
stant marching and fighting and heavy picquet duties,
the strain had been incessant since the 7th inclusive.
From this point, too, the order of march was changed.
The 3rd Brigade was directed to lead the advance
and the 4th Brigade to undertake the rear-guard
duties.

The enemy by this time had increased in numbers
and daring, until it was plain they thought they had
us on a ** down grade." They fired into our crowded
camp on the night of the nth with considerable
effect ; and parties sent out to forage during the
day, though very strongly guarded, were engaged
in a skirmish more or less severe all the time. All
the sections of the Afridis were represented in the
hungry crowd, attracted no doubt by the hope of
plunder, but the bulk of them were Zakka-khels and
Aka-khels, and they had not forgotten to bring their
Lee-Metfords with them ! It was actually necessary,
as the only way to disperse these prowling guerillas,
to pitch a few shells into them, where on the moun-
tain side fully 2500 yards away a little knot of marks-

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 199

men had established themselves across the river,
whence they kept up a most harassing fusilade
on the camp throughout the day and far into the
night.

On the 13th the march was resumed. Fortu-
nately the clouds had now cleared away, and once
more the weather was bright and fine. The cold,
however, was intense, and the river had as usual
to be forded many times during the day. Rarely
have troops been engaged in severer fighting than
Westmacott's Brigade on this memorable 13th of
December. Encouraged by their recent successes,
and with their appetites for plunder whetted by the
stuff that had fallen into their hands on the nth,
the Afridis plunged into the fray now with a keener
zest than ever. Before even the picquets had been
withrawn^ and while we were still not clear of the
camp at Sher-khel, they were pressing their fierce
attack, and were only held at arm's length by the
most determined fighting. But Westmacott's men
were comparatively fresh, and with a full reliance on
their General, who was ever amongst them, animat-
ing them by his presence and his words, they
hardened their hearts for a stiff day's work ; and
disputing stubbornly every inch of ground, fell back
slowly and steadily, firing on the crowding enemy
with deadly effect whenever a chance offered, and
backing and supporting each other with a coolness
and judgment that was admirable to a degree. The
Scottish Borderers nobly bore their share in the

200 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

day's operations, and the Northamptons were
engaged also, but the brunt of the fighting fell on
the 36th Sikhs and on the 3rd Gurkhas, more
especially on the last-named. And never did
Gurkhas or Sikhs behave more valiantly than on
this trying day. The former, under Lieutenant-
Colonel Pulley (who commanded his battalion on
this occasion with conspicuous ability), and the latter
under Major Des Vceux (of Gulistan fame), Colonel
Haughton being temporarily sick, displayed a cool-
ness and courage that could not be surpassed.
Pressed by the enemy, who was unrelenting in his
attack, and desperate in his efforts to work round
the flanks and drive it home, encumbered by
numerous wounded men whom they had to carry
along with them, and often running short of ammu-
nition, these two grand regiments held their own
more than successfully against all comers, and
defeated every attempt of the foe to break their
line or even to hurry their retreat. They were
splendidly supported by the Borderers, under
Colonel Dixon, one of the finest regiments in the
Force, while the artillery, as usual, rendered ines-
timable service, pouring in a deadly fire from every
coign of vantage ; so that, when darkness at last put
an end to the struggle, heavy though the casualties
of the Brigade had been, the General and his men
could lie down conscious that their duty had been
thoroughly and bravely and effectively done, and
also that the enemy had been very severely handled.

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 201

His losses this day were well over 300, at a very
moderate estimate, while ours must have been
between fifty and sixty in the rear-guard alone, and
included the gallant Lieutenant West, of the 3rd
Gurkhas, who was killed on the spot by a shot
through the heart, and Captain Bateman-Champain,
of the same regiment, wounded. The Gurkhas had
besides six men killed and sixteen wounded ; the
Borderers, two killed and twelve wounded ; and the
36th Sikhs, three killed and nine wounded.

That evening the whole Division bivouacked at
a place called Narkandai (Spin Kamar in the
Despatches), About 3 J miles from Sher-khel we
left the valley of the Bara, and followed a track
across the hills on the left bank, in order to avoid a
dangerous defile which lay ahead. About 4J miles
along this track, and then night coming on, a halt
was called. We were here far from any water, but
the men had been warned to replenish their water-
bottles before leaving the river, and with that to
drink, and such food as they had in their haver-
sacks, they lay down to sleep just as they were.
There was no village near us — the name Narkandai
is the name of the locality merely — and we passed a
comparatively quiet night.

I should mention that communication was opened
with General Hammond this day by helio, and, in
compliance with a request previously forwarded to
him by special messenger from Sher-khel, he had
sent out to meet us a large number of extra kahars

202 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

and doolies, of which we now stood sorely in
need.

On the next day, the 14th, the march was
renewed, and the fighting, the same troops taking the
rear-guard. But the enemy, though still active in
pursuit, kept at a much more respectful distance ;
and though it was again a hard day, with several
casualties, it was not nearly so trying as on the 13th,
and, at the same time, was quite as successful. Four
miles out of Swaikot (or Barkai) Brigadier-General
Hammond met Sir William Lockhart, and by five
in the evening we were all comfortably encamped at
Mamanai, inside his brigade. That night, free
from care, we slept the sleep of the just, and joyfully
thought of the morrow, when we should see our
heavy baggage once more, and enjoy, perchance, the
luxury of a tub and a change of clothes.

Here, too, we were glad to learn that General
Symons* Division had arrived safely in the neigh-
bourhood of Bara, and to hear the details of his
interesting march down the Mastura, of his brilliant
raid into the Waran Valley en route ^ and of his
successful passage of the hitherto unexplored Sapri
Pass. His march had been chiefly through Orakzai
territory, and, therefore, had been practically unop-
posed ; but the Waran expedition against the
Aka-khels, which had been entrusted to General
Harts Brigade, had been most skilfully managed
(the casualties on our side being very few, while the
punishment of the enemy was very thorough), and

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 203

the crossing of the Sapri, a most difficult pass, had
been carried out with enterprise and judgment.^

Sir William Lockhart's whole force now stood
united about Swaikot (Barkai), Bara, Jamrud, and
the first phase of the Tirah campaign was ended.
It may be confidently asserted that in no expedition
or war in India since the great Mutiny has there
been such severe and constant fighting, or such
heavy losses. Hardships and frequent exposure,
too, of no ordinary kind, have been incurred daily
and nightly, and the strain on the troops has been
incessant. We are too much accustomed to think

' ''The 1st Division, while moving from Mastura to Bara, met with com-
paratively slight opposition, but the march was an arduous one, and in all
respects was carried out in accordance with my wishes.** — Sir JVil/utm Lock-
hart^s Despatches,

The Passage of the Sqf^ri Pass (5350 feet): "On the nth the column
halted about two miles from the foot of the pass. The rain came down
steadily all that day and the following night, and as we were mostly encamped
on rice-fields and boggy ground, it was not a cheerful time. Our column
(Brigadier -General Hart*s) included 7300 troops and followers, and about
5000 transport animals. Throughout the nth the Sappers and Pioneers
worked hard to improve the road ahead, but it was desperately bad, and the
dreadful weather increased the difficulties of their task. Long before daylight
on the 1 2th the advanced guard made a'start up the mountain-side, but so slow
was the progress made that though the leading troops, with Major-General
Symons, got through to Sapri (twelve miles) on the same day, the rest of the
column was benighted when only some nine miles had been accomplished,
und halted at a place called Khwaja Khidder. It was quite dark at 6 P.M.,
and as the transport was not then all in. General Hart had a long line of
l>onfires lighted, stretching four miles, from^ the summit of the pass right into
camp. By the cheery blaze of these beacons the tired animals were safely
guided through the dark forest, and not a load was lost. It was a sight that
will not be easily forgotten by those who saw it — the lurid leaping flames, the
black dancing shadows, the endless procession of pack-animals and drivers,
and the groups of armed men keeping watch and ward. Fortunately the
enemy made no serious attack during the night. Only a few shots were
firc<l, and we only had a couple of men wounded.** — From a Staff-Officer with
the lit Brigade.

204 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

of the tribes on our frontier as an undisciplined
rabble to be treated with contempt, and brushed
aside with ease, whenever we choose to advance
against them in lordly fashion. We have learned
now that the conditions no longer exist which
warranted such a belief. We have seen that the
Afridis and Orakzais are practically as well armed
as ourselves, except that at present they possess no
artillery ; that they can shoot as straight as our own
men ; that they can skirmish a g^eat deal better
than most of them ; and that they are enterprising
and bold, and thoroughly understand how to make
the best use of the natural advantages which their
woods and mountains and rocky defiles, and their
freedom from the cares of transports and hospitals,
and such like impedimenta give them. Such a foe is
to be treated with respect; and the next time we
approach him, our generals, and our staff officers,
and our men will be better prepared to tackle him
(for forewarned is forearmed) than some of them at
least were in the commencement of the present
campaign.

The 2nd Division will now be given a much-
needed rest, stationed about Bara-Barkai. Nearly
all the hard fighting has fallen to its lot, and in
killed and wounded alone its losses since the
commencement of the operations are little short
of 1000 men.^ General Yeatman- Biggs himself

^ << During the march from Bagh, through Dwatoi, down the BSLra valley,
the troops of the 2nd Division were almost unceasingly engaged with the

XIII DOWN THE BARA VALLEY 205

is ill, and only devotion to duty, and determina-
tion to see the thing through, has kept him at
his post at the head of his splendid Division
during these trying weeks of fighting, hardship,
and exposure.^

The I St Division, under Major-General Symons,
with Brigadier-General Hammond's column, which
is quite fresh and yearning for the fray, will
concentrate at Jamrud, preparatory to moving up
the Khyber and Bazar Valleys. This will probably
be a ten days' affair, and undoubtedly there will be
more hard knocks going, as the Zakka-khels appear
to be still full of fight. A start will be made about
the 23rd, and Sir William Lockhart will accompany
the expedition himself.

several sections of the Afridis through whose country they passed ; and
towards the end of the march they were followed up by a large gathering
representing every section. The flanking, picquet, and rear^guard duties in
the presence of such an active and enterprising enemy were exceedingly
onerous, while the line of march was along the bed of a river, the water of
which was of icy coldness, and had to be repeatedly forded. The followers
and kahars suffered most from the cold, and to assist the latter wounded men
had to be frequently carried by their own comrades." — Sir IVilUam Lockhart s
Despatches,

^ Major-General Yeatman-Biggs died at Peshawar on the 4th January,
lamented as an accomplished gentleman, a gallant soldier, and a good friend,
by every one who knew him. The following general order was issued from
Headquarters on lOth January : —

''The Commander-in-Chief has it in command from the Viceroy and
Governor-General in India to express to the army His Excellency's deep
regret at the loss which it has sustsuned in the death of Major-General
Arthur Godolphin Veatman- Biggs, CB., and his high appreciation of the
services rendered to the State by that officer.

*<The record of General Yeatman- Biggs' services covers a period of
thirty-seven years, during which he was employed in the following campaigns
and military expeditions —

" The operations against the Taeping rebeb in China, 1862 ; the South

2o6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH. 1897.98 chap, xiii

When this operation is completed the troops
will all go into winter quarters and await develop-
ments. Some regiments will be relieved by others
from India/ and some will probably return to their
stations without relief. Doubtless, too, the Head-
quarters Staff and the Divisional Staffs will be,
to a great extent, reorganised and reduced, as,
even if it should be necessary to resume active
operations in the spring, they will not be on the
same scale.

African war, 1879, during which he commanded one of the parties sent in
pursuit of Ketchewayo, and subsequently served as Staff-Officer of the
Lydenburg column against Sekukuni ; and the Egyptian campaign of 1 882.
In August 1897 General Yeatman-Biggs was intrusted with the command
of the troops in the Kohat and Kurram Valleys, then threatened by a
formidable combination of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes, and he conducted
the operations on the Ublan Pass, as well as those on the Samlna, which
ended with the defeat of the tribesmen and the relief of Gulistan.

** On the formation of the Tirah Expeditionary Force he was appointed to
the command of the 2nd Division, which he held until a few days before his
death. The Commander-in-Chief shares the regret which will be felt by the
army at the premature death of this gallant officer."

^ The Devons were relieved at once by the Royal Sussex Regiment^
the Dorsets by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the Northamptoos
by the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; all '* having been much
weakened by losses in action, or by sickness." — DcspcUches,

CHAPTER XIV

THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION AND REOCCUPATION
OF THE KHYBER — THE AFFAIR AT SHIN KAMAR
— THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

If the Afridis were under the impression that with
the evacuation of Tirah we had done with them,
they were now to be undeceived. Sir William
Lockhart had warned them before starting on his
march down the Bara that he had no intention of
leaving their country until they had fully complied
with the terms imposed by Government ; and he
now proceeded without a day's delay to carry out
his threat, failing their submission, to attack them
in their other winter settlements. On the 15th and
1 6th December the Peshawar column, under General
Hammond, marched from Swaikot for Jamrud, where
it was concentrated by the 1 7th, and joined on the
19th by the ist Division and the Gurkha Scouts,
under Major-General Symons.

A reconnaissance into the Khyber on the i8th,
by General Hammond, as far as Fort Maude,
showed that the road had not been injured. The

2o8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

telegraph line, of course, had been wrecked, and
everything combustible in the fort itself had been
burned. No one was seen or met during the day,
and Ali Musjid, about four miles further up the
pass, appeared to be deserted.

The operations now about to be undertaken com*
prised measures for reopening the road through the
Khyber Pass (which had been closed ever since the
end of August 1897) ; ^or reconstructing the Khyber
posts, which had been destroyed by the Afridis, in-
cluding the defensible seraz at Landi Kotal; for
restoring the Landi Kotal water-supply ; and for de-
stroying the defences of all Zakka Khel villages in the
Khyber. At the same time, the Bazar Valley was to
be visited and swept with the besom of destruction.

On the 2ist and 22nd December the Sappers
and Pioneers were busy making roads to selected
artillery positions at the mouth of the Khyber
Pass. On the 23rd General Hammond's column
advanced to Ali Musjid, the 9th Gurkhas, and
Captain Barton's Khyber Rifles, leading the way,
and crowning the heights on the flanks. No enemy,
however, was encountered, and the village of Lsla
China, near Ali Musjid, was without any sign of
life. Its towers were blown up the next day, and
large quantities of forage and fuel taken out and
brought into camp. As regards the fort of Ali
Musjid, the mischief done to it was not so great
as was expected. The roofs and wood-work of
the buildings inside it had been burnt, but the

XIV THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION 209

walls were for the most part standing, and in good
order.

On the next day the ist Division marched out
from Jamrud, and encamped at Lala China. Sir
William Lockhart arrived at the same time,
accompanied by General Sir Havelock-Allan, V.C.,
M.P., who had come out from England to have
a look at the Frontier, and had been invited by
Sir William to join him during the Bazar expedition.
A few shots were fired into camp this night, and one
man was wounded.

On the 25th, Christmas day, the ist Division
entered the Bazar Valley in two columns. Sir
William Lockhart himself accompanied the left
column, which consisted of the regiments of General
Gaselee's Brigade, No. i M.B. R.A., No. 2
(Derajat) M.B., the Gurkha Scouts, and No. 3
Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. This
column marched, vid the Chora Pass, to Chora
village ; about eight miles through low hills covered
with brushwood, by a fairly easy road. No
opposition was encountered, and the next day the
column reached China, its objective, eleven miles,
which of course was deserted. The rear-guard
had a skirmish on this march with small parties
of the enemy, and two men were killed and four
wounded. The next day the towers and defences
of China were destroyed, and the column returned
to Chora. The enemy on this occasion attacked
the rear -guard with some pertinacity, but were

2IO THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

repulsed with heavy loss to themselves, a noted
Mullah, named Idris, being among the killed.

Meantime Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade had
been having an arduous time. In the advance of the
division into the Bazar Valley it formed the right
column, and its march was directed, vid the Alachi
Pass, to Karamna. Major-General Symons accom-
panied this column in person. Karamna should
have been reached on the 25th, for General Ham-
mond was co-operating by holding the Aspoghar
heights on the right flank of the ist Brigade, and the
village of Alachi itself. But the pass was found very
much more difficult than had been anticipated, and
an endless string of camels encountered in the Khyber
interfering with the march of the troops, soon after
they had started from their bivouac, the movement
was so much delayed that the whole of the transport
had to spend the night a la belle itoile to the east of
the Alachi Pass, where, under the protection of the
Royal Sussex Regiment and the ist Gurkhas it re-
mained safe. The next morning it came on, all
well, to Karamna, and the same day the force
pushed on another three miles to Burg. Opposition
was encountered throughout, and a few casualties
were sustained ; but the enemy were easily driven
off, and considerable loss inflicted upon them.
Communication was now opened with the left
column, and while, on the 27th, the bulk of the
troops stood fast at Burg, a strong detachment
under Lieutenant-Colonel Cafe, Royal Sussex Regi-

XIV THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION 211

ment, moved out towards Walai, to picquet the heights
and protect the flank of General Gaselee's brigade
during its withdrawal from China to Chora, already
described. These picquets were attacked by the
Afridis, and lost three men killed, and an officer,
Lieutenant Julius, Royal Sussex Regiment, and four
men wounded.

I should mention here that from Karamna a road
leads vid the Bori Pass to a place called Lala Beg
in the Khyber Pass, not far from Landi Kotal. Sir
William Lockhart had originally intended to join
the 1st Brigade on his return from China, and
march with it to Ali Musjid by this route. But on
Christmas day General Symons, who had reached
Karamna with the leading troops of the brigade
comparatively early, reconnoitred the Bori Pass
and the road leading over it, and found the physical
difficulties so great for laden animals that Sir
William, on his report — knowing, too, that there was
great difficulty about water at Karamna — ^gave up
the idea, and both columns eventually withdrew
from the Bazar Valley by the same route by which
they had entered it. By the 30th December the
division was again concentrated at Jamrud. The
2nd Brigade returned without opposition, but the
1st Brigade was constantly engaged in skirmishes
more or less severe, and sustained some loss,
inflicting more, however, on the enemy. The
total casualties in the ist Division during these
operations in the Bazar Valley were one British

212 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

officer,^ six British soldiers, and four native soldiers
killed ; and one British officer, thirty British soldiers,
and seventeen native soldiers wounded.

While the ist Division had thus explored the
Bazar Valley, General Hammond's column had pro-
ceeded, on the 26th December, to Landi Kotal.
The walls and gates of the serai were found to be
intact ; but, inside, all the buildings had been
wrecked, the roofs, the iron-work, the wood-work
either removed or burnt, and all movable property
and stores carried off. The quarters in which
Captain Barton, the Commander of the Levies, used
to live, were a ruin, and everything they contained
had, of course, been destroyed or looted. The
piping of the water-supply was breached, and many
of the pipes carried off, but the great tanks about a
mile and a half below the Kotal, constructed at a
cost of three lakhs of rupees, ;^30,ooo, had not been
touched. Government have already decided to re-
build and repair in the Khyber wherever necessary^
and Landi Kotal, being the most important point
on the line, the work there will be put in hand
forthwith.

On the 27th a reconnaissance was pushed from
Landi Kotal towards the Bori Pass, as Sir William
Lockhart wanted information about the state of the
road on the Khyber side as well as on the Bazar
side. It was soon ascertained to be quite imprac-

^ Lieutenant C. R. Tonge, R.E., killed by the premature explosion of a
dynamite charge.

XIV REOCCUPATION OF THE KHYBER 213

ticable for the passage of a brigade, as a portion of
the defile through which the track ran was found to
be a winding passage, in places only four feet wide,
flanked by perpendicular cliffs.

General Hammond's troops were from this time
employed in working parties on the Fort, in foraging
and demolishing village defences of the Zakka-
khels all along the line of the Khyber, in picquet-
ing the hills which command the route throughout,
and in convoying supplies and material sent up from
the base. These seem trivial duties when written
down, but they mean incessant work and watchful-
ness for those who have to execute them, surrounded,
as the whole locality is, by a keen and enterprising
and relentless enemy. Encounters were, of course,
of daily occurrence, and every now and then a few
casualties would occur. On the 30th December,
however, an engagement somewhat more serious
than usual took place. The picquets of the Oxford
Light Infantry were fired into and attacked in
earnest while they were being withdrawn for the
day. Three men were killed, and three officers
(Lieutenant -Colonel Plowden, Captain Parr, and
Lieutenant Owen)^ and eleven men wounded.

^ The forward picquet in the valley commenced to retire at 3«30* P-M., and
was joined by the section under Captain Parr, and also by the section from
the Buddhist tope, which latter retired as a support to the two former in
extended order. After passing the Buddhist tope by about 250 yards a
volley was Bred into them from the left rear and three men were wounded.
The sections then got under cover in a nullah on their left as they retired ;
two of the wounded who could walk were sent along the nullah to the medical
officer of the regiment, while the third was dressed by Colonel Plowden on

214 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

News of this misadventure was brought into Landi
Kotal at half-past five in the evening by a bugler of
the Oxford Light Infantry, who galloped in on
Colonel Plowden's charger with a note asking for
help. General Hammond at once set out with
reinforcements, extricated the Oxfords from their
dilemma, and brought them all safely into camp,
with all their dead and wounded.

The AH Musjid picquets were attacked on the
same day, and as the attitude of the Zakka-khels
seemed to be now increasingly hostile, Sir William
Lockhart strengthened the force occupying the pass
by ordering the ist Brigade from Jamrud to AH
Musjid, and reinforcing the Landi Kotal garrison
with the 45th Sikhs and the 4th Gurkhas.

It may be mentioned here that on the 30th
December, on which date the pass seems to have
been alive with Afridis, General Sir Havelock-
AUan was killed. Sir William Lockhart thus
describes the sad incident in his Despatches : —

the spot, under cover from Bre. When all the wounded had got clear away the
rest retired, and in so doing had to cross a bit of open ground where Corpoiml
Bell was hit in the head and killed on the spot. Colonel Plowden, Lieutenant
Owen, and Lieutenant Fielden dragged him away up the nulhih, and all re-
tired under cover of the banks until the nullah broke away on their left flank
and again exposed them to fire. Here Private Butler was hit in the leg, and
Captain Parr and Lieutenant Carter having dressed his wound, the last-
named officer took him on his back and carried him across the exposed bit
of ground ; but in the middle of this Private Butler was again hit and killed.
Lieutenant Carter being knocked over by the force of the blow. Fielden
then came to the rescue and both officers got him under cover, while Colonel
Plowden and Lieutenant Owen carried Bell's corpse across the dangerous bit,
and were both wounded in doing so. — Special CorrtspondetU of the
*' Pioneer,''

XIV THE AFFAIR AT SHIN KAMAR 215

He left me at Lala China (on the 28th), and with my permission
proceeded to Landi Kotal, arrangements being made to provide
him with a sufficient escort I deeply regret to report that on
December the 30th, as be was returning to Jamrud, he un-
fortunately left his escort near Ali Musjid, and riding down a
ravine by himself was shot by the enemy. Every precaution had
been taken to secure his safety, and on bidding him good-bye at
Lala China I had impressed upon him the necessity of invariably
remaining with the troops detailed for his protection.

While these events had been taking place in the
Khyber and Bazar Valleys, the 2nd Division had
been enjoying a well-earned rest at Mamanai and
Bara ; and it would not have been necessary to
refer to its doings again but for a most unfortunate
affair in which the 4th Brigade was involved on
the 29th January. On that day an expedition was
planned to surround, and capture if possible, the
Afridi flocks and herds, with their attendant guards,
which, it was reported, were brought down daily in
large numbers to graze on the Kajurai plain, a
locality due west of Bara, and enclosed on the north,
west, and south by low spurs from the main range
which separates the Bara and Bazar Valleys. To
effect this four columns were ordered out simul-
taneously on the 29th January — one from Bara to
strike across the plain due west ; one from Jamrud,
and one from AH Musjid, as " stops " on the northern
boundary ; and one, to be furnished by the 4th
Brigade at M&manai, to ascend the Shin Kamar Pass
and block escape in a westerly direction.

Although the utmost secrecy was observed about

2i6 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

this enterprise, it may be surmised that news of it
was in some way conveyed to the Afridis, for after a
weary tramp of many miles, the Ali Musjid, Jamrud,
and Bara columns returned to camp without seeing
anything or any one. The Mamanai column did
not fare so well. It was commanded by Colonel
Seppings, Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry,
and consisted of Colonel Seppings own battalion,
200 rifles 36th Sikhs under Colonel Haughton, and
two guns of No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
The advance of this force was, as usual, hardly
opposed by the enemy ; but directly retirement
commenced they assumed a vigorous offensive, and
crowded to attack with great boldness.

Owing to a mistake in transmitting, or in receiv-
ing an order by Colonel Seppings, a company of
the 36th was prematurely withdrawn from a com-
manding knoll to the west of the pass. This
vantage-ground was instantly seized by the Afridis,
and as a part of the force with Colonel Haughton
was at this time still down the far side of the pass,

•

where it had been sent to explore some caves about
a mile below the crest, it was imperative to re-
occupy it. Two companies of the King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry attacked, therefore, at
once, gallantly led by Lieutenants Dowdall and
Walker, and driving the enemy back, established
a footing on the knoll, but only to find themselves
confronted by scores of tribesmen in a still stronger
position about 1 50 yards farther back, and against

SHIN KAMAR,

29'*' January 1898

A. 2 '/'"■' y.^-k L I B. / Co JB'^Sik.-, C. / Co York IJ.

O.EF.G H.K. PosilioBj ocrupieif ky Cumparties York I. I dwitg successive reiimments.

+ 3pBt where Its DoHdall and Walker fell.

+ + Spot nhere Col Haaghlon and it Turing fell

■X Crest of fhr Pass.

2i8 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

down. Even after Major Earles arrival the
fighting was desperate, and at such close quarters
that the officers repeatedly used their revolvers with
effect. But the Yorkshires in this trying situation
showed the utmost resolution and courage; and
though they had to abandon their dead, they
eventually brought away their wounded, and held
the savage foe successfully at bay until all had
been safely sent to the rear. Before they were
clear of the fatal pass many more casualties had
occurred, Lieutenant Hughes, Yorkshire Light
Infantry, being among the killed, and Major Earle»
Captain Marrable, and Lieutenant Hall, all of the
same regiment, wounded. The total casualties
were twenty-seven killed and thirty-two wounded,
a heavy list indeed.

Two miles out of the pass the column was met
by General Westmacott, with reinforcements from
camp ; and under cover of these troops Colonel
Sepping's exhausted force completed its homeward
march in safety.

The death of the brave Colonel Haughton in
this unfortunate affair, after he had successfully, and
with such credit and fame to himself, survived the
perils of the Samana fights in September, and the
desperate actions on the 9th and i6th November,
previously described, besides all the chances of an
arduous campaign, was an event most deeply and
universally lamented. His courage was conspicuous
always, and his coolness and judgment were never

XIV THE AFFAIR AT SHIN KAMAR 219

disturbed by the clash of arms and the scenes of
bloody strife by which he was so often surrounded.
His men, as brave as himself, simply idolised him,
and for years to come, Harton Sahib, as they
called him, will be a name to conjure with where
the 36th Sikhs are concerned.

An officer who was present writes to me —

All fought well. Haughton and Turing died like heroes.

Haughton, apparently, went forward with half-a-dozen men to see
what was going on on the left, and how he could best help the
Yorkshires. Turing followed with a couple of Sikhs. One of
these was killed by his side, and as men were dropping fast, and
the enemy getting quite close, Turing proposed a charge, but was
almost immediately shot dead. Haughton was himself using a
rifle at this time to keep the enemy in check. He evidently saw
it was no use, for turning to a Yorkshireman near him, he said,
** We will fire a few more shots, then charge, and die like men ! "
He fired five times, and then fell, shot through the head. A
better and a braver man never lived. Turing was a splendid little
fellow, and the loss of these two officers is a terrible blow to the
36 th.

There is no doubt the Yorkshires were in one of the tightest
comers in the campaign, and were very highly tried. But they
came out of it well They were kept together, and well handled
by their officers, and fought like men. The grim work was all
new to them, for they had only just come up to the front, and
none of them had been in a fight before. They must have a rare
lot of officers. The battalion is a better battalion now than it
was a week ago.

The Sikhs also did well, as usual. Young van Someren assumed
command when the others were killed, and kept his men steady
and well together. It was a great trial for him. His clothes
were torn by bullets.

There is little else to record. It was feared at
one time that this Shin Kamar affair would break off*

220 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

abruptly all negotiations for a peaceful settlement,
and necessitate perhaps a resumption of active
operations. But happily this has been avoided.
Throughout January, February, and March there
was outwardly little change in the attitude of the
Afridi clans, but by slow degrees they were realising
that they have been playing a losing game. The
blow to their prestige, the material losses they have
suffered, the hardships they and their people have
endured, and above all, the determination and
method and patience and judgment with which
the operations have been directed against them by
Sir William Lockhart : these have all been powerful
factors in convincing them that to prolong the
struggle was only to prolong their own misery, to
weaken themselves permanently, and to make their
punishment in the end severer, and their abase-
ment more complete.

Influenced, no doubt, by these considerations,
convinced of our determination and our power to
enforce our will, and dreading a second invasion in
the spring, one section after another has come in
and tendered its submission, and finally even the
Zakka-khels, the most truculent and redoubtable of
them all, have at last climbed down, and paid in the
fines and rifles demanded from them.

There can be no question that this happy result,
by which further bloodshed is avoided, is in the
main due to Sir William Lockhart's own personal
influence amongst these wild tribes on the border.

XIV THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 221

•

To many of their leading men he is known well ;
by all he is liked and respected. For years past he
has been a tower of strength on the frontier. His
patience, and judgment, and firmness in dealing
with these Afridis during these long and weary
weeks, since we emerged from the Bara Valley,
have not been less conspicuous than his energy and
decision while active operations were in progress.
And they knew him for a man of his word, and felt
that if he was compelled to strike again, he would
do it, and would strike hard.

Well, that necessity has been happily avoided,
and no more convincing evidence of Sir William
Lockhart s personal share and dominant influence
in achieving a peaceful end to the negotiations
could be cited, than the extraordinary fact that when
released at last from duty on the 5th April, and
about to start from Peshawar for England, to enjoy
a much-needed change and some well-earned repose,
crowds of Afridis, four or five hundred at least,
with Zakka-khels in numbers amongst them (mzra-
bile dictu /), surrounded his house, in cantonments,
wanted to hoist him on their shoulders, and drag
his carriage to the station, and finally sent him off
with shouts and cheers that made the welkin ring,
vowing that in future they would be the friends of
the English, and fight on their side! Surely no
campaign had ever such a remarkable ending ! !

1 cannot do better than close this narrative with
an extract from Sir William Lockhart s final De-

222 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897.98 chap.

spatch, and a copy of his farewell order to the
troops. He writes —

I wish to record my high appreciation of the conduct of
the British and Native troops serving with the Tirah Expedi-
tionary Force. Up to the present date (26th January) their
losses have amounted to 1050 killed and wounded. They have
been subjected to great hardship and exposure, harassed at
night by assaults at close quarters or by distant rifle fire, and
engaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. Their duties on
picquet and in guarding foraging parties have been particularly
onerous. Hardly a day or night has been passed without
casualties, and whether we advanced or retired, every soldier bad
to be constantly on the alert against enemies who made no stand
in the open, but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen.
The operations were carried out in a country which offered every
natural advantage to the tribesmen, and imposed on the regi-
mental officers, and the rank and file, the necessity for individual
initiative, unremitting watchfulness, and personal activity. I am
glad to say that the troops responded nobly to the call made upon
them. Cheerful and soldier-like under exceptionally trying cir-
cumstances, officers and men have upheld to the utmost the
traditions of their corps and the honour of Her Majesty's
Army.

The following was Sir William Lockhart's fare-
well order to the Force —

TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDERS BY GENE-
RAL SIR W. S. A. LOCKHART, K.CB., K.C.S.I.,
COMMANDING.

Camp Peshawar^ ^th April 1898.

Special Order,

On relinquishing the command of the Tirah Expeditionary
Force, which is about to be reduced to a single Division, I thank
all ranks for the work which, through their bravery and devotion,
has been successfully accomplished in the past six months.

XIV THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 223

From the beginning of October to the middle of January the
Force was engaged in active operations, and seldom have troops
been called upon to undergo greater fatigue, or to meet a more
vigilant and enterprising enemy. After long marches in cold and
wet, harassed by distant rifle-fire and by assaults at close quarters,
the columns bivouacked in positions which had to be protected by
numerous strong picquets posted on commanding heights, and
those picquets were always liable to determined attacks, and to
molestation in withdrawal. There was, in fact, little or no rest
for the force, the most carefully chosen camping-ground being
generally open to long-range fire from scattered individual marks-
men, armed with the most accurate weapons.

The boast of the tribes was that no foreign army, Moghal,
Afghan, Persian, or British had ever penetrated, or could ever
penetrate their country ; but, after carrying three strong positions,
and being for weeks subsequently engaged in daily skirmishes,
the troops succeeded in visiting every portion of Tirah, a fact
which will be kept alive in the minds of future generations by
ruined forts and towers in their remotest valleys.

In this recognition of the gallantry and devotion of all ranks,
British and Indian, I include the contingents sent by the Princes
and Chiefs of India, corps which have fought side by side with
the troops of the regular army, and have shared in the dangers
and hardships of the campaign.

For the past two and a half months the troops have been em-
ployed on the tedious duties of a blockade, and their discipline
during this period is deserving of high commendation.

I congratulate the soldiers under my command on the success-
ful result of the operations. In no previous campaign on the
North-West Frontier have the difficulties to be overcome been
more formidable ; in none has the punishment inflicted on the
tribesmen been more exemplary, or their submission more
complete.

W. S. A. LocKHART, General,
Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force.

CHAPTER XV

TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES

My narrative of the campaign in Tirah is ended,
but I venture, before dismissing the subject, to add
a few notes made during the progress of the opera-
tions, which may be useful to soldiers of all ranks
should they, on some future occasion, find them-
selves fighting on the north-west frontier of India.

The first essential fact to be recognised — one
which I think many of us did not fully appreciate
at the commencement of the campaign — is that the
tribes on the frontier (not all of them perhaps, but
the Afridis certainly) are now fairly well armed with
the Martini-Henry rifle. As to the means by which
they have become possessed of these arms of pre-
cision there has been much discussion, and there is
still much diversity of opinion. Some think they
are exported from Birmingham or Belgium, and
thence find their way via the Persian Gulf to the
I ndian frontier ; some imagine that they are obtained
from the Amir's workshops in Cabul ; and some be-
lieve that they are stolen in India, and sold for fancy

CH.xv TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 225

prices across the border. Probably from each of
these sources the supply is maintained ; but, whence-
soever they get them, it is certain that the Afridis
now possess Martinis in large numbers, and have
besides an apparently unlimited stock of ammunition.
They have, too, a good many Sniders, the bullets
of which inflict frightful shattering wounds ; and in
the recent operations they obtained forty or fifty
Lee-Metfords, and made uncommon good use of
them.

But not only have they got these arms of pre-
cision now in large numbers, and not only are they
thoroughly expert as marksmen, but also, it must be
borne in mind, that hundreds of them enlist in our
service, and when they take their discharge, and
return to their homes, carry with them all the ex-
perience and confidence of men who have been
carefully trained by British officers, and have
marched, and often fought side by side with our
own troops. I do not mean for a moment to imply
that familiarity has in this case bred contempt.
The truth is probably far otherwise. But these
men cannot have served in our ranks without
acquiring an insight into our military system and
methods,* which in the day of battle they are bound
to turn to useful advantage. I have previously said
that we met amongst them several old much be-
medalled pensioners, and it was a common thing

* One of oar best companies of Sappers and Miners is recruited from

Afridis.

226 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chaf.

to find our drill-books and musketry regulations —
Urdu editions — in their deserted houses !

It must also be remembered, when considering^
the conditions of fighting and the tactics to be
employed against these Afridis, that they are
mountaineers of the best type. Bred and bom
amongst steep and rugged hills, and dark and
dangerous ravines, inured to extremes of heat and
cold, and accustomed from childhood to carry arms
and to be on their guard against the wiles of the
treacherous kinsmen by whom they are surrounded,
it is small wonder that they are hardy, alert, self-
reliant, and active, full of resource, keen as hawks,
and cruel as leopards.

Further, it is to be noted that their country is»
like Caledonia, ''stern and wild": high mountains,
precipitous cliffs, dangerous defiles, wild ravines,
and rushing torrents everywhere ; while roads of
any kind are conspicuous by their absence — a
country, therefore, in which strict " formations " and
precise "manoeuvres," as we find them described
and defined in our drill-books, are impossible ; and
in which marches must be performed under condi-
tions in which they become slow, exhausting pro-
cessional movements, the long trailing flanks of
which are dangerously exposed to attack from start
to finish.

The difficulties and dangers and risks involved
in waging warfare against such a foe in such
a country are obvious. In former days when

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 227

expeditions have been launched against the tribes
on our frontier, we have found them for the most
part armed with jezails, and a few Sniders and
Enfields. The extreme effective range of the best
of these weapons was barely 1000 yards, so that if
the flanks of a marching column were protected by
detachments pushed out half a mile or so, the
column was fairly safe. But the Martini is effective
up to a mile, and the Lee-Metford up to two miles ^
particularly when the target is a mass of troops and
transport crowded into a river-bed, and covering
several miles of road. Consequently, flanking de-
tachments must be pushed out to right and left for
a full mile or more before safety can be assured.
Every march made in a country like Tirah is practi-
cally a march through a deflle from beginning to
end. The road followed is the bottom of the valley,
the river-bed. This valley is sometimes wider, some-
times narrower — generally narrower, and is com-
manded throughout by the hills on either side. It
may be imagined, then, what toils are involved to
the troops, what delays, and what risks in crowning
these successive heights during even a short march
of eight or nine miles.

Yet no advance can be made until the flanks are
thus made safe. The enemy, who know every inch
of the ground, occupy the summit of every com-
manding knoll with great skill, and invariably
intrench or sangar themselves. A company or two
is sent up the bare and rugged slopes to dislodge

228 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

them. It is bravely done, but not without incurring
casualties. The enemy retreat higher up the
mountain side. The lower spurs are now held by ovur
men. The column passes on, more positions in suc-
cession being captured in like manner as it advances,
by other detachments, from the advanced -guard.
At last, the rear -guard comes in sight, probably
hotly engaged with skirmishing bands, who are
following it boldly, eager for plunder, and anxious,
if possible, to secure a much-prized rifle or twot
The flanking detachments are now one after another
withdrawn, and join the rear-guard. It is durii^
this withdrawal that the greatest risks are run. The
watchers above swoop down at once. The ground
is all in favour of their guerilla tactics, and they
know every dip and break in it Two or three
soldiers are wounded. They cannot be left behind
to the tender mercy of the Afridi. They must be
carried. Four men are thus at once put out of
action to each man wounded ; and as many groups as
there are wounded men are immediately formed, to
become excellent targets to the pursuing enemy.

Let any one try to picture this scene to himself,
and he will have some faint idea of the stern reality,
of the pluck and devotion of the men, of the cool-
ness and judgment of the officers, and of the endur-
ance and hardihood of all, which enable them, not
once or twice, but repeatedly, and day after day, to
face such situations with resolution, and to emerge
from them with success.

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 229

Regiments new to this savage mountain warfare,
which have only practised drill-book methods of
attack and retirement, find themselves seriously
handicapped when brought suddenly face to face
with the conditions I have described. The drill-
book makes no allowance for wounded men who
must be picked up as they fall, and carried along by
their comrades ; nor does it presuppose a terrain in
which the activity of a goat is necessary for the
individual soldier, and in moving over which a com-
pany is certain to be broken up into almost as many
units as it hsts men. The drill -book, moreover,
apparently assumes a slow and dignified pursuit on
the part of the enemy, and accordingly directs that
" retirements should usually be performed in quick
time,'' and that " in moving from cover to cover an
upright position must be maintained " ! But the
drill-book was not written for frontier fighting. Yet
it is the guide for us all in India, as in England, and
if these are the only methods constantly practised on
cantonment parade-grounds, it must be impossible
to shake them off at a moment's notice, and it is
small wonder that across the border the attempt to
do so does not always lead to satisfactory results.

As a matter of fact, it was found in practice in
Tirah, that while in attack, an advance could not
be too deliberate, in order to prevent scattering and
exhaustion, and to give time for Echelons in support
to close up, and for out-flanking movements to be
developed, — the surest way of making an enemy

230 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

quit ; in retirement^ movements had frequently to
be made at a run^ otherwise the enemy would be
on the top of the retreating skirmishers before they
had made good their point.

The Pathan of the present generation seems quite
to have given up the practice of charging sword
in hand, for which he was once famous. As the
quantity and quality of their firearms have increased
the necessity for close combat has diminished. The
clansmen find it is now more easy, and much less
dangerous, to shoot you from behind a rock several
hundred yards away, than to rush in with a sword,
and try to slay you by cutting you down. Also,
the hill-man, despite his fierce nature and fanaticism,
has the bump of caution very highly developed, and
never takes risks that he can avoid. Consequently,
so long as even a few men, well-posted, are lying
down, and firing steadily at him, he is extremely shy
of coming on ; and it was the practice, therefore, with
those regiments who knew the business best, in a
retirement, to cover the withdrawal of companies by
selected men, who fired independently until their
company was established in its new position in rear,
and then rising all together after a final volley, raced
back to their support, and invariably got away safely
before the Afridis realised that they had gone.^

^ <* The 29th of December was a particularly hard day. We were the
rear-guard, and the enemy, apparently knowing it was their last chance at
us, followed us up very boldly. We have got very cunning by this time at
these rear-guard actions, and had only fifteen casualties (I believe there were
one or two in other regiments as well) as the result of being chased for several

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDINC NOTES 231

In attack, on the other hand, great deliberation was
enjoined. Officers were directed not to lead too
quickly, but to regulate the pace by the difficulties
of the ground and the condition of their men, the
great object being to maintain a steady advance
without getting scattered or unduly separated from
supports. All "attack formations," as laid down in
the drill-book, are, of course, entirely inapplicable to
hill-fighting. To attack a position on a mountain
top an extended line of skirmishers used to lead the
way, an officer always with them, and each company
followed its own skirmishing section, itself not
extended, but with files well opened out. Other
companies followed closely in support, and generally
more or less in Echelon. Great depth in attack was
not considered necessary, as it is in civilised warfare,

hours by the Zakka. That does not soand dignified, but it is exactly what
happened. The way we have found most paying to conduct these retirements
is as follows : — The rear-guard is formed in successive lines, one behind the
other, each on the most suitable bit of ground possible, generally the crest
line of a ridge. When the moment to retire begins the line nearest the
enemy doubles straight down as fast as it can past the other lines and takes
up a position behind the rearmost one. The line inunediately behind the
retiring line covers the movement by its fire. These beggars move so fiut
over this country that the only practical method is, when once a retire-
ment is begun, for the retiring men to run like hares, otherwise one gets
caught in the undesirable position of having one's back to the enemy. The
time when things begin to be serious is when one or two are hit between the
time of leaving a position and reaching the next line. For many reasons it is
impossible to leave dead or wounded men behind, as would be done in
European warfare, and a retirement through this country, which is quite
difficult enough for an active man to get over unhampered, is, when there are
several wounded men to be helped along, not all joy. This has been
pretty nearly the only sort of fighting we have bad ever since the Sampagha
was taken, and we none of us love it ; the chances are very one-sided, and the
enemy know this just as well as we da" — Extract frmn a ktttrfram am
OgUer in thi Dtrbyskin Htgimint.

232 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

but the importance of an enveloping attack was
not to be over-estimated. Directly the tribesmen
thought there was the slightest danger to their flank
or line of retreat, they were off,

As a general rule the Afridis never await a
charge, but if ever a position is stubbornly held,
and must be carried by assault, there is no doubt
that the whole of the troops in the front line should
charge together, their supports following close. To
send them forward in detachments or driblets is
disastrous. This was fully exemplified at Dargai
on the 20th October. Up to the time the Gordons
arrived no attempt to cross the decisive zone had
been made by any body of troops larger than a
company at a time. These detachments suffered
such terrible losses in crossing the fire-swept space
that they pulled up at the next cover they reached.
When the Gordons charged, they sallied out, with
the 3rd Sikhs in close support, practically all in one
mass. That ended the affair. The enemy saw
they were not to be denied, and they evacuated
the position in which for several hours they had
defied a whole brigade.

Dargai was the only instance in which the
Afridis made a resolute stand against a serious
attack. Their losses on that occasion were probably
more heavy than we supposed at the time, and
taking the lesson to heart, they did not again during
the campaign attempt to meet us in the field, or to
defend, with any appearance of being in earnest,

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 233

even such strong positions as the Sampagha and
Arhanga Passes, or the heights of Saran Sar. But
one must beware against being lulled into any false
sense of superiority or security by the small resist-
ance offered to an advance, or by the ease and
trifling loss with which such immensely strong
positions are won. The tribesmen's tactics are not
dictated by timidity. They do not know what fear
means. But they have plenty of common sense,
and conscious that they cannot stop us if we really
mean to come on, they quietly fall back as we
advance, and patiently await their turn, which they
know will come as soon as we begin to retire.

That instant they assume the offensive. Where
only three or four men have been seen before, they
now appear in dozens. The rapidity of their move-
ments now is quite extraordinary ; and their marks-
manship and the skill with which they skirmish
from rock to rock, availing themselves of every
feature of ground, and constantly threatening to
work round the flanks, are marvellous. To retire
successfully before such an enemy requires great
coolness and judgment. If there is any mistake
made, or any sign of hesitation or wavering, it is
instantly taken advant^e of, and in a moment,
where all was going well the minute before, disaster
may ensue.

So much moral elation pertains to the r6le of
assailant, and so much depression to that of the
soldier who has constantly to defend himself against

234 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

attack, that, with all Orientals, whether dwellers in
the hills or plains, it is most necessary to assume a
vigorous offensive whenever opportunity offers, and
whatever are the odds. In a great standing camp,
however, such as we had for some weeks in Tirah,
it was unavoidable that we should constantly afford
the Afridis the opportunity of attacking, while we
were compelled to assume a defensive r6le. Because,
every day our foraging parties, strongly escorted by
never less than a brigade, with artillery, had to go
far a-field to collect fodder and supplies, returning
to camp by sunset ; and on these occasions they
were invariably followed up by the enemy, who
were, no doubt, as invariably beaten off. Still for
the time being they attacked while we defended,
and hardly a day passed without a few casualties
being sustained in this most trying kind of warfare.
One point that must strike every one where hill
fighting is in question, whether attack or defence,
is the great difficulty of exercising superior control
or supervision. A General may have half a
dozen gallopers at his disposal, but on such ground
they are useless. Messages must be carried by
men on foot, and that takes a long time. Some-
times, but not always, they can be signalled. The
difficulty, therefore, in transmitting orders is extreme,
and the delay in getting them executed, or in learn-
ing what is happening, is often serious enough to
make a commander desperately anxious. It is most
necessary, therefore, for every officer to know

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 235

beforehand what is the "general idea," so that even
when isolated, and without orders, he may intelli-
gently co-operate. In no other kind of warfare
will company and section commanders find such
unlimited scope for the exercise of individual
initiative and control ; and much or everything
may depend upon the judgment and decision which
they display at critical moments.

The safety of camps and bivouacs by night is a
subject on which a few words may be usefully said.
Here, too, the drill -book, admirable as are its
maxims, was not of much help to us ; and here, too,
the fact that the Afridis now possess long-ranging
arms of precision compelled the posting of picquets
outside the camp at distances far exceeding anything
found necessary in previous expeditions. One
great source of annoyance and loss to the troops in
Tirah was the firing into camp by night, vulgarly
known as " sniping " ; and the only way to stop it
was to hold all surrounding commanding points,
within a range of 1500 yards to a mile, by strong
picquets. Even then, on dark nights, prowling
marauders would get in between the picquets and
the camp, and make it extremely unpleasant for us
while their ammunition lasted ; or until, in their
turn, they were stalked and ejected by the Scouts,
of whom I shall speak presently.

But as regards the picquets themselves, it may
be noted that their strength was always such that
they were independent of support, which, indeed,

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 245

71 it was as 5 to I. The wounds were inflicted by
all sorts of rifles, Lee-Metfords, Martinis, Sniders,
and sporting rifles, those by the Snider being the
most terrible of all.

One noticeable feature of the medical arrange-
ments which should be recorded was the use for
the first time in the field (in India, at all events) of
Rontgen rays. They were found of the greatest
value in locating bullets and splinters of lead. The
apparatus was brought out (entirely at his own
expense) and worked by Surgeon -Major Beevor,
A. M.S., to whom all the credit of the innovation is
due.

Numerous medical officers obtained a well-
deserved mention in Despatches, in which also the
subjoined passages occurred : —

The officers of the Army Medical Staff, and of the Indian
Medical Service, have fully maintained their high reputation by
their attention to the sick and wounded, both under fire and in
hospital. The hospital arrangements were generally excellent,
but I consider that the field equipment is too heavy and elaborate
for mountain warfare, and that it might be materially reduced
without hardship to the patients. The conspicuous colour of the
canvas doolies is very objectionable, as it attracts the enemy's fire.

Surgeon-Major-General G. Thomson, C.B., I. M.S., has been
my Principal Medical Officer in the field, and I desire to express
my indebtedness to him, and to the other officers of the depart-
ment of which he has been in charge, for the high state of
efficiency in which it has been maintained, often under very
unfavourable conditions.

The P.M.O. speaks in high terms of his Secretary, Surgeon-
Major W. A. Morris, A.M.S.

The Commander-in-Chief in India, in submitting

236 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap,

on a dark night, and over ground which was a net-
work of precipices and ravines, it would have been
impossible to send to them. For the same reason
the picquets were always instructed to fight where
they stood, and never under any circumstances to
attempt to fall back on the camp. The positions
occupied by them were generally held by the enemy
when we marched on to the ground. These posi-
tions were at once attacked and captured. Half a
company, or a whole company, was then left as a
picquet to hold each of them, or as many of them
as were considered necessary, and the rest of the
troops were at once withdrawn. The picquets then
promptly intrenched themselves strongly, and placed
such obstacles round their posts as they could
improvise. They quite understood that they had
only their own watchfulness and efforts to depend
upon to see them safely through the night. They
were often fiercely attacked, but they always held
their ground successfully, and generally with very
few casualties, and there was no instance during the
campaign of a picquet being overpowered. Their
sentries were always placed inside the intrenchment.
The rest of the men slept on their alarm-posts.
Patrolling of any kind in the night was, of course,
entirely out of the question, and was never attempted.
I have more than once in the course of this
narrative referred to the splendid services of the
Artillery. We had six Mountain Batteries with us,
and the way in which they were handled, the pre-

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 237

cision of their fire, and the wonderful effect of it,
were the admiration of all onlookers. At Dargai
on the 1 8th and 20th October, and at the attacks
on the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, the batteries
were massed, and their fire concentrated, with
marked effect. But, speaking generally, and remem-
bering that these guns can follow infantry over almost
any ground, greater effect can usually be obtained
by dispersion of the guns, and by splitting up even
a single battery to work by sections. An officer of
great experience with mountain artillery writes to
me as follows : —

My idea is to push on a couple of guns, with the inOantry,
to every height and ridge which they occupy, under cover of the
fire of those in rear, and then to push the rear-guns on in tum
(by sections), spreading them over the whole line of advance,
and so firing on the sangars from many directions instead of
directly from one only. In country such as we have been fight-
ing in, I never work my six guns together if I can help it. By
splitting them up good positions are more readily obtained, the
guns afford a smaller mark to the enemy, they can be more easily
and rapidly pushed forward, or withdrawn, under cover of each
other's fire, and their converging fire from different directions is,
I feel sure, more effective against a strong position than the con-
centrated fire of double the number of pieces firing directly from
one spot

In advanced-guard work two guns can always be safely kept
with the most advanced infantry, and in rear-guard affairs with
the most hotly pressed. But in either case, a whole battery is
too big a unit to be worked thus in the fighting line in hill war-
fare, for it takes too long to advance, or retire '% as a whole,

I am a firm believer in our present gun, the 2.5-inch, for
mountain battery work, provided the gun is new, and not old or
worn out I have seen it now in Bunnah, HazSra (1891),

238 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

Samana (1891), Chitral (1895), ^^^ ^^ Tirah, and have been
with my present battery for ten years, so can speak with some
little confidence of its merits. The gun shoots as straight as a
die up to all useful ranges, and never gets out of order if new at
the commencement of a campaign. It stands any amount of
knocking about, and throughout the Chitral and Tirah ex-
peditions my artificers seldom had to put a hand to gun or
carriage.

I cannot help asking why every one is full of its praises
during an expedition ; and why, as soon as it is over, do they
set to work to abuse it in the papers or elsewhere ? They say
it can't knock down sangars. They started saying this after the
Malakhand in 1895. But the sangers there were enormous
natural boulders which a 40 -pounder could not have moved !
Personally, I never try to demolish sangers. I try to kill the
men inside them, and it is on record that we did this with some
success at the Malakhand. On the 14th September 1897 we
brought down the Tsalai tower with two percussion shrapnel,
and sent the stones of the Saragheri sangars flying high in the
air. Firing at houses in Maidan and Bagh, our shells would go
through the walls, and burst inside, which is exactly what is
wanted; and on two occasions we set buildings ablaze by our
fire.

These are some of my reasons for my faith in the gun. I
have no belief in the outcry for a howitzer. If we get both in
the same battery, the Lord help us !

Lastly, why are we constantly kept to roads, and then
pitched into for taking up so much room? and offered many
useless and impossible suggestions for reducing the number of
our mules? We claim that we can go wherever an infantry
soldier can, so long as he does not go on his hands and knees.
Many Generals and Staff Officers do not realise this, and so we
lose many chances.

One last word : there is one first principle which wants to
be widely known and strictly observed by all, but more especi-
ally by Staff Officers. It is this : Dorit speak to the CO. of a
battery when his guns are in action^ any more than you would
speak to the man at the wheeL They all do it ! and I had to

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 239

explain firmly to one man who assailed me with suggestions,
that with only four guns I really could not fire at more than six
different objects at one and the same time !

The Gurkha Scouts have been so often men-
tioned, and have been so much in evidence, during
the campaign in Tirah, that a few remarks on their
organisation and work will be appreciated. They
included a body of about 120 picked men of the
3rd and 5th Gurkha Regiments, under Captain
Lucas of the 5 th Gurkhas ; and Lieutenants, the
Honourable C. G. Bruce, 5th Gurkhas, and A. B.
Tillard, 3rd Gurkhas, specially trained to work on
the steepest hill-sides, and selected for their wiry
physique, fleetness of foot, and skill as marksmen.
Their careful preparation in peace-time had made
them hardy, active, intelligent, self-reliant, and
resolute, and throughout the expedition, under
the bold leading of their officers, they were con-
spicuous by their dash and daring, both in attack
and defence.

The Scouts wore the uniform of their regiments,
and their equipment differed in no respect from that
of the regular soldier, except when engaged in night
affairs, when they sallied out by themselves to try
and stalk, and cut off "snipers," who were harass-
ing the camp— a feat which more than once they
successfully accomplished. On these occasions they
went barefooted, wore plain clothes, and took with
them just their rifles and bayonets, a few rounds of
ammunition, and, of course, their knives — the well-

^^^^^^B^^^^^B__»^\__r^^^l

IPI^I

,^..,.w,...,.„-....,.~..-...^.-..w..

240 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap,

known kukri, without which the Gurkha never stirs
from his bivouac.

That the special services of these Scouts were
appreciated may be inferred from the fact, that at
the close of the first phase of the campaign their
numbers were increased to 500 men and six officers,
at Sir William Lockhart's particular recommenda-
tion.^

At the same time, as the special duties on which
they were employed were precisely those which in
the Peninsular days could have been undertaken by
the " Light Companies y' which were then kept up in
every regiment, and to which it was an honourable
distinction to be posted, the question arises whether
it would not be a sound thing once more to introduce
the " light company " into every battalion, and dis-
pense with Scouts. Of course, in these days, one
company is theoretically " as good as another, if not
better," and all are supposed to be equally trained to
the highest pitch of perfection. But the experience
gained with these Scouts shows that specially selected
men, under specially selected officers, can, under
special conditions — the harder the conditions the
stronger the argument — "go one better" than the
average line company, in which the physique of the
men — to deal with one point only — is not equal all

1 " During the present expedition the Scouts drawn from the 3rd and 5th
Giirkhas have proved especially valuable. Being trained mountaineers and
accustomed to guerilla warfare, they were able to climb the most predpitoas
hills, lie in ambush at night, and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics." —
Sir fVm, Lockharfs Despatches,

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 241

through. And the spirit of emulation is now so
much abroad, and is such a powerful incentive in the
Struggle for distinction, that it seems worth con-
sidering whether immense good might not be done,
and the fighting power of every battalion substan-
tially increased, by reviving in each the old Light
Company, posting to it only picked men and officers,
training them highly and specially, and in return
granting them some small distinctions and privileges
in time of peace, and posts of honour and danger in
time of war.

I think many practical soldiers would like to see
this idea taken up.

Amid the clash of arms, the hum of camps, the
commotion of marches, and the turmoil of retreats,
the great Military- Medical Services, British and
Indian, are apt to receive scant notice from a
chronicler of events, whose attention (naturally,
perhaps) is directed rather to the narrative of
stirring deeds in the field than to descriptions of
the earnest, patient, self-denying work of those
whose business it is to bind up wounds and tend
the sick. But where so many pages have been
devoted to telling the story of the fighting in Tirah,
and of the pluck and endurance of the troops in
many situations, it is only in accordance with the
fitness of things that some reference should also be
made to the Medical Department during this arduous
campaign, whose work, if it has not been so much

242 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

in evidence, or so much noised abroad, as have the
stories of frays and forays, and "deeds of derring-
do " of the soldiery, has at least entailed on those
engaged in it as much toil and exposure, and has been
performed with as much zeal and devotion to duty.

Few people, probably, outside the Department,
have any conception of the strain and responsibility
devolved on the Medical Services, not merely during
the continuance and stress of active operations, but
also in the preparations necessary before an army is
ready to take the field. Here figures may be of
use to help the imagination. Twenty-three field
hospitals altogether were mobilised for service in
Tirah. Each of these could accommodate 100
sick men, and was fully equipped with supplies
and comforts for three months. In addition, base
hospitals were formed at Rawal Pindi, Nowshera,
and Kohat, in which beds were provided for
upwards of 3000 men. These figures will give
some idea of the scale of the organisation. But the
wild, roadless country in which the operations were
conducted enormously increased the difficulties with
which the Department had to contend in making
arrangements for the care and treatment and trans-
port of the wounded and sick. From Bagh in Tirah
to the advanced base at Shinauri is about thirty-
five miles by a track traversable only by mules and
ponies, or on foot. For these thirty-five miles those
who were too ill or too weak to ride, and there
were hundreds such, had to be carried in doolies

XV TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES 243

(palanquins) and stretchers, and strongly escorted
all the way, for the road throughout was in hostile
territory, except the last few miles.

From Shinauri wheeled ambulances were avail-
able for seventy-five miles, until the railway was
reached at Khusalgarh, whence it was a run of
eighty miles to Rawal Pindi.

It may easily be believed that the work of carry-
ing the wounded, and transporting them to the base
hospitals, was a very real difficulty. The dooly at
any time is heavy, cumbrous, and awkward to carry,
even on level ground, and when the bearers are
trained carriers. But when the roads are steep,
stony, and narrow, and crowded with transport and
troops, and when the bearers are wretched untrained
coolies, caught up from the nearest bazaars, and
pressed into an unwilling service — then it may be
imagined what delays and accidents ensue, and what
terrible sufferings must often be endured by the
wounded from the jolts, and jars, and drops, that
they get en route. When an enemy is near, and
bullets are whistling around, the doolies, with their
pale-green flapping canvas covers, form a con-
spicuous target, and are often hit ; the panic-stricken
bearers are always ready to drop them, and fly, if
they can ; and it frequently happened that the
wounded, abandoned by the regular carriers, had to
be carried by their own comrades. One would much
like to see the dooly extinguished, but it has been
the feature of our ambulance system in India for the

R 2

244 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap.

last hundred years, and no one seems to be able to
suggest an efficient substitute for it.

But if the dooly bearers were bad, the riding and
baggage ponies supplied to the hospitals were
worse. These are matters for which the Medical
Department is not responsible. They take what is
given them, and have no choice ; and as the strain
on the Commissariat Transport was extraordinary
at this time — so many expeditions being on hand
simultaneously — the animals supplied to the Field
Hospitals in Tirah were of the most wretched
description, and were directly the cause of not a
little of the delays and losses incurred in marching
down the Bara Valley, as rear-guards and escorts
were constantly stopped either to help animals that
had fallen and thrown their loads, or to give them
time to get along.

Complete reorganisation of the present system
of providing ambulance seems an imperative
necessity.

923 wounded men were treated in the Field
Hospitals in Tirah.^ Of these the Gordons con-
tributed 70, the Dorsets 80, the K.O.S.Bs. 34, the
Northamptons 55, the Derbys 35, the Yorks 42,
the 3rd Sikhs 28, the 15th Sikhs 48, the 36th Sikhs
72, the 2nd Gurkhas 66, and the 3rd Gurkhas 40.
These were the principal figures. Other corps made
up the balance. The proportion of wounded to
killed was as 3 to i. With the Germans in 1870-

^ Up to the middle of January 1898.

246 THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98 chap, xv

these Despatches to the Government of India,
wrote : —

The administration of the Military-Medical Service has been
successfully and satisfactorily carried on during the same period
by Surgeon-Major-General A. A. Gore, P.M.O., H.M.'s Forces in
India, through whose efforts, and the ready co-operation of officers
and subordinates, the Department has, at a time of pressing emer-
gency, been able to comply with the heavy demands made
upon it.

The extent of these demands may be best realised from the
statement that it was considered necessary to provide hospital
accommodation for 1 2 per cent of troops and followers. On this
basis 6526 beds were made available, including 36^^ field
hospitals. The accuracy of this forecast may be gauged from the
fact that on the 20th December 1897 the number of sick in
hospital, then at its highest, was 11.16 per cent of the force.
The results obtained in the treatment of the sick, and espedaliy
in surgical cases of wounds, have been most satisfactory.

1 Twenty-three of these for Tirah ; the remainder for other expeditions.

APPENDIX

The subjoined summary of casualties incurred during
the Tirah Expedition will be of interest.

From the \ith October 1897 to the 6th Apfil 1898

Killed, all ranks . . . . . .287

Wounded . . . . . '853

Missing ........ 10

Total . . .1150

British Officers

Killed: as per list A ...... 23

Wounded: as per list B . . .56

Native Officers
Killed, 4 ; wounded, 1 6

LIST A

TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Nominal Roll of British Officers Killed during thb ExPBDinoif

Rank.

Names.

Corps.

Dttft.

Major .

R. D. Jennings-Bramly .

Gordon Highlanden

i iSth Oct 1897

Captain

W. E. C. Smith .

Derbyshire Regt.

. 20th „

Lieutenant .

A. Lamont .

Gordon Highlanden

^ 11 tf

Captain

C. B. Judge .

2nd Gurkhas .

f> »>

»»

F. R. M*Butts

No. 5 (Bom.) M.B.

29th „

Lieutenant .

C. L. C.iffard

Northampton Regt.

6th Nov. 1897

Captain

E. Y. Watson

D.A. Com.-Genl. .

8th ,;

Lieutenant .

J. T. Waddcll

Northampton Regt.

9th

2nd Lieut. .

A. H. Macintire

>> >»

Lieutenant .

G. D. Crooke

Attached to
Dorsets

Suffolk Regt.

i6th „

)»

R. E. A. Hales .

East York Regt.

»* »>

»i

G. M. Wylie

' I /2nd Gurkhas

» »•

• »

N. A. I-,ewarne

1 15th Sikhs .

>> »•

>»

D. E. O. Jones

Yorkshire Regt.

22nd „

»»

R. M. Battye

' 6th Bengal Cavalry ,

1st Dec. 1897

G.W. M. West

i i/3rd Gurkhas

13th

»♦

C. R. Tonge .

' Royal Engineers

. 28th „

Major

D. W. Hickman

34th Pioneers.

3rd Jan. 1898

Lieutenant .

M. R. Walker

York Lt. Infantry

■ 29th „

T. P. Dowdall

»t f»

2nd Lieut. .

E. S. G. Hughes

t$ u

Lieut. -Col. .

J. Haughton .

36th Sikhs .

»> 99

Lieutenant .

A. H. Turing

»i

»» ft

LIST B

TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Nominal Roll of British Officers Wounded during the Expedition

Rank.

Lieutenant

Captain
2nd Lieut.
Captain

»>
Lieutenant

Major .

Lieutenant

LieuL-Col.

Captain

Lieutenant

Captain
Lieutenant
Lieut. -Col.

»»
Major .

Captain

Lieutenant

Captain

f I

Lieutenant

2n(l Lieut,
(."aptain
Major .
Captain
Lieutenant
Lieut. -Col.

Names.

^L L. Pears .

D. R. Sladen
T. H. Keycs.
W. R. Arnold
J. G. Robinson
(;. E. White .

F. Macbean .
K. Dingwall .

II. H. Mathias, C.
H. P. Uniacke
M. F. Meiklejohn

G. S. G. Crauford

F. F. Badcock, D.

G. D. Crocker
R. C. Hadow
C. A. P. Sage

R. Ilanford-Flood
C. T. A. Searle

E. G. Caffin .
T. G. MacLaren
E. L. Sullivan
O. P. S. Ingham
.'\. A. Mercer

G. A. Trent .
G. E. G. Cameron
W. D. Wright
J. H. Ik)wman
G. A. Money
11. L. Custancc
R. G. Munn .
II. A. Abbott

S.O.

Corps.

Scottish Rifles

(attached to (tordon
Highlander>)

K. O. Scot. Borderers

Dorsetshire Regt. .
I /2nd Gurkhas
3rd Sikhs
Gordon Highlanders

>t
i»
If

(Staff) i/5th Gurkhas
Slunstcr Fusiliers
1 5th Sikhs
2/ 1st Gurkhas
West Surrey Regt.
36th Sikhs
Yorkshire Regt.
K. O. Scot. Borderers
36th Sikhs .
Dorsetshire Regt.

Northampton Regt.
(jordon Highlanders
West Surrey Regt.
Derbyshire Regt.
iSth Bengal Lancers
36th Sikhs .

»i

ISth Sikhs

Date.

1 8th Oct. 1897

)f
20th

It
f>
It
I)
II
II
II
II

25th

II
26th

28th
29th
31st
1st Nov.

6th
9th
ti
tt
loth

nth
13th

1 6th
If
II

1897

250

THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH, 1897-98

LIST ^^Continued

Rank.

Names.

Corps.

Date.

2nd Lieut. .

0. C. S. WaUon .

Yorkshire Rcgt.

22Qd Nov. 1897

Captain

W. E. Venour

5th Punj. Infantry .
(attached to 36th Sikhs)

24th

f»

Lieutenant .

B. C. W. WiUiams

Yorkshire Regt

29th

•>

f »

F. 0. Wyatt .

lx.A,« ■ • .

»»

f»

»f

W. H. Pennington

6th Bengal Cavalry .

1st Dec. 1897 1

W. D. ViUiersStuart .

i/5th Gurkhas

Major .

E. Vansittart

•

i» •

Lieutenant .

R. Fowke .

Dorsetshire Regt. .

loth

Captain

C. E. None .

I /2nd Gurkhas

nth

Lieutenant .

W. de L. Williams

Assistant Transport

Officer

Captain

A. Bateman-Champain .

I /3rd Gurkhas

13th

f»

F. de Sausmarez-Shortt .

Scots Fusiliers

Lieutenant .

S. de V. A. Julius .

Sussex R^t .

27th

Lieut. -Col. .

F. Plowden .

Oxford Lt. Infantry

30th

Captain

C. Parr

>»

Lieutenant .

R. Owen

»»

•1

»» •

H. D. Hammond .

K. n.iv. . • .

1st Jan. 1898 1

{since

dead)

Captain

F. G. Bond .

H. £<. ...

Major .

H. Earle, D.S.O. .

York Lt. Infantry .

29th

Captain

A. G. Marrable

2nd Lieut. .

G. C. W. G. Hall .

i»

f »

D. S. Browne

36th Sikhs .

31st

Surg. -Lieut.

M. Dick

»»

2nd Lieut .

H. J. de la Condaminc .

D. of C. Lt. Infantry

nth Mar. 1898 |

Captain

E. W. Margesson .

Norfolk Regt.

26th

THE END

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Full text of "The campaign in Tirah, 1897-1898; an account of the expedition against the Orakzais and Afridis under General Sir William Lockhart, based (by permission) on letters contributed to ʻThe Timesʼ"

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